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Introduction 
 
 
Every complex form of human society confronts the problem of what makes state power 
rightful or legitimate, the question of whether and why holders of state power have the 
authority to command and enforce the obedience of those subject to it and why the latter in 
turn have a corresponding obligation to obey. The problem of legitimacy of state power 
assumes significance once the origin and exercise of the order of domination of the state has 
been substantially challenged or  has been widely experienced as oppressive and unjust. 
 
When the order of domination of the state is widely experienced as oppressive and unjust, 
people may obey the command of political authority from pre-moral motives such as fear, 
desire, custom or mere attachment to a ruler. However, an order of domination is not likely to 
be stable over time unless those subject to it recognise that when holders of state power claim 
the right to command, the claim is a legitimate one, that is, that it takes place in the context of 
values. Therefore, for an order of domination to be stable over time, the content of command 
must be based on valid norms that rulers share with the ruled and are justifiable to the latter. 
 
These norms prescribe the terms which are important for establishing and maintaining the 
order of domination, for defining the appropriate relationship between the state and its 
citizens and limiting state power by way of guaranteeing the basic rights of its citizens and 
providing for the separation of powers. Thus, the fundamental problem of the political order 
of domination of requires us to consider these terms in answering the question of whether and 
why power is rightful. But the problem is more salient and more pervasive in modern society.  
 
In order for us to better understand the problem of political order of the modern state as it 
presents itself today, we will first look at the historical development of the modern state in 
order to uncover the metaphysical foundation of values and beliefs that hold the state together, 
before turning to a discussion of the justification of the state to rule in terms of its purpose. 
 
To start with, we wish to state that the problem of the order of domination of the state could 
not have arisen in the ancient Greek times of the polis or city-state. For the city-state was 
experienced then as a natural cosmic order in which the citizen was situated, provided with a 
station and a purpose. In this community, the citizen had rights and obligations; but these 
rights were not attributes of a private personality and these obligations were not enforced by a 
state dedicated to the maintenance of a framework to protect the private ends of its citizens.  
 
Rather, a citizen’s rights in the Greek polis or city-state belonged to his station; his 
obligations flowed from the need to realise his own purpose in line with his station;1 and so, 
the obligation to obey authority was never in doubt in ancient times. In addition to this, the 
Greek city-state came into being for the sake of life. But once it existed, the city-state had as 
its purpose the good life. The good life, that is to say, the sum of all approved common 
purposes of religion, morals and art, as well as internal order and defence were all regarded as 
the function of the ancient city-state. In this sense, the city-state was not a state in the modern 
sense, which leaves much of the good life of citizens to social agencies and individuals. 
 
In view of the foregoing, the natural starting point for a discussion of the basic problem of the 
political order of domination of the state we consider is not the Greek city-state but, the 
                                                 
1 George Sabine, A History of Political Theory, 4th ed., Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1987, p. 31. 
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impersonal Roman state of republican times. The Roman state was conceived in terms of law 
that recognises the rights of all human beings and exists for the public good. Hence, political 
authorities were to be obeyed because they exercised certain offices that were conceived of as 
having been created for the public good, not for the person who exercised the office. 
 
Law not only formed the basis of the Roman state, whose revival in Renaissance Italy was 
central to the development of the modern state, as we know it today. It also supported the 
growth of the Roman Empire. As Roman political power and wealth grew, Roman customary 
law developed into the ius gentium or law of peoples based on practical universal principles of 
good business practice regarded as honest and fair that governed economic and political 
relations between Romans and non-Romans within the expanding Roman Empire. 
 
However, the expansion of the Roman Empire was followed by several centuries of eventual 
stagnation and paralysis. Lacking a steady supply of slaves and tribute from newly conquered 
peoples, it could not pay for its vast army, large bureaucracy and extensive public works. 
Hard measures were undertaken to meet increased costs that included an increase in taxes and 
the use of force to extract them which created extreme conditions of poverty of many people. 
 
As the unmanageability of the immense, far-flung imperial territory and harsh methods taken 
to counter it created extreme conditions, the Romans begun to turn away from the official 
paganism or belief in many gods. Seeking relief from economic misery, the impoverished 
masses turned mostly to Christianity because of its clear ideology that emphasized, among 
other things, the equality of all humans in the sight of God and the concern for the poor. 
 
Initially the state allowed people to follow Christianity provided they still formally recognized 
pagan Roman gods, fearing that failure to do so would negatively affect their loyalty to the 
Roman Emperor, seen as the representative of the people to the gods. But when Christians 
refused to formally recognise pagan gods, they were seen as the enemies of the state. The 
Christian belief in the universality of one God and its idea that all people everywhere were 
equal in the eyes of God represented loyalty and obligation ultimately to God.  
 
Christianity insisted on retaining a religious identity separate from the secular rulers of Rome. 
Therefore, the persecution of Christians followed because of the fear of the Romans rulers for 
those who refused to worship the pagan gods and thus recognise their loyalty to the Roman 
rulers seen as their representatives to the pagan gods and instead worshiped a non-nationalist 
and higher divinity to which they became ultimately loyal and had an obligation. 
 
However, despite, and perhaps because of, the persecutions the number of Christians 
increased. The stature of the church also increased when successive Roman Emperors 
embraced and declared Christianity official and outlawed paganism. Hence, with the 
disintegration of the Roman Empire, the Christian church which had before rarely been a 
factor in politics filled the void left by the Roman Empire as a form of organized rule that did 
not recognise the territorial boundaries to its authority over its community of believers. 
 
The fall of the Western Roman Empire in the 5th century changed the configuration of Europe 
as the invasions by semi-nomadic Germanic tribes from the Baltic region separated the 
western Roman Empire from the rest of the Mediterranean where the Eastern Roman Empire 
(Byzantine Empire) survived another one thousand years. The Germanic kingdoms and 
chieftains that followed the Roman Empire were themselves fragmented into semi-
autonomous political-military units that bore little resemblance to the modern state. 
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The Germanic kingdoms and chieftains were ruled by kings or chieftains chosen by the still-
living chieftain and confirmed through the act of acclamation by an assembly of leading 
warriors of the tribe. Thus loyalty was based on persons, which meant that followers were 
loyal only to a certain king or chieftain from a certain clan. Politics and power did not operate 
according to the same logic in Germanic tribes as it did in the Roman Empire that was based 
on loyalty to impersonal laws that guided the exercise of the power of the state. 
 
The barbarian kingdoms had no formal political organization, no specialized administrative 
departments, no civil service and no standing army, as did the Roman Empire. Governance 
was handled by the king’s household, which was not a problem when the kingdoms were 
small. But as they grew larger, kingdoms were broken up into subunits of counties governed 
by representatives of the king, counts, who ruled the counties independently as they were 
better able to mobilise military resources than the king and defend themselves turning 
counties into personal property which also saw the rise of dominant families in counties. 
 
The strong monarchy of early Germanic kingdoms fragmented into semi-autonomous political 
military units which came to be treated as private domains of those whom the king had 
appointed to indirectly administer them. In other words, royal power across Europe 
decomposed into feudalism which was a system of personal and cliental relationships of lord 
and vassals introduced to legitimise the modern state by contrasting conditions of the two. 
 
The practices of the feudal epoch did not constitute a “state” in any formal sense. Feudal 
governance lacked key features of a state such as permanent structures for decision-making, a 
standing army or an extensive administration that operated according to codified law. Most 
important though, people were personally loyal to counts and kings. Their identity as human 
beings was not bound up with a secular political order to which all belonged. 
 
Feudalism as a social world of “overlapping and divided authority” was a pyramidal structure 
with the king at the top of the pyramid as the sovereign or overlord of the entire kingdom and 
princes and knights below him as vassals who were bound to the king by the oath of loyalty to 
offer him military service in return for protection and the use of land - a fief – loaned to him. 
Vassals also had to provide the king with advice on, say, whether or not to go to war. 
 
The king prevailed as conqueror, tribute-maker and rentier and not as head of state. He was 
sovereign only as primus inter pares “first among equals”, and therefore his authority was 
limited by the clearly recognized rights and privileges of the three estates of the clergy, the 
nobility and the bourgeoisie who provided the king with advice on, say, whether or not to go 
to war and had to consent to the request of the king for financial resources, especially for war. 
 
The clergy was thus equal in status and power to the kings and counts of secular nobility. This 
could be seen from the many dioceses and religious orders that acquired a substantial amount 
of wealth and land which created tensions between the church and feudal kings who often 
tried to control the appointment of the clergy in order to deprive them of their property. 
 
The Church which had rarely been a factor before the collapse of the Roman Empire became 
the most powerful organization in Medieval Europe. The Church served not only the cultural 
function of preserving Roman inheritance of classical philosophy and science, but also the 
political function of providing a practicable bond of union of different peoples and places. 
Hence, the Church gradually came to be identified more with the medieval political order. 
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In this sense, the unity that existed during medieval times came not through identification 
with the political association of the state but through a system of religious rituals and 
ceremonies institutionalised by the church through Western Europe. This unity not only 
retarded the emergence of an understanding of a territorialized state. It also made available a 
powerful alternative political identity across otherwise politically fragmented lives of 
medieval peoples in which the political was subordinate to the religious as was reason to faith. 
 
The subordination of the political to the religious resulted in the limitation of the sovereign 
power of the kings who continued to express their claims to power in terms of their being 
representatives of a universal Christendom in Europe. However, the rise of Christianity 
brought with it the problem of conflicting church loyalty, as situations arose in which the 
jurisdictional lines between the church and the state were far from being clear at all. 
 
The development of the Holy Roman Empire presented the first real challenge to papal power 
giving rise to a dispute between imperium and sacerdotium or the secular and religious which 
came to be known as the Investiture Controversy. The controversy was in a legal sense a 
powerful struggle over the proper boundaries of authority of the king or pope. 
 
The investiture controversy began as a dispute in the 11th century between the Holy Roman 
Empire and the papacy of Gregory VII over the appointment of church officials which, prior 
to the controversy, while theoretically a task of the church, was in practice performed by 
secular authorities in order to maintain a balance of power with the church.  
 
This was in conformity with the Gelasian theory of the two swords summing up the teachings 
of the early Christian fathers of human society as divinely ordained to be governed by two 
authorities, the spiritual and temporal authorities, wielded by priests and secular rulers. The 
institution of the church and its higher, or longer term moral responsibility and the institution 
of civil authority and its functions of keeping internal order within society and protecting it 
from external forces were to be balanced within a single mystical body of a Christian state. 
 
However, the problem of conflicting Church-state loyalty arose chiefly because a substantial 
amount of wealth and land was usually associated with the office of the bishop or abbot and 
bishops and abbots were themselves usually part of secular government by virtue of their 
literate administrative resources. In this situation, it became beneficial for feudal kings to 
appoint clergymen to office who would be loyal to them. So, kings appointed clergymen who 
cared little for their spiritual offices leading to a degradation of the church’s spiritual role. 
 
The feudal degradation of the spiritual role of the church was challenged by the wave of 
reform which spread with the growth of the congregation of monasteries subject to the abbot 
of Cluny. Cluniac monasteries formed an order centralized under the control of a single head 
subject only to the papacy and were thus seen as qualified to be the medium for spreading 
reform in the church so as to make it an autonomous spiritual power.  
 
Therefore, with the increased consciousness for the independence of the church, there was a 
demand for the purification of the church for permanently raising the papacy from the 
degradation into which it fallen, and for an autonomous control of the pope over church 
offices. The Gregorian reformers felt most keenly the threat to the spiritual office occasioned 
by the involvement of the clergy in the business of administration of secular government. 
 
Pope Gregory VII prohibited the lay investiture of bishops or part played by secular rulers in 
the appointment of the higher clergy. Gregory realised this would not be possible so long as 
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the king maintained the ability to appoint the pope. So, he together with other churchmen 
loyal to the Gregorian cause declared through a church council in Rome that secular leaders 
would play no part in the election of the pope, but a college of cardinals would do this. 
 
Emperor Henry IV challenged the ruling in his letter to Pope Gregory with an attempt to 
secure the deposition of the pope and call for the election of a new pope. Gregory in turn 
responded to the letter by excommunicating and deposing the Emperor on grounds of the duty 
of a spiritual authority to exercise moral discipline over every Christian, even the emperor. 
 
By implication, the emperor lost his spiritual place and was dismissed into the secular order. 
He was subject, in regard to the fulfilment of his Christian duties, like everyone else, to the 
verdict of the pope’s spiritual authority on which his legitimacy would depend, while the 
spiritual authority of the pope was not subject at all to the verdict of the worldly authority.  
 
The revolution that took place here involved the secularisation of both the king and the 
political order that was dismissed at the same time with him from the sacred and sacramental 
sphere, and as such set free on its own course, to its own development as a worldly enterprise. 
The investiture conflict constituted politics in its own sphere; politics was no longer capable 
of a spiritual but a worldly that is a natural rights justification. 
 
The break with the old order was expressed in Pope Gregory’s excommunication of the king 
removing him from the Church. In effect, the excommunication order carried with it the right 
to depose the king and absolve subjects from their allegiance or loyalty to him. Hence, to 
create pre-conditions for the exercise of his office again, the king had no choice but to 
apologize and submit himself to the Pope and reconcile with the church. 
 
As Pope Gregory revoked the excommunication of the king, he limited himself to 
reconciliation of the king with the church and the neutralization of the political consequences 
of the revocation of the excommunication, and therefore the reinstatement in royal office. The 
pope was no longer concerned with taking over the secular functions of government. He was 
more concerned with the independence of the church in spiritual matters. 
 
The secularisation of politics was in its first stage only able to realise spiritually more through 
the church regaining its autonomy than the political order realised historically. After the 
investiture conflict religion was still without doubt the foundation for a minimum amount of 
existential common ground of homogeneity between rulers and ruled. Even the movement 
towards the development of the modern state occurred first of all in this context. 
 
A movement away from religion as a foundation for a minimum amount of existential 
common ground of homogeneity between rulers and the ruled first took the view of Thomas 
Aquinas of a natural rights justification of politics against the absolute and abusive authority 
of both spiritual and secular rulers. Thomas of Aquinas and later Christian thinkers sought to 
limit the absolute and abusive authority of the spiritual and secular rulers by making the 
people the ultimate source of authority. This saw the revival of the Roman republican ideals 
of a distinct political realm separated from the status or standing of the prince or pope. 
 
This new spirit of politics emerged most forcefully among republican theorists in the city 
states of Renaissance Italy. From the 13th through to the 16th century, powerful Italian states 
struggled to establish their independence from both the Catholic Church and the Holy Roman 
Empire believing that all power is liable to be corrupt, to serve the interest of the individual or 
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group at the expense of the community as a whole. Thus the only way to ensure power serves 
the common good is to leave the whole body of citizens in charge of their own public affairs. 
 
Within the republican tradition of thought we encounter for the first time a vindication of the 
idea that there is a distinct form of ‘civil’ or ‘political’ authority which is wholly autonomous, 
which exists to regulate the public affairs of an independent community, and which tolerates 
no rivals as a source of coercive power within its own res publica. In short, it is here that we 
encounter the familiar understanding of the state as a monopolist of legitimate force which 
found expression in the political thought of the Florentine writer, Niccolo Machiavelli. 
 
This view of “civil government” was of course taken up in France, and England at an early 
stage in their constitutional development as national monarchies began to emerge in France, 
England and Spain. The political task of the new monarchs was to centralize administration 
and law and subdue the medieval representative institutions of the clergy, the nobility and the 
bourgeoisie that obstructed it. For this they needed standing armies and revenue from taxes. 
Larger territorial political units emerged, and political-military power became concentrated in 
the institutions and offices of the king and his court. As a result public officials eventually 
replaced individuals who held political power as a private possession, and the centralized 
medieval monarchy, the precursor of the modern territorial state, came into being. 
 
As power and authority came to be concentrated more in the institutions and offices of the 
king and his court, they were increasingly depersonalised which involved the development of 
uniform impersonal laws and the development of the idea of state sovereignty. Medieval 
Kings claimed a different kind of sovereignty from kings in feudal states. Authority came to 
be vested in the state itself and in the person of the king for as long as the king represented the 
imagined unity of the state. The king was not simply “first among equals” but a separate 
overarching sovereign whose power was free from the control of all others. 
 
However, it took several centuries for the principle of state sovereignty that unified political 
rule within a specific territory to develop. The authority and growing power claimed by 
centralized monarchs were contested throughout the period of the renaissance and beyond by 
the Catholic Church as well as the nobility of most European kingdoms.  
 
Moreover, kings continued to frame their claims to power in terms of their being 
representatives of a universal Christendom in Europe and claim the authority to bring their 
coercive power of the state against heretics inside and outside their jurisdiction, setting the 
stage for a prolonged period of religious persecution and confessional war against the 
Protestant reformer movement across Europe. 
 
The Christian reformation and the religious and political violence it spawned between 
Catholics and Protestants was an important catalyst for the transformation of medieval 
monarchies into an idea of sovereignty that unified political rule within a specified territory in 
ways that broke with the traditions of medieval Christendom. 
 
The Reformation was a movement of revolt against the Catholic Church by those who 
considered it corrupt, more concerned with maintaining its power and privileges than with 
guiding the spiritual salvation of Christendom. Protestant reformers, led by the German monk, 
Martin Luther, argued that salvation depended on individual faith alone and thus emphasized 
the private, personal relationship between the individual person and God which obviated the 
need for Catholic Church’s rituals and the official hierarchy of the clergy. 
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Once the religious split between Catholics and Protestants became obvious, European 
Christendom was faced with the question of how possible it was for different religious 
confessions to live together with each other in a common political order. By virtue of the 
significance religion had for the political order as foundation for a minimum amount of 
existential common ground of homogeneity between rulers and the ruled that lent legitimacy 
to the state, the conflict between Catholics and Protestants was both religious and political. 
 
For both Catholics and Protestants, the conflict was about which one of them professed the 
true faith or pure gospel; as a fight about truth, the conflict allowed for no compromise. After 
the determining conditions of spiritual and worldly violence that theologians and canonists on 
both sides of the confessional divide fostered, it was considered the responsibility of the 
worldly political order to openly suppress error with its own means and punish heretics. 
 
Heresy was therefore determined by the church but punished by temporal rulers as a civil 
crime. The inquisition was in this case a judicial institution established by the Catholic 
Church that gave the papacy the legal power to seek out and try people guilty of heresy as per 
canon law while secular rulers had the power to do the coercive work of punishing offenders. 
 
It was the responsibility of the secular order to punish both rebellious heretics that fanned 
political unrest as well non-rebellious heretics that did not fan political unrest, as both were 
considered blasphemous. This understanding of faith as a legal-like relationship and the 
continuous working tradition of the polis-religion precluded a culture of civil tolerance. 
 
In view of the above, it was thus unavoidable that the question of religion became a matter of 
politics. In the 16th and 17th century, Europe experienced horrifying Wars of Religion between 
Catholics and Protestants; political and religious interests, exertion for the true faith and a 
striving for the extension of claims for political power crossed and combined with each other. 
 
This religious-political conflict took place specifically in three different places in Europe with 
different outcomes: in Spain, in France, as well as in the Holy Roman Empire. From these 
Wars of Religion followed the second stage of secularisation of the pure worldly and political 
foundation and legitimation of the state, settling the separation of religion and politics. 
 
The separation of religion and politics, first used by popes to justify church supremacy, now 
developed its strength in the direction of the primacy and supremacy of politics. The demands 
of the church on civil authority to suppress error with force and punish heretics that ensued in 
the wake of the confessional split, contained the threat of permanent political conflict. 
 
However, because politics placed itself above the demands of conflicting religious 
confessions for the true faith that was left to be a matter for the church, it emancipated itself 
from these demands and actually allowed for a peaceful political order, security of life and 
property to be restored. It is within this context that we understand the development of the 
position of power of the king of France as a neutral authority standing above the warring 
religious confessions and the Edict of Nantes guaranteeing for the first time in the state the 
existence of the Catholic and Protestant religion and the freedom of religion of individuals. 
 
Within the foregoing context in which politics is placed beyond the question of the true faith 
we also understand the principle of cuius regio eius religio (that a subject’s religion should be 
that of his ruler which in turn is transferred down to the people as a private affair) which was 
implicit in the Peace of Augsburg and was explicit in the Peace of Westphalia in the Holy 
Roman Empire. We further understand within this context the idea of state sovereignty that 
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unified political rule within a specified territory at the turn of the 16th and 17th century and the 
political thinking of Thomas Hobbes that resolves the representation of the territorial state. 
 
From the Peace of Westphalia arose the problem of how to imagine and represent a combined 
religious, moral and political authority in a secular, earthly entity confined within territorial 
boundaries. The predominant solution to the crisis of representation of territorial state was the 
attempt made by Hobbes’s contract theory to imagine the state as a body politic. 
 
Having reasoned that in the state of nature or a situation where no absolute sovereign state 
exists anarchy is the logical consequence of independent individual judgments that became 
prominent during the Reformation, Hobbes concluded that the only way to overcome such 
anarchy is to make a single body out of  the several bodies of citizens whereby they give up 
their right to govern themselves in a contract to a Leviathan by virtue of which he has the 
absolute power to effectively secure citizen’s peace, their lives, property and families . 
 
With Hobbes, as we shall see, we arrive at the view that if there is to be any prospect of civil 
peace, the fullest powers of sovereignty must be rested neither in the people nor in the rulers 
but always in the figure of a Leviathan or artificial man. It was as a result of his insistence to 
establish an impersonal form of sovereignty whose power remains distinct not merely from 
the people who originally instituted it, but also from the rulers that the concept of the state as 
we have inherited it was first articulated and went on to be further developed by later thinkers. 
 
John Locke disagreed with Hobbes’s location of absolute sovereign power in the state or 
monarchical government. He believed the power of the state is a trust and a delegation by the 
majority of the people to institutions of government by contract to do in a convenient way on 
their behalf things that they find inconvenient to do themselves: the  legislative power’ to do 
whatsoever a person thinks fit for the preservation of himself and others within the permission 
of the law of nature,’ which is the provision that ‘no one ought to harm another in his life, 
liberty and estate’ and the executive ‘power to punish crimes committed against the law’. 
 
People find it inconvenient to exercise the right to legislative and executive powers in the 
state of nature due to the lack of ‘an established, settled, known law,’ a ‘judge with authority 
to determine all differences according to the established law,’ and the ‘power to back and 
support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution’. These defects of the natural 
state will lead to disputes in the administration of justice, as people will disagree about 
whether or not an offence has been committed against the natural law, as they will be biased 
against others in judging that their right has been infringed upon and punishing offenders. Or, 
they may simply lack the power to protect their rights and liberties when infringed upon. 
 
In order to overcome the defects of the state of nature people agree in a contract to transfer the 
rights to exercise the legislative and executive powers each had in the natural state ‘ into the 
hands of the community’; they agree in common intention to put themselves under whatever 
specific form of government that the majority of the people may choose.  This gives authority 
to the institutions of government to make laws, administer justice, and execute laws made. 
 
Government is created through a trust arrangement by which equally free persons entering 
into a contract delegate the right to exercise their legislative, judicative and legislative powers 
to government as a fiduciary agent to do for them things they find inconvenient to do in the 
natural state. Therefore, the powers of government are limited by the purpose for making the 
contract: the preservation of the natural rights of individuals to life, liberty and estate. 
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Absolute arbitrary power, or government without settled laws with penalties for preserving 
property (which Locke used broadly to refer to life, liberty and estate), and the use of the 
force of the community in the execution of such laws, as well as the defence of the state from 
foreign injury, cannot be consistent with the purpose for which the state was set up.  
 
Contrary to Hobbes, Locke recommended that the legislative and executive powers be 
wielded not by a single body but by the different branches of government, giving as his reason 
for the doctrine of the separation of the two powers the common one that both powers in the 
same hands may tempt persons charged with the making laws to exempt themselves from 
their execution when they pleased. An absolute sovereign would not have to seek impartiality 
and could ignore natural rights. Hence the need for a separation of powers. 
 
Of the powers, legislative and executive, Locke proposed that the former is supreme, for what 
can give laws to another must be superior. In other words, the executive has no authority 
independent of legislative control, except in the case of prerogative when it is proper for the 
executive to exercise discretion where the public good is at stake.  But executive prerogative 
can still be limited by laws of the legislature, for it exists for the public good. 
 
Both the legislature and the executive are merely the fiduciary agent and executor of the 
supreme power of the people for the more effective promotion of their own good. Hence, 
Locke’s conclusion that the community retains its right to exercise the legislative power that it 
only delegates to government as a trust. When this power is abused it reverts to the 
community acting through its majority. The sovereignty of the people over government is thus 
expressed in the election of representative legislative bodies and in the right to remove them. 
 
However, the French-speaking Swiss philosopher Rousseau found this to be an unwarranted 
limitation of a people’s legislative power to govern itself as it saw fit to a single act of setting 
up a supreme legislature. He rejects the view the sovereignty of the people can be represented 
at all by a legislative body, which, like all other partial associations will develop a pseudo-
general will of its own, directed towards its special interests. This implies people will be 
subordinated to the will of an interest group more inclined towards its own interests and that 
they cannot, therefore, be expected to voluntarily obey the state or institutions of government. 
 
In other words, where the sovereignty of the people is represented, the people will not be free 
to govern themselves according to the general will, directed to their common good, not the 
good of a particular group. Sovereignty, argued Rousseau, belongs to the people as a whole 
body, while government is only an agent delegated powers to carry out particular applications 
of the law people make which can be withdrawn or modified as the will of the people dictates. 
 
The only free government is a direct democracy in which each person gives himself up 
entirely together with his natural liberty and property to the political community and in return 
receives the civil liberty to participate actively and directly with others in making laws to 
defend and protect with the whole common force the person and property of each one of 
them, and in which each while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself  and remain as 
free as possible  by voluntarily obeying the laws of the state he helped put in place.  
 
Rousseau’s idea of popular sovereignty made him to be one of the most influential and 
explicit proponents of the liberal, democratic principles of the French Revolution that paved 
the way for a new social and political order of a liberal theory of the state that was principally 
significant for bringing the development of the modern state, as it arose in the wars of 
religion, and was thought of by Hobbes, to its completion and extension beyond Europe. 
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The revolutionary movement proclaimed the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen of 1789 and established the new French constitution of 1791 which put together 
summarized the principles of a new social and political order of a liberal theory of the state. 
Against the old feudal societal order and the religiously legitimated political order, the new 
French constitution and the Declaration proclaimed universal principles derived by reason 
and of natural right as the basis for a new social and political order. 
 
These principles appear in the inalienable human rights and general freedoms (of the person, 
of thought, speech, the press, work and property acquired through labour and not as a result of 
one’s social class as was with the old societal feudal order). These rights and freedoms come 
to be seen as prior to the political order. They involve the detachment of the individual from 
the attributes of birth and status of the family and the release of the individual to full self-
referential development on the basis of the equal treatment of individuals subjects by law. 
 
Equality of right is immanent in the law. Law eliminates the particular differences of the 
individual and guarantees his abstract, general freedom. It proceeds from the right of every 
citizen to participate personally or through his representative in its foundation. Therefore, 
subjects come to be seen in the liberal state as bearers of rights, as a body, really a nation. 
 
The concept of being French began to be associated more with equal rights and freedoms 
rather than with being a subject of the French king. French nationalism was about escape from 
the old oppression of the monarch and church and the right of participation in the government 
of the polity that was considered to be a common enterprise that required to be run by all. 
 
The idea of a ‘nation’ or a ‘people’ distinguishable from other people by the objective criteria 
of a common language, culture, race, origin and history gained currency in the 19th century as 
a basis for the political order of the state that was expressed in the idea of a nation-state. 
 
However, the idea of a ‘nation’ or a ‘people’ later lost its binding force, not only in many 
European states where in clarifying boundaries of the state it was used by authoritarian 
regimes to deny freedom to identifiable outsiders to the dominant ethno-national group seen 
as representing the population of the entire territory of the state.  
 
Even in  young Asia and African states, to which the  territorial state was extended by the 
need for formal political control and resource exploitation by European states that occasioned 
the drawing of territorial boundaries, the binding force of the idea of a nation, that was based 
on shared common experiences of a colonised people of colonial domination and exploitation 
and the demand for an escape from this, was of a temporary duration, as it ceased with the 
granting by colonial European powers to colonised peoples the equal right to self-rule. 
 
Given the multi-ethnic nature of the newly independent Asian and African states, there has 
been need for the development of an ethnically neutral basis for state identification that 
guarantees rights to individual members of all ethnic groups. This reinforces the view for 
basing the political order of the state on individual rights and freedoms of those making up the 
state that is crucially important in specifying the moral norms that rulers share with the ruled, 
and by which the power of the state is justified to those subject to it as being at all legitimate. 
 
The problem of legitimacy, as we shall explain it, is then that of demonstrating by a priori 
means how the state can have the right or moral authority to impose its laws and to enforce its 
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borders, and claim that all those residing within the territory of the state, have a general 
obligation to obey the commands or orders of the state to which they are subject. 
 
The problem with authority is not in the right to decide one’s action while conceding an equal 
right to all, as we shall demonstrate. Rather, it is in the duty to obey the state whether those 
subject to it agree with it or not. In line with the theoretical view of authority we will adopt, 
one should obey commands of the state whether or not one agrees with them because one 
believes that these orders can guide one better than oneself. In this sense, to have authority 
may mean to have the state’s commands acknowledged by those at whom they are directed. 
 
The recognition of the power of the state as rightful or legitimate by obeying its commands is 
not merely to the advantage of rulers in the consolidation of their rule. The primary 
motivation is to establish moral principles that serve to define when the state has the moral 
authority to do the things involved in ruling, principles that set limits to what the powerful 
may do if they are to maintain their authority over those subordinate to them and which define 
the appropriate relationship between rulers and the ruled. 
 
The useful starting point in thus specifying what legitimacy consists in that we shall consider  
is to recognise that it presupposes the existence of a legal system and of power as force 
exercised according to legal rules, as well as the justification of legality by conferring on 
power the special moral attribute of authority for it to be maintained. 
 
Legality, as we shall see, has long been held since the time of Max Weber as the basis of the 
legitimacy of the modern state. In constructing legitimacy from the dimension of legality, the 
state is spokes of as legitimate insofar as it acquires and exercises power in accordance with 
impersonal rational rules. Of course laws may assure the regular exercise of power. 
 
However, laws are not by themselves morally binding and worthy of the willing obedience of 
citizens subject to the state without a consideration of the purpose for which power is 
exercised, the means available to citizens to ensure government is responsible and responsive 
to the purpose for which power is exercised and the moral content or norms justifying power 
to those subject to it. This is what will lead us into a discussion of the three forms of 
legitimacy: functional, affirmative and moral legitimacy. 
 
From a discussion of the normative criteria for the justifiability of legal rules, we shall 
develop a societal needs moral justification of the moral authority of the state to rule 
according to which the state is justifiable to citizens subject to it by the currency of moral 
norms in society derived from settled convictions of the community that they share with the 
dominant where the fact that they share them enables society to get along and efficiently meet 
its social needs and those of its members in improving their welfare. 
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I. The State. 
 
 
 
One of the fundamental problems of  the modern state is that of defining it. As Pierson 
observes, ‘we think that we know the state when we see it, (when it flags us down on the 
motorway, sends us a final tax demand or, of course, arranges for our old age pension to be 
paid at the nearest post office’) yet it proves extremely difficult to bring it under some brief 
but generally acceptable definition’1 to say  what we exactly mean by  the word state. 
 
More empirically-minded political scientists and sociologists look to institutions of 
government and the political system of rule or regime in defining the state. Political 
philosophers are more concerned with uncovering the metaphysical foundation of values and 
beliefs supporting it and from which it grew in the attempt to properly understand the 
fundamental problems of political order that present themselves in the state of the present.  
 
The analysis of the modern state characteristically raises two kinds of questions. The first and 
more normative or evaluative question is: What should the state be and what should it do ? 
This invites us to consider the proper terms for establishing and maintaining any political 
authority, for defining the appropriate relationship between the state and its members and the 
acceptable limits of state action. The second and more ‘fact- based’ or empirical question asks: 
what are states actually like ? This invites us to consider the organization of the state.2
 
Initially, we think about these explanations in terms of those which focus upon the 
organizational means of the state and those which concentrate upon its functions. In practice, 
the two approaches cannot be so neatly separated; they overlap. What the modern state is as a 
matter of fact does imply something about what we can reasonably suppose that it should be.3  
 
Our point of departure in understanding the modern state will be with the ‘fact-based’ 
question, though the more evaluative claims will not be far away. For, in trying to understand 
the fundamental problems of political order that present themselves in the state of the present, 
that is the modern state, we will at the same time be uncovering the metaphysical foundation 
of values and beliefs supporting it and from which it grew historically. But before we do this, 
we consider conceptions of the modern state by first looking at the origin of the word state. 
 
 
I.I. The Conception of the State 
 
1.1.1. Etymology. 
 
The word state derives from the latin stare (to stand) and status (a standing or condition).4 
Following the revival of Roman Law studies in 12th century Italy, the word status was used to 
designate the legal standing of all sorts and conditions of men, with rulers being described as 
enjoying a distinctive “estate royal,” estat du roui, or status Regis.5
                                                 
1 Christopher Pierson, The Modern State, London: Routledge,  1996, p.5. 
2 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Andrew Vincent, “Conceptions of the State” in  Encyclopedia of Government and Politics, Vol. 1. 2nd ed.  
  Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan eds., p. 39. 
5 Quentin Skinner, “The State,” in Contemporary Political Philosophy, 
  eds., Robin E. Goodin and Philip Pettit,  Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1997, p.3. 
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The high estate of the ruler was usually acquired through family, rank and most importantly 
property. This is where we also find the subtle linkage with the word ‘estate’. The English 
word ‘state’ is, in fact, a contraction of the word ‘estate’. This is similar to the old French 
word estat and the modern French etat, both of which can imply a profession or social status.6  
 
The high estate of the ruler was intimately connected with display. In other words, those in 
authority had insignia, crests and so forth illustrating their stateliness. Furthermore, the ruler 
or ruling persons of such standing had potentially the greatest authority and power.7 Such 
authority was often seen, in the 13th century classical view of what it means for a civitas or res 
publica to attain its best state, as the guarantee of justice, the common good and hence the 
peace, and happiness of the subjects.8 The status of the ruler was thus linked to stability (of a 
realm or commonwealth), which derived from the same root.9 This personal view of political 
power was later to be revived by proponents of absolute monarchy in the 17th century. 
 
The decoupling of the person of the ruler from the realm or commonwealth over which he 
ruled, which began with the vital tradition of Italian renaissance republicanism in the 16th 
century asserting the civic autonomy and independence of the Italian cities from the external 
interference of the Empire and the Church, came about in the 19th century with the 
development of the modern state as an apparatus of power existing independently of the status 
of those who control it, as Skinner points out.10
 
The modern state as we know it today is a political form of order that arose in Europe from 
the 13th up to the end of the 18th, and part of the beginning of the 19th centuries from specific 
pre-conditions and impulses of European history and has since then, so to speak, detached 
itself from its concrete conditions of origin and spread out over the whole world.  
 
There are, therefore, two sides to the development of the state that we shall consider. There is 
the historical side to the development of the state, as well as the detachment of this political 
form of order from its concrete conditions of origin (that is, its spiritual-religious 
determination and formation), which is authoritatively presented in the German sociologist 
Marx Weber’s classical ideal type theory or pure form of the state.  
 
 
I. I. 2. Max Weber’s Ideal Type Theory of  the State. 
 
 
In his 1918 long lecture Politik als Beruf (Politics as Vocation), Max Weber argued against 
defining the state sociologically in terms of its ends (of, say, realising human virtue or serving 
spiritual  salvation and eternal peace in the afterlife, as in ancient Greece and the medieval res 
publica christianus, respectively[our emphasis]) or its actual tasks, since ‘there is scarcely any 
task that some political association has not taken in hand, and there is no task that one could 
say has always been exclusive and peculiar to political associations: today the state, or 
historically, those associations which have been the predecessors of the modern state.’11
                                                 
6  Andrew Vincent, “Conceptions of the State,” p.39. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Skinner, “ The State,” p. 4. 
9 Andrew Vincent, “Conceptions of the State,” p.39. 
10 Skinner, “The State,”  p.11. 
11 H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (trans. and eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, London: Kegan Paul,  
   Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. 1947. p. 77. 
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Rather, Weber defined the modern state in terms of the specific means peculiar to it, as to 
every political association, namely, the use of physical force. ‘Every state is founded on 
force,’ Weber quotes Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk. ‘If no social institution existed which knew the 
use of violence,’  he reasons, ‘then the concept of state would be eliminated, and a condition 
would emerge that could be designated as anarchy in the specific sense of this word.’12  
 
‘Of course,’ Weber emphasized, ‘force is certainly not the normal or only means of the state - 
nobody says that - but force is a means specific to the state. Today the relation between the 
state and violence is an especially intimate one. In the past, the most varied institutions – 
beginning with the sib - have known the use of physical force as quite normal.’13 Here, we 
understand Weber as making specific reference to historical predecessors of the modern state 
that were internally involved in embattled relations with the armed segments of its population. 
 
The crucial defining feature of the modern state for Weber is that it is ‘a compulsory 
association’ 14  which, unlike its predecessors, ‘successfully claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.’ Using our own words, the modern 
state is a nation-state in embattled relations with like-states rather than with armed segments 
of its population. We notice here that in defining the modern state, Weber placed emphasis on 
territoriality and violence or physical force as two distinctive features of its history. 
 
Weber understands the success story of the modern state specifically to mean that, ‘the right 
to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to 
which the state permits it.’15 So, for instance, the law of the state might permit individuals to 
use violence in defence of self or property. The state might also delegate certain tasks 
requiring the use of force to other bodies, such as law enforcement to the police. In both cases, 
‘the state is considered the sole source of the right to use violence,’16 according to Weber. 
 
‘Like the political institutions historically preceding it, the state is,’ for Weber, ‘a relation of 
human beings dominating other human beings, a relation supported by means of legitimate 
(that is, considered to be legitimate) violence. If the state is to exist, the dominated must obey 
the authority claimed by the powers that be.’17  In this sense, domination is a reciprocal 
relationship between rulers and ruled, in which the actual frequency of compliance is only one 
aspect of the fact that the power of command exists.18  
 
Weber defines power (Macht) as ‘the probability that one actor within a social relationship 
will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on 
which this probability rests’. He thus views the concept of power to be sociologically 
amorphous to embrace all conceivable qualities of a person and all conceivable combinations 
of circumstances which may put him in a position to impose his will in a given situation.19  
 
 
                                                 
12 Ibid., p. 78. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., p. 82. 
15 Ibid., p. 78. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait, New York: Dobleday & Company, inc., 1960, p.295 
19 Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds., Max Weber: Economy and Society, Berkeley : University of California 
   Press, 1978, p. 53. 
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The concept of domination must hence be more precise and can only mean the probability that 
a command with a specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons.20 The effect 
of  this specification is to separate power based on command, whether accidental or formally 
organized, from power based on coercion (Zwang) grounded in the possession of facilities 
(weapons of all kinds) by means of which physical violence (Gewalt) may be exerted. 
 
However, the definition of domination is still too imprecise for Weber’s purposes. He 
therefore makes a further distinction between domination by virtue of a constellation of 
interests (in particular by virtue of a position of monopoly) and, domination by virtue of 
authority, that is power to command and duty to obey.21 He thus distinguishes, quite carefully, 
between legitimate and illegitimate domination, and thereby recognizes that power can come 
from the control of resources. But he is more interested in legitimate domination defined as: 
 
[T]he situation in which the manifested will (command) of the ruler or rulers is meant to influence the 
conduct of one or more others (the ruled), and actually does influence it in such a way that their conduct 
to a socially relevant degree occurs as if the ruled had made the content of the command the maxim of 
their conduct for its very own sake.22
 
The ruled may accept a command from a variety of possible motives including :  a sense of 
duty, fear, ‘dull’ custom, personal advantage, attachment to the ruler’s values, emotional or 
ideal motives of solidarity.23 A system of domination will not be stable over time, however, 
unless the ruled accept that when the ruler claims the right to command the claim is a 
legitimate one, that is, that it takes place in the context of values/beliefs. In Weber’s words, 
the command must be accepted as ‘a “valid” norm’24 shared between the rulers and ruled. 
 
Weber identified three ideal types of domination. The validity of the claims to legitimacy can 
be based on the following grounds: 
 
1. Rational grounds – resting on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right 
of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal domination); 
 
2. Traditional grounds – resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial  
traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them (traditional 
domination); 
 
3. Charismatic grounds – resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or  
exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order 
revealed or ordained by him (charismatic domination). 
 
In the case of charismatic domination, it is the charismatically qualified leader as such who is 
obeyed by virtue of personal trust in his revelation, his heroism or his exemplary qualities so 
far as they fall within the scope of the individual’s belief in his charisma. 
 
In the case of traditional domination, obedience is owed to the person of the chief who 
occupies the traditionally sanctioned position of authority and who is bound by tradition. But 
here the obligation of obedience is a matter of personal loyalty within obligations of custom. 
 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., p. 943. 
22 Ibid., p. 946. 
23 Ibid., pp. 946-7 
24 Ibid., p. 946. 
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In the case of  legal domination, obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order. 
It extends to the persons exercising the authority of office under it by virtue of the formal 
legality of their command and only within the scope of authority of the office.25
 
Weber then goes on to discuss the organizational structures that implement and correspond to 
given systems of domination. In his view, beliefs in the legitimacy of a system of domination 
are not merely philosophical matters. They can contribute to the stability of an authority 
relationship, and they indicate very real differences between  given systems of domination.26
 
The best known of the organizational structures of domination is the pure type bureaucracy 
that implements the rules of legal domination. Thus, it  has the following characteristics: 
 
• A continuous rule-bound conduct of official business. 
• A specified sphere of competence (jurisdiction). 
• The hierarchical organization of offices; that is, each lower office is under the control 
and supervision of a higher one. 
• The administrative staff consists of officials who have demonstrated an adequate 
technical training. 
• Members of the administrative staff should be completely separated from ownership 
of the means of production or administration. 
• A complete absence of appropriation of  his official position by the incumbent. 
• Administrative acts, decisions, and rules are formulated and recorded in files.27 
 
The bureaucratic administrative staff emphasizes the abstraction and impersonality of the 
legal norms by which the exercise of power is legitimated. 
 
By contrast, traditional domination gives rise to one of four organizational structures of 
patriarchialism, patrimonialism, sultanism or feudalism. Weber’s main interest lies in 
patrimonial bureaucracy and feudalism, which most immediately precede modernity. 
Patrimonial bureaucracy is a system of absolute and undivided rule and in which power is 
exercised through a coterie of notables or personal retainers – household officials, relatives, 
personal favourites who are subject to the customary or arbitrary commands of their master. 
Their loyalty is ensured by the granting of benefices, which are rights to ‘own’ offices and to 
which material rewards are attached. By contrast, in a feudal society, officials – vassals, 
tributary lords – are not personal dependents but socially prominent allies who have given an 
oath of loyalty and have independent jurisdiction by virtue of  the contract they possess. 
 
Charismatic domination does not give rise to an organization. Officials are selected in terms 
of their own charisma and personal devotion, rather than in terms of status, personal 
dependence or special qualifications. The theoretical significance of charisma lies only in its 
capacity to disrupt established claims to authority on the one hand, and its instability and 
consequent capacity to provide a context for new claims to authority on the other. 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Ibid., pp. 215-216. 
26 Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait, p. 297. 
27 Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds., Max Weber: Economy and Society, pp. 216-219. 
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Weber warns that the typology of legitimate authority is only an ideal type construct for 
analytical purposes of the forms of domination there are . No pure instance of  it could survive 
with any measure of stability. Socio-historical instances always include impure mixtures of 
the forms of domination. However, Weber’s interest is not in the classification of 
organizations implementing the forms of domination but in the transformation of society from 
power structures based on claims to tradition to the form based on claims to rationality. Power 
structures based on claims to charismatic personal qualities are only interesting because they 
operate to effect the transition in a situation of crisis of  a particular form of domination. 
 
For our purposes, we wish to state here that, without the socio-historical side to the process of  
development of the modern state, we cannot properly understand the modern state as it has 
become and presents itself to us today. It does not allow us to put into proper perspective the 
fundamental problems of political order that present themselves in the state of the present.  
 
In order for us to better appreciate the fundamental problems of political order that present 
themselves in the state of the present, we will present the modern state in its wider historical 
context as having arisen from a two-stage process of secularisation in the investiture conflict 
and the declaration of the neutrality of the state. In using the concept secularisation, we will 
steer clear of the varied political associations with the concept and understand it in its original 
sense vis-à-vis legality or illegality, legitimacy or illegitimacy to mean the withdrawal or 
release of a thing, a territory or an institution from church-spiritual control and rule.  
 
 
2. The Origin of the  State.  
 
 
2.1.  The Ancient Roman State 
 
 
2. 1. 1.  Background 
  
 
Our starting point for the historical development of the modern state is a discussion of the 
ancient Roman state. We discuss the Roman state for two reasons :  
 
(i) to show how the unique circumstances associated with the collapse of the Roman 
Empire, as an outgrowth of the ancient Roman state, gave rise to conditions that 
led to the emergence of the European medieval monarchies, which themselves 
eventually became the first territorial states.  
 
(ii) to show how it could be treated by the Renaissance and early legal defenders of 
modern sovereignty as the origin of the modern impersonal state. 
 
The political history of  Roman rule can be divided into two periods: (1) The Roman Republic: 
spanning from the founding of the city of Rome in 508 B.C. to the rule and assassination of 
Julius Caesar (49-44 B.C.), and (2) The Empire: spans from the rule of Emperor Caesar 
Augustus to the defeat of Rome by the Visigoths in 410 AD.28
 
                                                 
28  Walter C. Opello, Jr.  and Stephen J. Rosow, The Nation-State and Global Order, A Historical Introduction to 
    Contemporary Politics, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, p. 13. 
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2.1.2. The Roman Republic 
 
 
In the first republican period of the Roman state, politics was characterised in Roman political 
imagination by the political dominance of the city of Rome on the Italian peninsula. Roman 
mythology and history marked Rome as a special place and justified the political rule of the 
patricians who were men of high birth and property (giving them a distinctive “estate royal,” 
estat du roui, or status Regis or high estate) who could trace their ancestry to one of the 
original clan heads appointed to govern the city of Rome by its mythical founder Romulus.29
 
The Roman Republic was a mixed state between democracy and aristocracy meant to check 
and balance each other. Whereas the Roman state was governed by the Senate, composed 
entirely of the patricians, senate allowed the wealthier plebeians, or ordinary people, to gain 
access to the Consul, the highest office of magistrates in the Republic. It also created the 
Tribunate to give the poor a voice in the governing of Rome and protect them against the 
unjust acts of patrician officials which brought about political conflict between them. 
 
In addition to the institutional flexibility of the Republic, a flexibility always kept from 
bending too far by the senate, the Roman state managed political conflict and allegiance 
through the oratory of its politicians and their skill at playing the “seamier side of politics… 
patronage, bribery, vote-buying, tampering with electoral bodies, and the sale of public 
contracts.”30 So long as politics remained centred in the city of Rome itself, this political 
practice managed to maintain order and secured for Rome significant wealth and power. 
 
The governing practices of  the Roman state focused on two attributes of  the patrician class: 
virtus and ‘nobility of birth and ancestry’31. The respect given to ancestry associated power 
and authority with patriarchy; that is the supremacy of the father of the family and the legal 
subordination of wife and children. In law, the power of the father was nearly absolute: only 
he could own property and make contracts. Moreover, the attribute of virtus relegated women 
to the private world of the household, and constructed their public role as “civic cheerleaders, 
urging men to behave like men, praising heroes and condemning the cowardly.”32
 
The patrician attribute of virtus or “manliness” militarised Rome. Faced with the military 
threat of the Carthaginians and mountain tribes, and in need of more fertile farm lands for its 
largely agricultural economy, the Roman Republican state early had a well-disciplined and 
effective army composed of all male citizens of Rome. By 275 B.C., the Roman army 
conquered the Italian peninsula, defeated the Carthaginians in the Punic Wars (264-202 B.C.), 
and conquered Greece and Macedonia between 201 and 146 B.C. 
 
Conquest was a serious business whose success demanded the single-minded attention of 
those who could subject their own desires to the needs of the Roman republican state.  In this 
sense, the civic virtue  of  the ruling class carried with it both honour and a sense of duty to 
                                                 
29 Ibid., p. 14. 
30 Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought Boston: Little,  
   Brown, 1960, p. 83. ; Opello Jr. and Rosow, The Nation-State and Global Order,  p. 14. 
31 E. Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic, 2nd ed., Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1968,  
   p. 8. 
32 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Women and War, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 121. 
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look after the affairs of the state, inclining the class to define the essence of politics in terms 
that went beyond private interests of members of the class. 33  
 
The above is most evident in the political thought of Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43B.C) the 
great Roman statesman and lawyer who sums up in his political writings the basic notion of  
the impersonal state of his time to which we still resort, which is based on law that recognizes 
the rights of all humans, and which exists for the common good of all citizens in the state and 
not for the person exercising the power of the state, who is also subject to the law of the state. 
 
The definition of the state which Cicero puts into Scipio’s mouth in the first book of the 
Republic is instructive . This definition opens with the deceptively simple phrase, res publica 
res populi. Cicero calls the state the ‘public thing’ or the ‘thing of the people’, ‘the affair of 
the people’ that is equivalent in meaning to the older English use of the word commonwealth: 
 
The commonwealth is the affair of the people; but the  people is not any and every sort 
of human association brought together in any fashion whatever, but an association of 
many united together by consent to law and a partnership for the common good.34
 
The commonwealth or state exists to secure the common good of all its citizens. To have 
power meant to act for the common good. But alongside of the common good, Cicero sets the 
consensus iuris, the setting up of laws, as the hallmark of the state; ‘for indeed’, he adds in 
another passage, ‘I cannot conceive of a people unless held together by consent to law’.35
 
Like Aristotle, Cicero saw the state as the product of human nature: ‘the prime cause of this 
coming together is not so much man’s weakness as a kind of human gregariousness.’ But, 
unlike Aristotle, Cicero emphasized not so much the ‘good life’ it fosters, but the structure of 
the state, the plan which governs it, the normalization of human relations it ensures. 
 
Every people, which is such an association of many as I have described, every city 
which is an ordering of the people, every commonwealth which, as I said, is the affair 
of the people, must if it is to last, be governed according to some plan. And this plan 
must first and always be referred to  the cause which brought the city into being.36
 
Now, the forms of political association may vary according as power is in the hands of one, 
few, or all. But all political associations alike have one thing in common, according to Cicero. 
They must use force on the basis of a binding rule of regular procedure: for a government is 
acceptable only ‘if it secures the bond which first joined men together in the partnership of the 
commonwealth’. That bond is the bond of  the law, for it is law that holds society together.  
 
The foregoing passages from Cicero’s Republic show how intimately linked for the Romans 
were the idea of law and the notion of the state. However, it is important to observe that 
Cicero’s definition of the state may well not be a strictly juridical definition. In stressing the 
acceptance of law as a requisite of the state, as a condition of the state’s existence, Cicero 
very properly did not have in mind the acceptance of any law, whatever its content. 
 
Just as unjust laws are not laws, so a state cannot be a state without justice. This, at any rate, 
was the interpretation which, according to St. Augustine, Cicero himself, through the 
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mouthpiece of Scipio, gave to his definition of the state as based on consensus iuris.37 Clearly, 
if this interpretation is accepted, the state is defined not only in legal, but also in moral terms: 
the requisite of law leads straight on to a moral evaluation of  the quality of  law. 
 
Undoubtedly, Cicero’s consensus iuris can be taken to mean both ‘respect for justice’ and 
‘consent to law’, and in the former case his definition must be understood as a request for a 
further justification of the state in terms of justice or the Greek Stoic doctrine of natural law, 
of that ‘true law’, which he himself described in the following statement, in which it came to 
be universally known in Western philosophy from his day down to the 19th century, as 
 
right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unalterable and 
eternal. By its commands this law summons humans to the performance of their duties; 
by its prohibition it restrains them from doing wrong. It is a sin to try to alter this law, 
nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it 
entirely …[God] is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge.38
 
Under this law all human beings, as Cicero insists, are equal. It is properly binding on all 
because all humans, endowed as they are with the capacity to reason, can understand it. 
 
Reason, which alone raises us above the level of the beasts and enables us to draw 
inferences, to prove and disprove, to discuss and solve problems, and to come to 
conclusions, is certainly common to us all, and, though varying in what it learns, at 
least in the capacity to learn it is invariable.39
 
All humans are equal in the possession of the capacity to understand God’s moral or natural 
law, discriminate between right and wrong and thus attain to virtue. There are no humans who, 
under the guidance of nature, cannot attain to virtue. The same virtues are pleasing, the same 
vices are detestable to all peoples; all humans can be made better by learning the natural law. 
 
Cicero goes so far as to suggest that it is nothing but perversion caused by bad habits and 
foolish thoughts that prevents humans from being in fact equal. 40  Contrary to Aristotle, 
Cicero argues that not merely citizens are equal, but all humans. Even the slave whom 
Aristotle treats as a living implement, in Cicero’s view of the natural law, is entitled to a 
measure of equality. The slave is a human being with the capacity to reason and has rights 
that must be respected.41
 
The political deduction that Cicero draws from this is that it is impossible for the state to have 
any existence at all unless it is founded upon and represents the highest justice. Justice 
requires that the law of the state recognize the rights of all human beings without which 
human dignity is impossible and protects human beings in the enjoyment of them. Only to  
law with such moral quality can human beings be expected to give their deserving consent. 
 
However, in terms of pure definition, it is the emphasis on the element of law, not on the 
quality of law itself, that particularly matters. In this more restricted sense, the importance of 
Cicero’s definition can be said to lie in the fact that it definitely inserted the idea of law in the 
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notion of the state – from which it was not to be dissociated again. And it is precisely in this 
sense that that definition may be said to be still in the minds of all those who refuse to reduce 
the state to mere force, but conceive of it as power exercised within the framework of legality. 
 
But there are in the passages just quoted a further notion which call for consideration. This is 
the idea that there exists in any given political community a supreme power from which the 
law emanates, and that this according to where it resides, determines not only the form of 
government, but the very structure of the state. In the traditional Roman view, this supreme 
power resided in the people, and laws, accordingly, were the expression of people’s will.42
 
This principle, that all power derives from the people does not interest us as a political 
principle, as implying a preference for a ‘democratic’ regime, founded on popular sovereignty. 
Among Roman lawyers, the principle has a markedly ‘juridical’ or legal, not a political, 
meaning. That principle enabled them to present all the various sources of law as stemming 
from a common root. They held to it faithfully by construing the power of the prince as being 
an emanation from, and a conferment of, the original power of the Roman people. 
 
 What the prince has decided has the force of law, inasmuch as by a special 
 enactment concerning his government the people has conferred to him and 
 upon him the whole of its government and power.43
 
The important point here is the notion that there is in the state a power which, whether held by 
the people or by the prince, is the source of law, and thus higher than law itself. This notion 
can only be properly understood in terms of law itself - as a legal, not as a political, principle. 
It must not be interpreted as affirming an arbitrary power in the state in the sense that at a 
certain point, beyond and above the law, the ultimate decision is a matter of force alone. 
 
Rather, it should be taken as a recognition that power, when considered more especially from 
the point of view of the actual holder of power, is conditioned by law. In other words, it may 
be absolute but cannot, by definition, be arbitrary. Indeed, this is the only way to understand 
how, in the Roman doctrine, power was conceived as force controlled by and subject to law, 
and yet as the source of law, and thus superior to the law which is its own creation.44
 
Clearly, the fact that the lawgiver was the creator of the law did not mean that he was, 
because of this ‘lawless’. The ‘state’ remained throughout, in the Roman view, a legal 
structure: and that this was the case is still more apparent if we compare the Roman view with 
the view represented by Plato and Aristotle and by Greek thought generally, of the 
exceptional man who may be superior to the law, and indeed be a ‘a law unto himself’. 
 
Whilst in the case of Greek political thought it was the personal qualities of an individual 
which made the bondage of the laws superfluous, in the Roman case, it was the office which 
conferred a particular position on the lawgiver in respect of the law, regardless of his personal 
qualifications. But the ‘office’ itself was created by the law. In a theory of this sort, power 
appears as something completely impersonal. This, too, is a consequence of the legal 
approach to the state, of the conception of power as the lawful exercise of force.45
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The rule of law or the view that law should rule, and not men, was set forth by Cicero in 
certain famous passages where he discussed the relation between law and power. Speaking in 
the De Officius, of the ‘duties of magistrates’, he described them in the following terms: 
 
 The proper task of the magistrate is to be aware that he represents the state and that  
 he must uphold its dignity and honour, respect the laws, define rights, and constantly 
 bear in mind the things that are placed in his trust.46
 
 
This view is further developed in a passage from the De Legibus : 
 
 Here you can see what is the power of the magistrate: he must lead, and command   
 what is right, useful, and in accordance with the laws. For as the laws govern the 
magistrate, so the magistrate governs the people and it may truly be said that the  
the magistrate is a speaking law, whilst the law is a silent magistrate.47
 
In Rome, political authorities were to be obeyed because they lawfully exercised certain 
offices, which were conceived of as having been legally created for the public good, not for 
the person who exercised the office. The idea that the public good was to be associated with 
political office rather than the particular office holder would make possible the reference to 
Rome as an original source of the bureaucratic and legal authority of the modern state. 48  
 
Roman law not only formed the basis of the Roman state, whose revival in Renaissance Italy 
was central to the development of the modern state. It also supported the growth of the Roman 
Empire. Roman law, like most systems of ancient law, was at the start ius civile or the law of 
the city. This early law, as Sabine observes, combined religious ceremonial and ancestral 
formularies which made it inapplicable to anyone not by birth a Roman.49 In law, the person 
and property of the foreigner in Rome were not protected but at the mercy of the citizens.50
 
However, as Roman political power and wealth grew, there came to be a larger body of 
foreign residents in Rome who had to transact business both among themselves and with 
Romans. This, Sabine states,  necessitated the development of another system of law parallel 
to the Roman law of the city, known as ius gentium or the law of the peoples that was based 
on practical universal principles of good business practice regarded as honest and fair that 
justices used to settle legal disputes involving the Roman and non-Roman business class.51  
 
The  ius gentium or law of the peoples was endowed with a more authoritative status by being 
embedded in the Stoic conception of  the law of nature binding on all men. The law of nature 
held up an ideal of reasonableness and equity as a means of evaluating law at a time when 
positive law was likely to be narrowly customary. The use of equity as a principle of criticism 
grew out of the realisation that justice could not be identified with the positive ius civile 
which disadvantaged slaves, women and foreign residents presumed to be of  a lower nature. 
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2.1.3. The Roman Empire 
 
 
The  imperial expansion of the Roman republican state was driven in good part by the need 
for additional land in order to grow its economy. The state’s revenues were mainly drawn 
from agriculture, and its more ambitious public works from public buildings, aqueducts and 
bridges to wide, paved roads were funded from tribute paid by conquered peoples. Moreover, 
the Roman economy was dependent on a continuous supply of slaves whose primary source 
was conquered territory. Further, important social reforms, say grain subsidies and 
distribution of provincial lands to the poor were paid for by wealth from Roman colonies.52
 
The Roman Empire, which expanded greatly under Caesar Augustus (r.27-14 B.C.), reached 
its greatest territorial extent during the reign of Trajan (r. 98-117 A.D.).  The Roman Empire 
was administratively divided into Italy proper and the provinces. The city of Rome and the 
Italian peninsula were governed by the Senate, the supreme council of the empire, whilst the 
eastern and western provinces outside of the peninsula were governed by the emperor.53
 
The practice of Roman imperial policy was not the same in all of its provinces. On the Italian 
peninsula and in the eastern provinces, especially Greece and Asia minor, as well as Egypt, 
Rome established its domination indirectly by using its ideology of civic virtue and 
manipulating local rulers through its policy of divida et impera. In the West, Roman imperial 
policy required more direct forms of rule which often amounted to the brutal and violent 
repression of the largely semi-nomadic tribes of  Celtic peoples whom Romans called 
“barbarians” meaning foreigners,54  taken not to be of the same rational cultivation as Romans. 
 
The expansion of the Roman Empire was followed by several centuries of its eventual decline 
and fall. Having conquered Britain, all of Europe and the Middle East, and much of North 
Africa, the Roman Empire in time became stagnant and paralysed by the unmanageability of  
this immense, far-flung imperial territory.55 Under Hadrian (r.117-138), it ceased to expand. 
 
Lacking a steady supply of slaves and tribute from newly conquered peoples, the Roman 
Empire could no longer pay for its vast army, large bureaucracy, and extensive public works. 
Consequently, hard measures were undertaken to meet these increased expenses which 
included the increase in taxes and the use of force to extract taxes which impoverished many 
ordinary people, leaving the patricians to be the only ones who were well off.56  Deteriorating 
economic and material conditions of  Imperial Rome had an effect on existing religious 
beliefs and traditions of ideas and put the loyalty of the people to the emperor in serious doubt. 
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3. The Christianisation of  the State. 
 
 
3.1. The Rise of Christianity. 
 
 
The official state religion of Rome was paganism. Romans believed in the many gods of the 
Greco-Roman pantheon, such as Jupiter, Juno, Minerva and Mars, as well as dead emperors 
who had been deified. These gods were tied to the life-world of the Romans and were seen as 
protecting Rome itself.57 Roman Emperors had a supreme religious function. They were seen 
as representatives of the people to the gods, or they might themselves be regarded as divine.58
 
As the disintegration of the Roman Empire and the harsh methods taken to counteract it 
created extreme economic conditions, Romans began to turn away from official paganism. 
They turned either to ancient natural and fertility gods from pre-Roman times or to oriental 
religions. Initially, the state allowed people to follow these new religions, provided they still 
formally recognized the pagan gods of Rome and the cult of deified dead emperors,59 fearing 
that failure to do so would adversely affect their political loyalty to the Roman emperor. 
 
The followers of these new religions were largely, but not exclusively, from the lower and 
most economically distressed classes of Roman society, especially slaves and the very poor,  
who were desperately looking for relief from economic misery. One of these oriental religions 
was a Jewish sect founded by Jesus of Nazareth in the Eastern province of Judea. At first, his 
disciples preached among Jewish communities elsewhere in the empire’s eastern portion. 
After the death of Jesus, his disciples began to preach in the  western portion of the empire.60
 
Christianity was a revolutionary social movement that spread rapidly, especially among lower 
social classes as well as aristocratic women, because of its theology which was clear-cut as it 
pitted good against evil; universalistic since it emphasized the equality of all  humans in the 
sight of God; satisfied the psychological and emotional needs of its followers through its 
belief in life after death, as well as emphasized concern for the poor (through charity).61
 
At first the Roman state tolerated Christianity. However, because Christians refused to 
formally recognize the pagan gods of Rome, they came to be seen as enemies of the state. Its 
monotheism or belief in the universality of one God and its idea that all people everywhere 
were equal in the eyes of God represented loyalty and obligation ultimately to God. 
 
Subject to the Roman Empire, Christianity insisted on retaining a religious identity separate 
from its rulers. The words of the Gospel that were used to express this differentiated loyalty 
were (Matt. 22:21): ‘Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and to God the 
things that are God’s.’ Persecution of Christians followed precisely because the imperial 
authorities feared those who refused to worship the divinity of the  Roman state in favour of a 
non-nationalistic and higher divinity which lacked geographical (and cultural) boundaries.62
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However, despite, and perhaps because of, the persecutions, the most of which came during 
the 3rd century when many thousands were tortured and put to death, the number of Christians 
increased during the 4th  century. The prestige of the church increased a few years later when 
the Emperor Constantine embraced the Christian faith, and after the Emperor Theodosius 
declared Christianity the official religion of the Roman Empire and outlawed paganism.63  
 
As the Roman Empire disintegrated, the Christian Church replaced the politico-military 
institutions of Rome with its canon law, ecclesiastical courts, and administrative hierarchy of 
priests, bishops, and cardinals. The capital of the empire became the capital of the Catholic 
Church. In effect, the Church had become the Roman Empire,64 a form of organized rule that 
did not recognize the territorial boundaries to its authority over its community of  believers. 
 
 
3.2.  The Germanic Invasions 
 
 
The fall of the Western Roman Empire in the 5th century changed the configuration of  Europe, 
as invasions by semi-nomadic Germanic tribes from the Baltic region separated it from the 
rest of the Mediterranean, where the Eastern Roman or Byzantine Empire survived another 
millennium until it fell to the Ottoman Turks in 1453. The fragmentation of the centralized 
Roman administration into semi-autonomous political military units by the successor 
Germanic kingdoms, combined with the universalism of the Catholic Church, produced the 
political space we call Western Europe which later gave birth to the modern-day state. 
                                                                            
The Germanic tribes, which settled in the West alongside the Roman population, often found 
the ius gentium or imperial law designed for the government of diverse peoples irrelevant to 
the needs of their economy based on agriculture and animal husbandry whose major concern 
was survival. Land was the property of everyone. The regulation of  land possession and the 
respective rights of jurisdiction and administration, once the preserve of the Roman 
centralized system, became in an agrarian economy the domain of decentralized centres of 
power or assemblies, dominated by military kings who waged war to protect their kin.65
 
Many of the clans making up Germanic tribes were matrilineal (that is, they traced descent 
and inheritance through the female line) which gave women important public roles as leaders 
of the clan and involved them in decision-making.66 Finally, because the tribe was seen to be 
the family writ large, there was no distinction within the tribe between the public and private.  
 
However, where tribes settled within the Empire, there grew a new society, which brought 
together Roman and Germanic institutions and practices. In many places, Germanic peoples 
abandoned communal ownership and accepted the Roman idea of private ownership. 
Increasingly, women were subordinated to men as Germanic tribes accepted Rome’s 
patriarchal inheritance laws that relegated women to the private world of their household.67
 
For their part, the Romans gradually accepted the Germanic practice of comitatus which was a 
band of young men who attached themselves to a military king to whom they pledged 
unswerving loyalty. As more Germanic peoples were drafted into the Roman army, most 
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generals during the last centuries of the empire were of Germanic origin. Gradually, loyalty to 
Rome was replaced by personal loyalty to a particular commander. Thus, the chain of 
command from the emperor downward was broken and the Roman Imperial state was left 
without a reliable means of defence.68 This opened it to full-scale Germanic invasion. 
 
Germanic peoples were ruled by kings or chieftains who were military, political, and religious 
figures expected to lead the tribe into combat, settle disputes and act as intercessors with the 
gods through religious rituals. Successors were chosen from among a chief’s direct, male 
descendants by the still-living king or chieftain, but had to be confirmed through acclamation 
by an assembly of the leading warriors of the tribe. Thus, loyalty was based on persons, which 
meant that followers were loyal only to a certain king or chieftain from a certain clan.69
 
Politics and power did not operate according to the same logic in barbarian tribes as it did in 
the Roman Empire. The King or chief was the leader of the tribe. He did not have the power 
to command the obedience and actions of persons in the tribe. Rule was a matter of 
performing religious rituals, maintaining peace among the tribe’s clans and leading the tribe 
into battle, activities that accorded the chieftain honour and respect and, hence, authority.70
 
After the conversion of Germanic peoples to Christianity, the Catholic Church was called 
upon to consecrate, and thereby authenticate, a new chieftain. According to the Catholic 
Church, and in accordance with the age-old theory of the divine right of kings, a king was 
appointed by God to maintain order, protect the weak, support the Church and defend the faith. 
Thus, barbarian kings in the collapsed Western Roman Empire held secular authority under 
the sacred authority of the Church – in contrast to the Eastern Roman Empire where the 
emperor, seen as representing Christ on earth, held both secular and sacred authority.  
 
Consequently, in the West, kings wielded secular power, which they acquired through 
heredity, and the Church wielded sacred power, which it acquired, in its view, from God. 
Therefore,  a political imagery emerged  here that defined politics both in terms of the clan-
based, personalized, lateral connections of  Germanic tribal rule and in terms of the trans-local, 
depersonalised, and hierarchical politics of the Roman Catholic Church.71
 
The Germanic kingdoms had no formal political organization, no specialized administrative 
departments, no civil service, and no standing army, as did the Roman Empire. Governance 
was handled by the king’s household, which was not a problem when the kingdoms were 
small. As they grew larger, the kingdoms were broken up into subunits called counties, and a 
representative of the king, called a count, was selected to govern each one. Counts ruled their 
counties as the king ruled the kingdom: they had full military, judicial, and financial power.72  
 
This way of governing had a serious setback in that counts might always have been tempted, 
as Tilly observes, to use their independent military resources on behalf of their own interests 
while paying little attention to the interests of their nominal sovereigns.73 Few Kings were 
able to raise an army quickly enough to be effective against bands of fast-moving invaders. 
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Thus, when local counts defended themselves, they turned the land they defended into their 
personal property and not the king’s. Great families began to take root in specific counties.74
 
The only institution surviving the collapse of the Western Roman Empire was the Roman 
Catholic Church, which preserved the Roman cultural inheritance and remained the primary 
source of learning in its domain until the 13th century; the bishop of Rome, known as the pope, 
became the leader of the western church. His supremacy was never accepted in the east. 
 
In the year 800 AD, Charlemagne, king of the Franks, who subdued western Germany, large 
parts of Italy and chunks of surrounding countries, was appointed and crowned in Rome as 
king of the Holy Roman Empire by Pope Leo III, who wanted to cut the remaining ties with 
the Byzantine Empire. The Holy Roman Emperor would in turn appoint the Pope. The Holy 
Roman Empire lasted a millennium that saw a further fragmentation of Germanic kingdoms 
which weakened the Holy Roman Empire and the development of the Catholic Church. 
 
Thus, the strong monarchy which was associated with the early Germanic kingdoms was 
fragmented into semi-autonomous political units which eventually came to be treated as 
private domains of those whom the king had appointed to indirectly administer them. These 
units could be bought and sold, divided among heirs, mortgaged, and given in marriage.75 In 
other words, royal power across Europe eventually decomposed into feudalism. 
 
 
 
3.3. The Feudal Polity of  Estates. 
 
 
The political-military practices in the fragmented successor barbarian kingdoms have been 
known since the 17th century as feudalism. The word feudalism is based on the medieval Latin 
feudum, which was borrowed from the old German fee, a commonly used term in the Middle 
Ages which meant cattle or  land held under  certain obligations. 76
 
Even though the word components are from the Middle Ages, the concept of feudalism was 
not invented until the 17th century, in the modern era.  The word feudalism as a system of 
personal and cliental relationships of lord and vassal was introduced to legitimise the modern 
state by contrasting the modern conditions of the 17th century with the pre-modern conditions 
of the previous age(s) that were surpassed by the modern ones. 
 
The political-military practices of the feudal epoch did not constitute a “state” in any formal 
sense. Feudal governance lacked key features of a state, such as permanent structures for 
decision-making, a standing army, or an extensive administration that operated according to 
codified law. Most important, though, people were personally loyal to counts and kings, their 
identity as human beings was not bound up with a secular political order they belonged to.77
 
Feudalism as a social world of ‘overlapping and divided authority’ was a pyramidal structure 
of individuals bound together by oaths of loyalty. The king was at the top of this pyramid and 
was the sovereign, or overlord, of the entire kingdom. Several dukes or princes, who held 
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huge tracts of land within the kingdom, were his direct vassals. At the bottom of the pyramid 
were the simple knights, who held sufficient land to maintain themselves and their families.78
 
The glue that held the feudal “state” together was the vassalage defined as “a system in which 
a free man binds himself personally to a lord, offering him loyalty and military service in 
return for protection and the use of property (usually land).”79   It was entered into by doing 
homage, which was a ceremony in which the lesser man, kneeling before the greater man with 
hands joined as if in prayer, pledged himself and his loyalty to the greater man.80
 
The core constituent relationship of feudalism was the personal bond between lord and vassal, 
with land (and its people and product) – the fief – being loaned by the king or lord in 
exchange for the military support of the vassal. However,  the vassal also had to provide the 
king or lord with “counsel” or advice on, say, whether or not to go to war. 
 
The king prevailed as conqueror, tribute-taker and rentier, not as head of state that durably 
and densely regulated life within  the feudal realm. He was sovereign only in the sense of 
being primus inter pares “first among equals”, and therefore his authority was limited by the 
clearly recognized rights and privileges accruing to the three estates of the realm – the first 
estate of the clergy, the second estate of the nobility, the third estate of the bourgeoisie. 81
 
Together, the crown and estates governed the feudal estate (a  medieval version of the modern 
state). This was made possible through the great council, composed of members of the three 
estates that represented their estates as corporate groups such as the nobility and clergy, which 
eventually included other corporate groups such as lawyers, professors, and physicians.82  
 
Thus the feudal “state” was constitutional in that the three estates represented the realm of the 
king, voiced protest, restated rights, gave advice, and agreed to financial requests. But, since 
the king needed the consent of the estates to gain access to their financial resources, especially 
for war, a struggle ensued between the crown, on the one hand, which needed the money, and 
the council of estates, on the other hand, which had it to give out but expected justification.83  
 
The clergy that included the bishops and abbots of its religious orders and the knights, masters, 
and grandmasters of its military orders were equal in status and power to the kings and counts 
of secular nobility. Many dioceses and religious orders acquired a lot of  wealth and land. The 
military orders were powerful as they were made up of armed monks. 
 
The great power and wealth of the church created tensions between the church and feudal 
kings, as the latter frequently sought to control the appointment of the clergy and looked for 
an opportunity to deprive them of their rightful property. The threat of excommunication was 
usually enough to persuade an unwilling king to bend to the wishes of the church.84  
 
The clergy served an important politico-cultural function in medieval Europe. They 
comprised its intellectuals, and as such they interpreted the meaning of scripture, elaborated 
Church doctrines, and carried on the traditions of classical philosophy and science inherited 
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from Rome. The clergy came to be respected for its learning as well as feared for its 
enforcement of canon law, under which, among other things it could accuse people of heresy 
(i.e., adherence to religious teaching contrary to Church dogma) and execute them. 
 
Few people outside the clergy and the nobility were literate in Latin, the lingua franca  of 
religion and government that inevitably enabled the ecclesiastics to penetrate, and take charge 
of, the administration of the kingdoms and other feudal entities. The use of Latin gave the 
clergy enormous power because the Church communicated legal and moral ideas.85  
 
The unity that existed during the medieval times came not through identification with the 
political association of the state but through a system of religious rituals and ceremonies 
institutionalised by the Church throughout Western Europe that served not only the religious 
function of reinforcing and strengthening faith, but the socio-political function of  establishing 
identity in Christendom, that universal community to which all Christian believers 
belonged.86
 
Of course, many areas in Europe were not thoroughly Christianized until the 12th and the 13th 
centuries. The establishment of Catholic dogma was a struggle, a political act that often 
involved persuasion and the use of military force in the form of  Crusades instigated by popes 
and undertaken by Christian kings to win to the faith different peoples from different places. 
 
The universal idea of Christendom that acted as a bond of union of different peoples and 
places both retarded the emergence of an understanding of the territorialized political 
community and made available a powerful alternative community identity across the 
otherwise politically fragmented lives of medieval peoples.87 In this alternatively imagined 
Christian community, the political was subordinated to the religious, as was reason to faith.  
 
The subordination of the political to the religious resulted in the limitation of the power of the 
kings, who were obliged to pledge their ultimate allegiance to the Pope. Kings did not see 
themselves as the sovereign power of the state. They continued to express their claims to 
power in terms of their being the representatives of a universal Christendom in Europe. Of 
course, this allowed them to claim rightful authority in areas outside their territorial domain. 
 
However, the rise of Christianity raised the problem of conflicting Church-state loyalty. 
Situations were bound to arise in which the jurisdictional lines between Church and state were 
hazy. Indeed, it sometimes appeared to the conscientious Christian that the secular authority 
had invaded sacred territory. When this happened, the Christian, if he were concerned about 
an eternal life of salvation, had to obey the authority (the Church) which was of consequence. 
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4. The Development of the Modern State 
 
 
4.1.  The First Stage of the Secularisation of the State:  The Investiture Controversy  
 
 
When the Holy Roman Empire, one of the medieval European authorities that emerged 
around 800 AD, developed as a  strong force, it was the first real challenge to Papal power, 
and a dispute of jurisdiction between imperium and sacerdotium or the secular and religious 
powers emerged which came to be known as the investiture controversy. 
 
While on the surface it was over a matter of official procedures, regarding the appointments 
of offices, underneath it was in a legal sense a powerful struggle over the proper boundaries of 
authority, of what the one or other, the king or pope, might lawfully do within the limits of his 
office. 88  In this sense, and in this sense only, was the investiture controversy the most 
significant conflict between secular and religious powers in medieval Europe. 
 
The investiture controversy began as a dispute in the 11th century between the Holy Roman 
Empire and the Gregorian Papacy concerning who would control the appointments of church 
officials (investiture). Prior to the controversy, the appointment of church officials, while 
theoretically a task of the Church, was in practice performed by secular authorities, as a way 
of maintaining a balance of power between secular authorities and the Church. 
 
This was in line with the theory of the two swords expounded as early as 494 by Pope 
Gelasius I (492-7). According to the Gelasian theory of the two swords that was universally 
accepted in the 11th century, and which summed up the teachings of the Early Christian 
Fathers on the relationship between Church and state, human society is divinely ordained to 
be governed by two authorities, the spiritual and the temporal, the one wielded by priests and 
the other by secular rulers, in accordance with divine law and natural law respectively. No 
man, under the Christian dispensation, can possess both sacerdotium and imperium.89
 
By sacerdotium is meant both the institution of the church and also its higher, or longer term 
moral responsibility. By imperium, or regnum ( whether one is referring to an empire or a 
kingdom), is meant both the institution of the civil authority and its particular functions, 
which were to keep order within society and protect it generally from external forces that 
were bent perhaps on its destruction. That the two powers should be balanced within the state 
conveyed the sense of how Christian theorists conceived the nature of good government.90
 
Within this circle of ideas, there was properly speaking neither church nor state in the modern 
meaning of  both terms. The emperor and pope were not representatives of the secular order, 
and of the religious order, respectively. Rather, as Boeckenfoerde notes, both stood within a 
single mystical body of the Christian state (as St Augustine wrote in the City of God), the king 
as church advocate and patron of Christianity, just as consecrated or blessed a person as the 
pope: in both the king and pope lived the res publica Christiana as a secular-religious unity.91
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However, collision between sacerdotium and imperium became inevitable, principally 
because a substantial amount of wealth and land was usually associated with the office of the 
bishop or abbot and bishops and abbots were themselves usually part of secular government, 
due to their literate administrative resources. In this situation, it became beneficial for feudal 
kings to appoint to (or sell) office someone who would be loyal. So, feudal kings appointed 
bishops and abbots who often cared very little for their spiritual duties and offices. 
 
The feudal degradation of the spiritual role of the Church was challenged by the wave of 
reform which spread with the growth of the congregation of monasteries subject to the abbot 
of cluny. Cluniac monasteries formed an order centralized under the control of a single head 
subject to no external authority other than the Papacy. They were thus qualified to be the 
medium for spreading reform in the church so as to make it an autonomous spiritual power. 
 
It was a foregone conclusion, therefore, that the increased consciousness for the independence 
of the Church should bring with it a demand for the purification of the Church for 
permanently raising the papacy from the degradation into which it had too often fallen, and 
for an autonomous control of the pope over ecclesiastical officers. It was precisely the more 
conscientious churchmen who felt most keenly the menace of the spiritual office occasioned 
by the entanglement of the clergy in the business of the administration of secular government. 
 
The investiture controversy began in earnest with the accession to the papal throne of Gregory 
VII in 1073. Specifically, Gregory prohibited the lay investiture of bishops, that is, the part 
played by secular rulers in the appointment of the higher clergy. Gregory knew this would not 
be possible so long as the king maintained the ability to appoint the pope. Therefore, the very 
important first step was to liberate the papacy from control of  the king.  
 
An opportunity came in the 1050s when Henry IV became king at a tender age. Gregory with 
other churchmen loyal to his cause seized the opportunity to free the papacy while the king 
was still a child and was unable to react. In 1059 a church council in Rome declared secular 
leaders would play no part in the election of popes, and created the college of cardinals, made 
up entirely of church officials for the election of the pope. The college of cardinals remains to 
this day the method used to elect popes. Once the church had gained control of the election of 
the pope, Gregory was now ready to attack the practice of  lay investiture on a broader front. 
 
In 1075, Gregory declared in the Dictatus Papae that as the Roman church was founded by 
God alone, only the pope was the sovereign head of the whole church, and that the pope alone 
could appoint or depose churchmen or move them from see to see. His legate was to take 
precedence of bishops and all other officers of the church; he alone could call a general 
council and give effect to its decrees. Papal decrees, on the other hand, could not be annulled, 
and a case once brought before the papal court was not subject to the verdict of anyone else.   
 
In short, Gregory’s theory of government was monarchical, not in the sense of the feudal 
monarchy, but more nearly in the sense of the imperial Roman tradition; under God and the 
divine law the pope was absolute. The Pope had now become effectively the head of the 
Church and no longer felt himself to be dependent on the emperor for its good government.  
 
This radical departure from the Early Medieval balance of power ended the practice of  the 
lay investiture of bishops and reduced the influence of the bishops in secular government. 
What the king (and bishops) really desired was the continuation of a state of affairs which, in 
fact if not in theory, had given the king a predominant voice in papal affairs. The king’s case 
was weak in theory but strong in respect of historical precedents, and as he was forced into a 
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defensive position, he was obliged to appeal against the practically novel claim of  Church 
autonomy, to the generally admitted theory of two independent spheres of authority. 
 
By the time Gregory VII made the ruling prohibiting the lay investiture of bishops, Henry IV 
was no longer a child, and he immediately challenged the ruling in his letter to Gregory of 
March 1076 with an attempt to secure the deposition of the pope and call for the election of a 
new pope. Gregory in turn responded to the letter by excommunicating and deposing the king. 
 
In excommunicating the king, Gregory still basically operated within the bounds of the old 
political-religious unified order.92 The position taken by Gregory, in opposition to Henry IV 
was a natural, if extreme, development of the church’s admitted jurisdiction over questions of 
morals. Gregory defended his action on the grounds of the right and duty of a spiritual 
authority to exercise moral discipline over every member of the Christian community. He 
claimed the same right of discipline over a king that as pope he had over every Christian.93  
 
By implication, the coordinate authority of a secular ruler over spiritual and moral matters 
disappeared. The king, indeed the ruling office, was banished from the new ecclesia, lost his 
spiritual place and was dismissed into the secular order. The king was no longer the 
consecrated person, but a layman like every other believer. He was subject, in regard to the 
fulfilment of his Christian duties, like everyone else, to the verdict of the pope’s spiritual 
authority on which his legitimacy would depend, while the spiritual authority of the pope was 
not itself in any conceivable sense at all subject to the verdict of the worldly authority.94
 
The revolution that took place here went beyond the secularisation of the king. The political 
order was dismissed at the same time with him from the sacred and sacramental sphere, it was 
secularised and as such set free on its own course, to its own development, as a worldly 
enterprise. What was thought of as devaluation in order to resist the king’s claims to power in 
the sphere of the ecclesia turned out in the indissoluble dialectic of the historical process to be 
emancipation: the investiture conflict constituted politics in its own sphere; politics was no 
longer capable of a spiritual but a worldly, that is, a natural rights justification.95
 
The break with the old order comes to be self-evidently expressed in the action of Gregory 
VII in excommunicating Henry IV, removing him from the Church which was in line with the 
old political-religious unified order. In effect, however, this amounted to the claim that the 
right to excommunicate carried with it the right to depose the king, of course for adequate 
cause, and thus absolve subjects from their allegiance to the king.  
 
The German aristocracy was happy to hear of their king’s deposition. They would use the 
cover of religion as an excuse for a continuation of the rebellion started at the first battle of 
Langensalza in 1075 and for the seizure of royal powers. The aristocracy would claim local 
lordship over peasants and property, build castles which had previously been outlawed, and 
build localized fiefdoms to break away from the empire. 
 
In order to create within the old religious-political unified order, through papal absolution, the 
preconditions for the exercise of his office again, Henry IV had no choice but to back down, 
needing time to mobilize his forces to suppress the rebellion in his kingdom. In 1077, he 
                                                 
92 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit,pp.45-46. 
93 George Sabine, A History of Political Theory, pp. 222-223 
94 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit, p. 46. 
95 Ibid. 
 36
travelled to Canossa in northern Italy to meet the pope and apologize in person, submit 
himself to the pope in admission of his misdeeds and reconcile with the Church. 
 
As Gregory VII revoked the excommunication of the repentant king, Henry IV, Böckenförde 
states, he limited himself to the religious act, reconciliation of the king with the Church and 
the neutralization of the political consequences of the revocation of the excommunication, and 
therefore the reinstatement in royal office. As pope, he no longer concerned himself with 
taking over the secular functions of government, it was the king’s business.96 He was more 
concerned with the independence of the Church in spiritual matters. Herein was the separation 
of the spiritual from the worldly matters, the religious from the political order evident.  
 
The secularisation of politics was in its first stage only able to realise spiritually more by 
regaining its autonomy than it directly realised historically and politically. In this first stage, 
secularisation effected only the release of the political order from the sphere of the sacred and 
holy the direct orientation towards the spiritual goal of salvation and eternal peace in the next 
life and not the release from its religious foundation.  
 
After the investiture conflict and being set free on the way to worldly politics, state rulers and 
kingdoms were still Christian rulers and governments, the Christian religion was still without 
doubt the foundation for a minimum amount of existential common ground of homogeneity 
between rulers and the ruled that gave the state its legitimacy. Even the movement towards 
the development of the state, as well as the delivery of politics oriented towards the formation 
of and struggle for power in the 15th and 16th centuries occurred first of all in this context.  
 
However, while state rulers and kingdoms remained Christian rulers and governments, a 
movement towards a natural rights justification of politics began unfolding as early as the 
writings of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). For Aquinas, politics was to be governed by 
principles of natural law independently of direct religious supervision. He revived Aristotle’s 
ideas about the ability of human reason to discover for itself moral laws that governed humans.  
 
Following from this, Natural Law, that was only indirectly linked to God’s law in having 
developed from “participation in the Eternal Law by rational creatures”, 97 reflected 
humankind’s nature as a rational being with the power of insight by virtue of which it is able 
to discover the moral rules of natural law governing human conduct in order to achieve the 
good life. These moral rules of natural law are evident from the inclination of humans to do 
good. When legally enacted for the regulation of human conduct, they constitute Human law. 
 
In order to be just, argues Thomas of Aquinas, Human Law must accord with and never 
contravene the Natural Law. A just law must accord with reason that has as its first and 
principal object the ordering of the common good, rather than the advantage of an individual 
or group. For this reason, law has behind it a general authority rather than an individual will. 
 
In order to give legitimacy to law, it must be derived from the whole community or some one 
person selected by it who represents it. Thus, law is the product of the whole people acting for 
their joint good, either by legislation or by the less tangible means of creating custom, or it 
has the sanction of a public personage to whom the care of the community has been delegated. 
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The most important position adopted by St. Thomas is that a law which fails to conform to 
natural law is no law at all. St. Thomas seems to have said that laws which conflict with the 
requirements of natural law lose their power to bind morally. In other words, a government 
which abuses its authority by enacting laws which are unjust (against the common good) 
forfeits its right to be obeyed, for  it lacks moral authority or right to rule. 
 
St. Thomas does not suggest that one is always justified in disobeying government which 
abuses its authority by enacting unjust laws. He was obviously fearful that resistance to 
authority might become a standard of political right and bring about disunity. Hence, St. 
Thomas only allows for disobedience in exceptional circumstances when it is a matter of 
avoiding ‘scandal’ (that is, a corrupting example to others) or civil disorder. 
 
The Thomistic view of the authority of the ruler to govern as derived ( indirectly- via natural 
law) from God who exercises it through the participation of the people, or a superior public 
personage representing them, in the making of its own laws, and as existing for the moral 
purpose of the common good by which his/her authority is limited in order to check its 
arbitrary use or abuse of authority, became more explicitly political in later Christian thinkers. 
 
Their concern was with the absolute and abusive authority of both the spiritual and secular 
rulers. They sought to limit the absolute and abusive authority of the spiritual and secular 
rulers by making the people the ultimate source of authority. The people have the inherent 
power to make its own laws which is effected through a representative body that stands and 
speaks for the people. This saw the revival of  Roman republican ideals of a distinct political 
realm separated from the status or standing of the prince or the Pope. 
 
 
4.2 Renaissance: Revival of Roman Republicanism 
 
 
This new spirit of politics emerged most forcefully in the city states of Renaissance Italy. 
From the 13th through to the 16th century, powerful Italian states such as Florence, Venice, 
Pisa, Milan, and Siena struggled to establish their independence from both the Catholic 
Church, which claimed the right to control them directly, and the Holy Roman Emperor. 
 
Among the republican theorists of Renaissance Italy, the main reason for this basic 
commitment was that all power is liable to be corrupt. All individuals or groups, once granted 
sovereignty over a community, will tend to promote their own interests at the expense of the 
community as a whole. Thus, the only way to ensure that the laws promote the common good 
must be to leave the whole body of citizens in charge of their own public affairs.98
 
This basic insight was followed up within the republican tradition in two separate ways. It 
was first used to justify an assertion of civic autonomy and independence, and so to defend 
the libertas of the Italian cities against external interference. This demand was initially 
directed against the Holy Roman Empire and its claims of feudal sovereignty or lordship over 
the Regnum Italicum or Italian kingdom. But the same demand for libertas was also directed 
against all potential rivals as sources of coercive jurisdiction within the cities themselves.99  
 
It was claimed, on the one hand, against local feudatories, who continued to be viewed as the 
most dangerous enemies of free government. And it was even more vehemently directed 
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against the jurisdictional pretensions of the Church. The most radical response against the 
jurisdictional pretensions of the Church, that was embodied, for example in Marsilios’s 
Defensor pacis of 1324, took the form of insisting that all coercive power is secular by 
definition, and thus that the church has no right to exercise civic jurisdictions at all.100  
 
Like Dante Alighieri, Marsilio of Padua described the pope as “ a mere administrator of 
sacraments who could have no power and make no laws in temporal fields”.101 The reason, as 
Giovanni da Viterbo expresses it, is that the ends of temporal and ecclesiastical authority are 
completely distinct. The implication being that, if the church tries to insist on any jurisdiction 
in temporal matters, it will simply be “putting its sickle into another man’s harvest”.102  
 
The other way in which the basic insight of the republican tradition was developed was in the 
form of a positive claim that the precise type of government under which a city could hope to 
remain “in a free state” will be a res publica in the strictest sense. The community as a whole 
must retain the ultimate sovereign authority, assigning its rulers or chief magistrates a status 
no higher than that of elected officials. Such magistrates must in turn be treated not as rulers 
in the full sense, but merely as agents of ministri of justice, charged with the duty of ensuring 
that the laws established by the community for the common good  are properly enforced.103
 
The underlying assumption that liberty can be guaranteed only within a republic can already 
be found in many Florentine writers. Dante, for instance, speaks in the Inferno of the move 
from seigneurial (monarchical) to republican rule as a move from tyranny to a stato franco, a 
state or condition of civic liberty. However, the equation between living in a republic and 
living “in a free state” was worked out with the greatest assurance by the leading republican 
theorists of Venice and Florence in the course of the high Renaissance.104  
 
Among Florentine theorists, it was of course Machiavelli in his Discorsi or Discourses on the 
First Ten Books of Titus Livy who provided the most famous version of the same argument. 
As he explains at the start of book II: 
 
 It is easy to understand whence the love of living under a free constitution springs 
 up in peoples. For experience shows that no cities have ever increased in dominion 
 or riches except when they have been established in liberty. 
 
The reason, he goes on 
 
 is easy to perceive, for it is not the pursuit of individual advantage but of the common 
 good that makes cities great, and there is no doubt that it is only under republican 
 regimes that this ideal of the common good is followed out.105
 
From the point of view of the present argument, it can be said that it is within the republican 
tradition of thought that we encounter, for the first time, a vindication of the idea that there is 
a distinct form of “civil” or “political” authority which is wholly autonomous, which exists to 
regulate the public affairs of an independent community, and which tolerates no rivals as a 
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source of  coercive power within its own civitas or res publica. It is here in short, that we first 
encounter the familiar understanding of the state as a monopolist of legitimate force.106
 
This view of  “civil government” was of course taken up in France and England at an early 
stage in their constitutional development. National monarchies were emerging in France and 
England in the 15th century: England with the installation of Henry VII, the first Tudor King; 
France with the end of the Hundred Years War; Spain with the marriage of Ferdinand and 
Isabella. In the German and Italian domains that remained divided into a multitude of princely 
states, unification was held up until the 19th century.107
 
The political task of the new monarchs in France and England was to centralize 
administration and law and subdue the medieval representative institutions of the clergy, the 
nobility and the bourgeoisie that obstructed it. For this they needed standing armies and 
revenue from taxes with which to support them. New weapons, notably the cannon, helped to 
nullify the castles of the nobility.108  
 
The collection of revenue, as well as the growth of the general right to tax, led to the 
commercialisation of economic life and the loss of control by the nobility over taxation and 
with it the power to influence the king, as medieval kings came to take into their possession 
the instruments of rule that had up until then been dispersed among the estates.109 They began 
to construct an administrative apparatus for the formulation and execution of centralized, 
territory-wide rule. This structure became more public, official, distinctive, and visible. 
Society came to be seen more as composed of private individuals and not corporate groups.110  
 
Large territorial political units emerged, and politico-military power became concentrated in 
the institutions and offices of the king and his court. As a result, public officials eventually 
replaced individuals who held political power as a private possession, and the centralized 
medieval monarchy, the precursor of the modern territorial state, came into being.111
 
As power and authority came to be concentrated more in the institutions and offices of the 
king and his court, they were increasingly depersonalised which involved, first the 
development of uniform impersonal systems of law, such as common law in England and 
Roman code law on the continent.112 The second element of the increasing depersonalisation 
was the development of a new language of politics and rule revolving around the idea of state 
sovereignty.  
 
Medieval kings claimed a different kind of sovereignty from that of kings in feudal “states”. 
For, as authority, the legitimate right to exercise power, came to be vested in the state itself, 
and in the person of the king for as long as the king represented the imagined unity of the state, 
the king claimed to be not simply primus inter pares (“first among equals”) but a separate, 
overarching sovereign – that is, one whose power was free from control by all others.113
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In this new language of politics, the king became more and more the symbolic representation 
of the apparatus that managed public affairs. In other words, the state became identified less 
with the authoritative decisions of private persons, in this case the king, and more as an 
ongoing apparatus of processes, offices, and institutions under the supervision of the king.114
 
When Machiavelli wrote his most famous book, the Prince, most of Italy was divided among 
five states: Naples, Milan, Venice, Florence and the Papal states. He shared with Marsilio a 
common hatred for the unwarranted interference of the Pope in secular matters that he held to 
be  responsible for the disunity of Italy and the inability of any other ruler to unite the land, 
leaving it a prey to the French, the Spaniards and the Germans. In Machiavelli’s view: 
 
a country can never be united and happy except it obeys wholly one government, 
whether a republic or a monarchy, as is the case in France and Spain; and the sole 
cause why Italy is not in the same condition, and is not governed by either one 
republic or one sovereign, is the Church.115
 
Apart from a common hatred for the unwarranted interference of the pope in secular matters 
as a cause for the disunity of Italy which Machiavelli shared with Marsilio, observes Sabine, 
the two men had similar ideas about the political utility which religion ought to have as its 
secular consequences. However, Machiavelli’s secularism was more thoroughgoing than that 
of Marsilio in that, whereas Marsilio defended the autonomy of reason by making Christian 
morals otherworldly, Machiavelli condemns them because they are otherworldly. He believed 
Christian virtues were servile in their effects on character, and contrasted Christianity 
unfavourably with the more virile religions of antiquity. 
 
 Our religion places the supreme happiness in humility, lowliness, and a contempt for  
 worldly objects, while the other, on the contrary, places the supreme good in grandeur  
 of soul, strength of body, and all such other qualities as render men formidable… 
 These principles seem to me to have made men feeble, and can control them to become 
 an easy prey to evil-minded men, who can control them more securely, seeing that the  
 great body of men, for the sake of gaining paradise, are more disposed to endure  
 injuries than to avenge them. 
 
Machiavelli does not deny the important role of religion in the state in making citizens good 
and obedient. Nevertheless, when confronted with a choice between a strong and successful 
state and the Christian virtues of private goodness, the ruler must not actually believe in the 
religion of his subjects or practice their virtues. 
 
Machiavelli’s indifference to Christian morals has sometimes been described as an example 
of scientific detachment. Machiavelli was not detached; he was merely interested in a single 
end of acquiring and maintaining state power, and indifferent to all others. Political and 
military measures were almost the sole objects of Machiavelli’s interest and he detached these 
from religious and moral considerations, except as the latter were politically expedient. 
 
The purpose of politics was to acquire and maintain state power itself, and the standard by 
which he judged it was its success in doing this. He therefore never hesitated to pass sweeping 
judgments on rulers who allowed their states to grow weak. His judgment was formed 
empirically by the observation of rulers he had known or by studying historical examples. 
 
                                                 
114 Walter Opello, Jr. and Stephen J. Rosow, The Nation-State and Global Order, p. 56. 
115 Nicollo Machiavelli, The Prince and Discourses ed., Max Lerner,  New York: Random House, 1950, p.12 
 41
He used history, exactly as he used his own observation of rulers he had personally known, to 
draw maxims or rules for successful political behaviour in order to write something ‘useful to 
the enquirer’. Machiavelli’s method is illustrated in the third chapter of the Prince, where ‘the 
general rule’ (regola generale) that ‘he who enables someone to become powerful ruins 
himself’ is drawn from Machiavelli’s practical experience of Louis XII’s campaign in Italy 
that made Popes Alexander VI and Julius II strong at his own expense. 
 
The originality of Machiavelli’s method lies in his use of the growing Renaissance’s emphasis 
on man’s behavioural patterns instead of Christian moral precepts as a basis for politics. His 
method is based on a pragmatic and utilitarian approach to politics, trying to be useful (utile) 
by getting at the real truth of the matter (verita effetuale) instead of dealing merely with 
imaginary situations. The Renaissance impelled Machiavelli to re-examine things other than 
from the clerical point of view, that is from a purely secular basis. 
 
Machiavelli is regarded as the founder of the true political philosophy. 116  He makes an 
emphatic break with the tradition of political philosophy associated with the names of 
Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine and others. The entire tradition had failed both in its 
quest for truth and in its inability to lead men toward peace. The classics failed, because they 
based their political doctrines on considerations of man’s highest aspirations, the life of virtue 
and the society dedicated to the promotion of virtue.117 They conceived of human beings not 
as they are but as they ought or wished them to be, they rendered themselves ineffective; as 
Bacon said, they made imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths.  
 
The actualisation of the best regime, Machiavelli contended, depends on Fortuna, that is, on 
luck, chance or something which is essentially beyond human control. Fortuna, Machiavelli 
said in a famous passage in the Prince, “ is a woman and it is necessary, if you wish to master 
her, to conquer her by force.”118 Machiavelli’s realistic assessment of politics revives the 
Roman idea of virtù, that is the individual’s (male’s) own abilities to master the circumstances 
he finds in the world. Politics, he declared, demanded that the ruler knows how men live.  
 
Machiavelli was not concerned with how men do live merely in order to describe it; his 
intention is rather, on the basis of how men do live, to teach princes how they ought to rule 
and even how they ought to live.  A ruler should know that if he is to live happily and his rule 
is to be strong and effective men’s nature is such that a wise ruler cannot and should not do in 
every matter what is good or else he will be ruined by so many who are not good. 
 
Underlying Machiavelli’s realistic view of politics was the assumption that human nature is 
essentially selfish, and that the effective motives on which a statesman must rely are egoistic, 
such as the desire for security in the masses and the desire for power in rulers. Government is 
really founded upon the weaknesses of the individual who is unable to protect himself against 
the aggression of other individuals unless supported by the power of the state. 
 
Human nature, moreover, is profoundly aggressive and acquisitive: men aim to keep what 
they have and to acquire more, Machiavelli argues. Neither in power nor in possessions is 
there any normal limit to human desires, while both power and possessions are always in fact 
limited by natural scarcity. Accordingly, men are always in a condition of strife and 
competition which threatens to lead to anarchy unless restrained by the force behind law.  
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The power of the ruler is therefore built upon the very imminence of anarchy and the fact that 
security is possible only when government is strong. Machiavelli constantly takes this 
conception of government for granted, though he nowhere develops it into a general 
psychological theory of behaviour. He frequently remarks, however, that humans are in 
general bad and that the wise ruler will construct his policies on this assumption. 
 
In particular, Machiavelli insists that successful governments must aim at the security of 
property and of life and everything else; since these are the most universal desires in human 
nature. When completed by a systematic psychology to explain and justify it, this phase of 
Machiavelli became the political philosophy of  Thomas Hobbes. 
 
However, Machiavelli is not so much concerned with badness or egoism as a general human 
motive, as with its prevalence in Italy as a symptom of social decadence. Italy stood to him as 
an instance of a society, with no such partial mitigation, as the monarchy brought in France 
and Spain. 
 
In fact it is in vain to look for anything good from these countries which we see 
nowadays so corrupt, as is the case above all others with Italy, France and Spain also 
have their share of corruption, and if we do not see so many disorders and troubles in 
those countries as is the case daily in Italy, it is no longer so much owing to the 
goodness of their people…as to the fact that they have each a king who keeps them 
united.119
 
The problem in Italy, then, was to found a state in a corrupt society. By corruption, 
Machiavelli meant in general the decay of private virtue and civic probity and devotion that 
renders popular government impossible. It included all sorts of disorder and violence, great 
inequalities of wealth and power, the destruction of peace and justice, the growth of ambition, 
disunity, lawlessness, dishonesty and contempt for religion. Machiavelli was convinced that, 
in such circumstances, no effective government was possible except absolute monarchy.  
 
A successful state needs to have a single man at the top, and the laws and government that he 
creates determine the national character of his people. Moral and civic virtue grows out of law 
and when a society has become corrupt, it cannot reform itself. It can only be reformed when 
a law-giver takes control of it and restores it to the healthy principles set up by its founder. 
 
 But we must assume, as a general rule, that it never or rarely happens that a republic 
 or a monarchy is well constituted, or its old institutions entirely retained, unless it is 
 done by only one individual; it is even necessary that he whose mind has conceived 
 such a constitution should be alone in carrying it into effect.120
 
Machiavelli was not thinking only, or even mainly, of political organization, but of the whole 
moral and social constitution of a people, which he conceived to grow out of the law and from 
the wisdom and foresight of the law-giver. There is practically no limit to what a ruler can do, 
provided he understands the rules of the art.  The lawgiver is the architect not only of the state 
but of society as well, with all its moral, religious and economic institutions.  
 
From this point of view, it is easier to understand the double standard of conduct for the 
statesman and the private citizen which forms the main connotation of Machiavellism. The 
                                                 
119 Ibid., p. 321. 
120 Ibid., p. 323. 
 43
ruler as creator of the state is not only outside the law, but if law enacts morals, he is outside 
morality as well. There is no standard to judge his acts except the success of his political 
expedients for enlarging and perpetuating the power of his state.  
 
The frankness with which Machiavelli accepted this conclusion and included it in his advice 
to rulers is the chief reason for the evil reputation of the Prince. He openly sanctioned the use 
of cruelty, perfidy, murder, or any other means provided only they are used with sufficient 
intelligence and secrecy to reach their ends.  
 
It is well that, when the act accuses him, the result should excuse him; and when the 
result is good, as in the case of Romulus[his murder of his brother], it will always 
absolve him from blame. For he is to be reprehended who commits violence for the 
purpose of destroying, and not he who employs it for beneficent purpose.121
  
Machiavelli’s prince, the prefect embodiment of shrewdness and self-control, who makes 
capital alike of his virtues and his vices, was little more than an idealized picture of the Italian 
tyrant of the 16th century. He is a true, if exaggerated, picture of the kind of man that the age 
of the despots threw into the forefront of political life. Though the most extreme examples 
occurred in Italy, Ferdinand of Spain, Louis XI of France, and Henry VIII of England were of 
the same type. 
 
There is no doubt that Machiavelli had a temperamental admiration for the resourceful, if 
unscrupulous, type of ruler and a deep distrust of half-way measures in politics which he 
believed to be due to weakness more often that to scruple. His admiration for this type 
sometimes betrayed him into serious superficialities of judgment, as when he held up the 
unspeakable Cesare Borgia as the model of a wise prince and asserted that his political failure 
was due to nothing but unavoidable accident. 
 
Machiavelli never erected his belief in the omnipotent lawgiver into a general theory of 
political absolutism, as Hobbes did later. His judgment was swayed by two admirations for 
the resourceful despot and for the free, self-governing people which were not consistent. He 
patched the two together, rather precariously, as the theories respectively of founding a state 
and of preserving it after it is founded.  
 
Therefore, he recommended despotism only in two somewhat special cases, the making of a 
state and the reforming of a corrupt state. Once founded, a state can be made permanent only 
if people are admitted to some share in government and if the prince conducts the ordinary 
business of the state in accordance with law and with due regard for the property and women 
of his subjects, since these are matters on which men are most easily stirred to resistance. 
 
The preservation of the state, as distinct from its founding, depends upon the excellence of its 
law, for this is the source of all the civic virtues of its citizens. Even in a monarchy the prime 
condition of a stable government is that it should be regulated by law. As a result, Machiavelli 
no longer equates the idea of governmental authority with the powers of particular rulers but 
as embodied in a structure of laws and institutions which rulers may be said to have a duty to 
maintain. 
 
Machiavelli favoured a gentle rule wherever possible and the use of severity only in 
moderation. He said explicitly that government is more stable where it is shared by the many 
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and he preferred election to heredity as a mode of choosing rulers. He spoke for a general 
freedom to propose measures for the public good and for liberty of discussion in order that 
both sides of every question may be heard before a decision is reached. He believed that the 
people must be independent and strong. 
 
Closely related to his favourable judgment of popular government where possible, and of 
monarchy where necessary, is his exceedingly low opinion of aristocracy and the nobility. 
More than any other thinker of his time he perceived that the interest of the nobility are 
antagonistic both to those of the monarchy and of the middle class, and that orderly 
government required their suppression or elimination. 
 
Side by side with Machiavelli’s dislike of the nobility stands his hatred of mercenary soldiers. 
Here again he had in view of one of the most serious causes of lawlessness in Italy, mercenary 
troops who were ready to fight for whosoever would offer the largest pay, who were faithful 
to no one, and who were often more dangerous to their employer than to his enemies.  
 
Such professional soldiers had almost wholly displaced the older citizen-soldiers of the free 
cities, and while they were able to terrorize Italy, they had proved their incompetence against 
better organized and more loyal troops from France. Machiavelli had a clear perception of the 
advantage which France gained from nationalizing her army and consequently he was never 
tired of urging that the training and equipment of a citizen-army is the first need of a state. 
 
The art of war is therefore the primary concern of a ruler, the condition of success in all his 
ventures. Before everything else he must aim to possess a strong force of his own citizens, 
well equipped and well disciplined, and attached to his interests by ties of loyalty to the state. 
With such a force the ruler can maintain his power and extend limits of the state; without it he 
becomes a prey to civil strife within and to the ambition of neighbouring princes. 
 
It took several centuries for the principle of state sovereignty that unified political rule within 
a specific territory to develop. The authority and growing power claimed by centralizing 
monarchs were contested throughout the period of the renaissance and beyond, in some cases 
successfully, by the Catholic church, as well as  the nobility of most European kingdoms.  
 
Moreover, kings did not yet clearly see themselves as representatives of the sovereign power 
of the state. Most kings continued to frame their claims to power in terms of their being 
representatives of a universal Christendom in Europe and claim the authority to bring the 
coercive power of the state to bear against heretics inside and outside their jurisdiction. This 
set the stage for a prolonged period of  religious persecution and confessional war against the 
Protestant reform movement across Europe. From the pacification of warring confessional 
groups followed the second and final stage of the secularisation process that gave primacy and 
supremacy to politics over religion which was reduced to an affair of the private citizen. 
 
 
4.3.  The Second Stage of Secularisation : The Christian Reformation and the  
Development of State Sovereignty. 
 
 
An important catalyst for the transformation of medieval monarchies into an idea of 
sovereignty that unified political rule within a specified territory that linked the local to the 
national and the rest of the world, in ways that broke with the traditions of medieval 
Christendom, was the Reformation and religious violence it bred between Catholics and 
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Protestants from the great slaughter of Protestants in Paris 1572 to the Thirty Years War 
(1618-1648).122  With the Church in disarray, freedom was given to the state to begin to 
develop. Princes began to tolerate less and less manipulation from the church. The monarchy 
began to detach itself from the Church for its legitimacy and looked towards its own power. 
 
The Reformation was a movement of revolt against the Catholic Church by those who 
considered it corrupt, more concerned with maintaining its power and privileges than with 
guiding the spiritual salvation of Christendom. At first, reformists were members of the 
Catholic clergy, notable among whom was the German monk Martin Luther (1482-1546).123 
But soon they hardened themselves into separate churches as Lutherans, Presbyterians and 
Calvinists and spread throughout Europe, especially among the bourgeoisie and the nobility. 
 
Reformers, known as Protestants argued that salvation depended on individual faith alone. 
Protestant religious practice emphasized the private, personal relationship between the 
individual person and God; this relationship, they argued, obviated the need for the Catholic 
Church’s liturgy, sacraments, and official hierarchy of priests, bishops and the pope. Indeed, 
Protestants argued that the Catholic Church’s statues and images of its saints amounted to 
false gods; some even viewed the Catholic hierarchy, including the Pope, as the Antichrist.124
 
After the religious split became reality, the European Christendom was faced with the 
question of how possible it was for different religious confessions to live together with each 
other in a common political order. By virtue of  the meaning that the Christian religion had for 
the political order as the foundation for a minimum amount of existential common ground of 
homogeneity between rulers and the ruled that gave the state its legitimacy, the conflict 
between the Catholics and Protestants was not only religious, but at the same time  political. 
 
For both Catholics and Protestants, the conflict was about which one of them professed the 
true faith or pure Gospel; as a fight about truth, the conflict allowed for no compromise. After 
the determining conditions of spiritual and worldly violence that theologians and canonists on 
both sides of the confessional divide fostered, it was considered the responsibility of the 
worldly political order to openly suppress error with its own means and punish heretics.  
 
Heresy was therefore determined by the church but punished by temporal rulers as a civil 
crime.125 The inquisition, for instance, was the judicial institution established by the Catholic 
Church that gave the papacy the de jure power to seek out and try people guilty of heresy 
while secular rulers were given de facto power to do the coercive work of punishing offenders. 
 
Both Catholics and Protestants alike were in agreement that not only rebellious heretics that at 
the same time fanned political unrest were to be punished; it was the responsibility of the 
secular order to also punish non-rebellious heretics that did not wreck havoc by fomenting  
political unrest. For, they were both to be considered blasphemous. Indeed, observes 
Boeckenfoerde, this understanding of faith as a legal-like relationship and the continuous 
working tradition of the polis religion precluded a culture of civil tolerance.126
 
From the foregoing consideration, it can be safely surmised that it was thus unavoidable that 
the question of religion became a matter of politics. In the 16th and 17th century, Europe 
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experienced a wave of the horrifying Wars of Religion between Catholics and Protestants; 
political and religious interests, exertion for the true faith and a striving for the extension of 
and claims for political power continuously crossed and combined with each other.  
 
This religious-political conflict took place specifically in three different places in Europe with 
different outcomes: in Spain under Philip II who dedicated his monarchy to overthrowing 
Protestant states of other countries, in the Holy Roman Empire in the conflict between the 
King and the feudal estates, in France in the conflict between Catholics and Huguenots 
(Protestants) and the nobility over the ruling of the country. From these Wars of Religion 
followed the second stage of secularisation of the pure worldly and political foundation and 
legitimation of the state; with the coming up of the second stage of secularisation, the 
separation of religion and politics was in principle at the same time also  settled.127  
 
It may remain to be seen how far this development was a result of the intention of those 
involved at the time, but this development arose from the logic of the historical situation and 
the conditions of human agency already given in it. The distinction between the spiritual and 
worldly, first used by popes to justify church supremacy, now developed its strength in the 
direction of the primacy and supremacy of politics. The demands of the spiritual authority on 
worldly power (to suppress error with its own means and punish heretics) that ensued in the 
wake of the confessional split, contained the threat of permanent political conflict. 
 
However, because politics placed itself above the demands of the conflicting religious 
confessions, it emancipated itself from them and actually allowed for a pacified political order, 
peace and security for the people and for everyone to be restored. It is within this context that 
the development of the position of power of the King in France, the “cuius regio eius religio” 
(a subject’s religion should be that of his ruler) in the Holy Roman Empire, the already 
applying idea of sovereignty that unified political rule within a specified territory at the turn 
of the 16/17th century and the political thinking of Thomas Hobbes should be understood. 
 
The first major wars of religion were the series of wars fought between Catholics and 
Huguenots (Protestants) from the middle of the 16th century to the development of the 
position of the king of France as neutral authority standing above the warring religious 
confessions and finally to the Edict of Nantes in 1598. In addition to religious elements, they 
also involved a struggle for influence over the control of the ruling of the country by Francis 
II who took over from his Father Henry II as King of France at the tender age of fifteen.  
 
Understanding that the monarchy was in a weak position, the noble family of Guise and the 
Catholic League, on the one hand, and the noble family of Bourbons, who were mostly 
Catholic, but for political reasons supported the Protestant cause,  on the other hand, struggled 
for control of  the rule of France. The most powerful Catholic family of Guise would 
eventually gain control of the young monarch and, for all practical purposes, the French state.  
 
When Francis II died, barely one year after taking over from his father, his younger brother, 
Charles IX  assumed the throne. The accession of Charles IX, who was barely ten years old, 
clearly called for the appointment of  a regent (a regent is the ruler of a kingdom when the 
king is incapable of exercising that rule), as the position was openly coveted by the Catholic 
family of Guise.128  In 1560, Catherine de Medici  succeeded in thwarting this ambition by 
accepting the regency of  her young son.                                                                                                              
                                                 
127 Ibid., p. 50. 
128 Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: The Reformation, Vol. 2, Cambridge:  
     Cambridge University Press, 1978, p. 243. 
 47
 
However, Catherine still found her government under enormous pressure from the Catholic 
family of Guise to impose its policy of religious uniformity by force, in particular the use of 
weapons to suppress the Huguenots (Protestants). But she understood right off that the 
Catholic family of Guise would be a threat to her if she allowed such a policy. For, it would 
be equivalent to overcoming their rivals amongst the Huguenot nobility, and would thus be 
equivalent to making themselves completely dominant in the Kingdom’s affairs.129  
 
As Catherine  de Medici quickly perceived, her best hope of maintaining her own authority 
was to steer the throne carefully between the powerful and conflicting interests that 
surrounded it. Although she was a sincere Roman Catholic, she was prepared to bring about 
an agreed measure of religious toleration for the Huguenots, hoping in this way to avoid the 
domination of the most powerful Catholic family of Guise. This accordingly became her 
policy throughout the 1560s and later that of her son Charles IX, a fact which does much to 
explain the initial cautious approach adopted by the Huguenots. 
 
During the early stages of the religious wars, the Huguenots adopted a strategy of avoiding as 
far as possible any direct confrontation with the government of Catherine de Medici. This 
relatively passive strategy was partly forced on the Huguenots by their lack of any very 
powerful basis of popular support.130 Moreover, such support, as they did succeed in winning, 
tended to be concentrated in the more remote corners of the land. On the other hand, the 
Guises, who had formed the Catholic League, were aided by Philip II of Spain who was 
dedicated to overthrowing Protestant states and were therefore in a very strong position. 
 
While the foregoing considerations virtually forced the Huguenots to proceed at the outset 
with as much caution as possible, it was also rational for them to hope that they might be able 
to emerge from the growing factional conflicts with the Catholics with a relief from 
persecution and a measure of official toleration for their faith. The most obvious reason for 
this optimism was that Catherine de Medici made it clear throughout the early phases of the 
civil wars that she was emphatically in favour of a policy of compromise.131  
 
Another reason why it was rational for the Huguenots to pin their hopes on winning an 
official measure of toleration in the 1560s was that an influential group of moderate Catholics 
had by that time come to the conclusion that any attempt to impose a policy of religious 
uniformity by force would constitute a serious tactical even if not a moral mistake. This 
became the characteristic platform of the so-called party of politiques (“politicians”), who 
argued that uniformity was no longer worth preserving, however valuable it might be in itself, 
if the cost of enforcing it seemed liable to be the destruction of the commonwealth.132  
 
The politiques’ case was mainly presented by those who had no belief in religious toleration 
as a positive moral value, but merely believed in the unfortunate necessity of conceding it as 
the only alternative to endemic civil strife. As already mentioned, this became the policy of 
the government itself, and as the crisis between Catholics and Protestants deepened, this 
position was brilliantly and very influentially expounded in a series of speeches by Michel de 
l’ Hôpital, the moderate chancellor nominated by Catherine in May 1560. 
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In spite of  the unquestioned value of his earlier advocacy for a return to a unified faith in the 
hope of trying to bring about civil peace in the state, l’ Hôpital quickly came to realize, 
however, that the price of trying to impose the time honoured demand for ‘one faith, one law, 
one king’ (une foi, une loi, un roi) was becoming ruinous. This appears most clearly in his 
opening address to the representatives of Parlements assembled at St. Germain in January 
1562. He proceeds from two uncontentious claims: that religious uniformity is always 
desirable, but that ‘those of the new religion have become so much bolder’ of late that any 
attempt to enforce uniformity will now be liable to constitute a grave danger to civil peace.  
 
L’ Hôpital then moves on to introduce two new principles of far-reaching significance in the 
development of a specific thinking of the state, as we shall later see. He argues that while 
government may be said to have a duty to defend the established religion of the state, it has an 
even more compelling duty to ‘maintain the people in peace and tranquillity’ Where these two 
duties collide, he is now prepared to contemplate separating the fate of the kingdom from that 
of the Catholic faith, insisting that the fundamental question at issue ‘is not about the 
maintenance of religion but about maintaining of the commonwealth.133
 
He then offers the reassurance that such a loss of unity need not have very catastrophic effects, 
since religious uniformity is not essential to the well-being of France. He cites with approval 
the claim that ‘many can be citizens who will not be Christians’, and insists that it must be 
possible for the kingdom as a whole ‘to live in peace with those who have different opinions’, 
if only because it has already been proved in the case of individual families that ‘those who 
remain Catholic do not cease to love and live in amity with those who adopt the new faith’. 
 
L’ Hôpital’s conclusion is thus that religious uniformity is simply inapplicable in the existing 
circumstances of the time. The enforcement of uniformity ‘may be good in itself’ but 
‘experience has shown it to be impossible’. 134  Any attempt to enforce uniformity by 
suppressing rival religions merely leads to the jeopardising of peace in the name of religious 
unity, whereas the only sane policy is thus to tolerate rival religious confessions. 
Consequently, l’ Hôpital urged measures for the toleration of  Huguenots to avert civil strife. 
 
The government of Catherine de Medici was led to support religious toleration in the shape of 
the Edict of Toleration (1562), which allowed the Huguenots to worship publicly outside of 
towns and privately in towns. On March 1, however,  the Guise family attacked a Huguenot 
service at Vassy and slaughtered everybody they could get their hands on. The Edict was 
revoked, under pressure from the Guise faction. This immediately prompted the Prince de 
Conde to mobilise on behalf of the Huguenots, and so sparked off the first religious wars. 
 
The pattern of unending warring conflict about the renewal and extension of the religious 
liberties of the Huguenots by Catherine de Medici and their limitation by the Guise family 
was repeated in 1563 following the signing of the Edict of Ambiose, in 1568 following the 
signing of the Peace of Longjumeau. The government completely lost the power to steer a 
politiques’  course after the violent renewal of  fighting in 1568, at which point l’ Hôpital  was 
forced to concede defeat and withdraw from public life. 
 
The summer of 1572 saw the final collapse of Huguenot hopes on the possibility of winning 
an official measure of religious toleration from government when Catherine suddenly 
abandoned any remaining chance of a politiques settlement by throwing in her lot with the 
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Guise family. Skinner discounts the traditional story that Catherine acted out of a growing 
hatred for the Huguenot spokesman Admiral Coligny’s influence of the young king.135
 
Instead, he does not doubt that Catherine begun to fear the increasing military as well as 
political strength of the Huguenots, especially after they began to threaten her perpetual 
efforts to preserve peace abroad as well as to contain the factional struggles at home. The 
immediate threat in the summer of 1572 arose out of Coligny’s demands for a campaign in 
support of the developing – and partly Calvinist – opposition to the rule of the Spanish in the 
Netherlands. This was the point at which Catherine decided to have Coligny eliminated.136
 
The first attempt to assassinate Coligny was made on August 22, 1572. It failed and Charles 
was persuaded by Catherine, the power behind her son’s throne, that the Huguenots would 
take revenge against the monarchy. Therefore, Charles IV approved in a pre-emptive strike, a 
day before St. Bartholomew’s Day, the murder of the entire Huguenot leadership. The 
outcome, the massacre on the eve of St. Bartholomew’s day, involved the slaughter of some 
three thousand Protestants, including de Coligny, on the occasion of the marriage of 
Marguerite de Valois to Henry of Navarre when many Huguenots were in Paris for the event.  
 
The St. Bartholomew Massacre was a turning point in both French history and the history of 
the European Christian church. Both Philip II of Spain, a fanatical Catholic himself, and Pope  
Gregory XIII declared themselves well-pleased with the outcome, which was naturally 
viewed with horror by their religious opponents throughout Europe. Throughout Europe, 
Protestant movements slowly transformed into militant movements. In France, the Huguenots 
were forced into a direct revolutionary confrontation with the  monarchy.  
 
When Charles IX died in 1574 and Henry III succeeded him, France had become a basket 
case. On the one hand, the noble family of Guise had formed a Catholic League, which was 
violent and fanatical. On the other hand, the Huguenots were filled with a passion for revenge. 
Like his mother, Henry tried to stay in the middle of the conflict. Unlike his mother, he had 
immense popular support for his middle course; the St. Bartholomew Massacre had deeply 
troubled moderate Catholics and the growing conflict upset moderate Huguenots. 
 
By the middle of the 1570s, however, the very ferocity of renewed conflicts began to be 
treated by many political writers as the clearest possible sign that a policy of toleration was in 
fact the only sane course of action for the government to pursue. The outcome was the revival, 
with a renewed sense of urgency, of the suggestion that such a policy needed to be adopted as 
the only means of avoiding the total ruin of France. 
 
This revival was of course partly the work of the Huguenots themselves, many of whom 
clearly feared, after the massacres of 1572, that unless they could somehow promote a policy 
of toleration once again, they might actually find themselves facing complete annihilation. Of 
course, this renewal of the politiques programme was more than a mere reflex on the part of 
the Huguenots, for the same arguments were soon developed once again by a number of 
moderate Catholic writers, the most important being Jean Bodin . 
 
Bodin developed the argument for the renewal of the politiques programme in his Six Books 
of a Commonwealth in 1576.137 He makes no pretence of dismissing the great and enduring 
value of religious uniformity. Like l’ Hôpital, be begins by admitting that nothing does more 
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to ‘uphold and maintain the estates and commonwealths’ than religious unity, since it serves 
to provide ‘the principal foundation of the power and strength’ of the state. He insists that 
since all ‘disputations of religion’ tend more than anything else to bring about ‘the ruin and 
destruction of commonwealths’, they ought rather to be ‘by most strict laws forbidden’, so 
that any religion which is ‘by common consent once received and settled, is not again to be 
called into question and dispute’.  
 
The foregoing sentiments are matched, however, by a reluctant yet absolutely clear perception 
that, since rival religions represent such a potent source of discord, they must always be 
tolerated where they cannot be suppressed. Bodin’s conclusion here is best expressed 
figuratively when he says, ‘the best advised princes’ must ‘imitate the wise pilots, who when 
they cannot attain unto the port by them desired, direct their course to such port as they may’.  
 
Bodin’s first reason for accepting this conclusion was that although the government may be 
said to have a duty to uphold the unity of religion, this cannot alter the fact that ‘the health 
and welfare of the commonwealth’ must remain ‘the chief thing the law respects’. Where 
good order is found to be in conflict with religious uniformity, the maintenance of the good 
order must always be treated as a higher priority. 
 
The other and even more emancipated argument he advances – very much in the spirit of l’ 
Hôpital – is that the ‘wars made for matters of religion’ – which, as he observes have been 
taking place ‘almost in all Europe within this fifty years’ – are not in fact ‘grounded upon 
matters directly touching his estate’. The implication is that all religious disputes ought in the 
end be seen as irrelevant to the essential business of government. 
 
The duty of the prince is to ignore and avoid all such arguments as far as possible, separating 
the welfare of his kingdom entirely from the fate of any particular religion and thereby 
ensuring that he is never driven ‘to make himself party, instead of holding the place of a 
sovereign judge’. In our view, Bodin saw in royal power the mainstay of peace and order and 
thus sought to raise the king, as centre of national unity, above all religious sects and political 
groups.  
 
The view of the politiques that royal power had a duty to maintain the good order of the 
commonwealth led to the development of a Machiavellian-type absolutist thinking of the state 
that is relevant in a time of disorder. Against the scholastic natural rights tradition, the 
politiques presented a formal conception of peace, developed not from the quest for truth, but 
from opposition against civil war. They gave primacy to this conception of  peace, that is the 
silence of weapons, the external peace and security of life over dispute about religions truth.  
 
In the words of Boeckenfoerde, civil war brings not a win or subjugation of heresy but hate, 
misery and enmity; weapons were not a suitable means to overcome the confessional split. 
Formal peace, as against the horror and suffering of civil war is for the politiques an 
independent justifiable good in itself. It is only to be brought about through the unity of the 
land that is only possible through the observance of the order of the king as the highest law; 
the king is the neutral authority which stands over and above the warring parties and citizens. 
Therefore, only the king is in a position to bring about peace and to preserve it.138  
 
The diversity of the confessions is for the politiques no longer a state but a church matter. The 
king has to ensure that his subjects do not seek to destroy themselves in bloody and insidious 
                                                 
138 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit, p. 51. 
 51
obstinacy. He cannot and should not himself decide the question of truth. The separation of 
politics from religion, the claim of autonomy asserts itself here without much ado, but 
emphatically. This general policy of settlement between politics and religion that left the 
question of truth to be decided by the subjects themselves and hence gave them freedom of 
conscience prevailed under Henry IV of Navarre, a Huguenot, who took over from his cousin 
Henry III, a catholic himself. 
 
By the mid-1580s, Henry III tried to put himself at the head of the Catholic League, while 
remaining in favour of a moderated settlement with the Huguenots. This was considered 
anathema to the Catholic extremists who wanted the Huguenots completely suppressed. In 
May 1588, the League rose against the king and drove him from Paris into exile.  
 
In exile, Henry III made an alliance with his Huguenot cousin, Henry of Navarre. However, 
before the two Henrys could attack Paris, Henry III was assassinated by a fanatic monk in 
July 1589. Since he had no children, Henry III named Henry of Navarre as the heir to the 
throne before he met his death. Henry of Navarre was a politique; he believed that the peace 
and security of France was far more important than imposing his religious views.  
 
The situation on the ground in 1590 was that king Henry IV of France, as Navarre had 
become, held the south and west, and the Catholic League the north and east. He knew that he 
had to take Paris if he stood any chance of reuniting the Kingdom. Realising that there was no 
prospect of a Protestant king succeeding in fanatically Catholic Paris, Henry IV announced 
his conversion to the old faith and was crowned at Chartres in 1594. 
 
As Henry IV of Navarre finally converted to the Catholic faith to realise his existing claim to 
the throne, Boeckenfoerde explains, this was no longer a win of the true religion, like it may 
have appeared from the outside but a win of politics.139 In order finally to give peace to the  
country, to guarantee the rule of the king, a change of faith took place. The Catholic League 
fought on but enough moderate Catholics were won over to the throne by the conversion to 
make the party of the Catholic League ultimately one of extremists only. 
 
The first thing that Henry IV of Navarre did  after he externally pacified the country, 
following the signing the Peace of Vervins that saw the withdrawal of the Spanish from 
France, was to negotiate for the Edict of Nantes that granted to Huguenots the right to worship 
publicly, to occupy public office, to assemble, to gain admission to schools and universities, 
and to administer their own towns. Rather than being a genuine toleration of Protestants, the 
Edict was a permanent truce between the two religions, guaranteeing the existence of both.  
 
As citizens of the kingdom, individuals were able to enjoy all civil rights, with the freedom of 
religion being the first right to be guaranteed, without the requirement by the state that 
citizens belong to the true religion. The first substantial separation of Church and state 
herewith became reality. For the first time, the Edict of Nantes was able to allow two religions 
in a state. The Edict can be said to mark the end of the first Civil Wars of Religion in France. 
 
The other major war of religion was the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) which took place in 
Germany, that was part of the Holy Roman Empire, and extended from the North Sea to the 
Mediterranean. Germany then was not a unified state, but a loose collection of a huge number 
of autonomous province-states half of which were predominantly Protestant while the other 
half were predominantly Catholic. Religious differences between Catholics and Protestants 
stoked the fires of the political and economic rivalries between these separate states. 
                                                 
139 Ibid. pp. 52-53. 
 52
 
The fighting was bloody because the combatants thought they had God on their side and that 
the enemy was the instrument of Satan. It is estimated that about one-third of the population 
of German-speaking Europe died as a result of the fighting. Eventually, the desire to end 
bloodshed and economic devastation led to a new concern with peace in Europe.140 An end to 
the bloodshed of the Holy Roman Empire came in sight with the Peace of Augsburg of 1555,  
followed by the signing of peace treaties in 1648 in the cities of Muenster and Osnabrueck , 
141which lie about fifty kilometres from each other in the present day state of North Rhine-
Westphalia. Hence these treaties were known collectively as the Peace of Westphalia.142
 
The Peace of Westphalia was the agreement which not only ended religious violence for 
purely political motives, but also sanctioned the division of the Holy Roman Empire into 
territorially-bound states and gave absolute authority to the sovereign of each state. This was 
accomplished by granting rulers the right to decide the religion of their new states which  in 
turn was transferred down to the people as a private affair. Thus, once again, the authority of 
the church was restricted with respect to the exercise of temporal functions, however this time 
by the emergence of the institution of the state that attained primacy and supremacy over it. 
 
The principle of cuius regio, euis religio,  that a subject’s religion should be that of his ruler, 
which was implicit in the Peace of Augsburg of 1555, was not formulated until the end of the 
century and came to be more explicit in the Peace of Westphalia, set a precedent of non-
interference in other states’ internal affairs and was key in the evolution of the modern state as 
a legitimate actor in the international system of states. The peace treaties also further 
encouraged the development and use of diplomacy, that is the art and practice of conducting 
relations among states through embassies and ambassadors, that begun in the 16th century.143
 
Increasingly, the political other was conceived of as a state, with a specific geographic 
location, rather than a heretical religious group, a rival noble family, or a person of inferior 
rank. Gaining knowledge about and communicating with other states required different norms, 
rules, and formal institutions than did overcoming the estrangement from heretics or rival 
nobility. The new institutions of diplomacy, then, both presupposed the organization of 
territorial states and helped to further their entrenchment into a system of states.144
 
In this view of things, the Peace of Westphalia is considered the most important historical 
benchmark in the formation of the modern territorial state. Through it the principles of state 
sovereignty became normalized into a new political imaginary that, inside the state, 
sovereignty referred to legitimate, controlling authority, while outside, sovereignty referred to 
the reciprocal right of self-determination against dynastic, imperial or other claims, as well as 
freedom from external religious interference.145
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4.4. The  Territorial State Sovereignty Imagined: Social Contract Theory. 
 
 
From the Peace of Westphalia, observe Opello and Rosow, arose the problem of  how to 
imagine and represent a combined religious, moral, and political authority in a secular, earthly 
entity confined within territorial boundaries. It was imperative to find a solution since these 
territorial entities were created by conventions and agreements, which gave some measure of 
peace to the Europe of religious wars and which had to be grounded and secured.146
 
 
 
4.4.1. Thomas Hobbes’ Absolute Monarchy. 
 
 
The predominant solution to this crisis of the representation of territorial authority was to 
imagine the state as a symbolic body, a body politic.  This representation of authority, which 
was to have a lasting effect, was developed by the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes 
(1558-1679) in the Leviathan. For Hobbes, the reason for having the state, that great 
Leviathan called a commonwealth, was the interest of  individual subjects in securing their 
own peace, as well as protection for their own lives,  property, and families.  
 
Thomas Hobbes, deeply worried by the English Civil War of 1642-7 and the defeat and 
execution of Charles I that he attributed to the unlimited exercise of private judgment in 
matters of religion endorsed and practiced by anti-episcopal Protestants147, leads the readers 
of his Leviathan, to imagine a ‘state of nature’, a situation where no absolute sovereign state 
exists, in order to justify his political conclusion for an absolute sovereign state. 
 
Hobbes hypothesized that with no common power to keep them in awe, human beings would 
live in a natural state characterized by a state of war ‘where every man is enemy to every 
man’. He defines the state of war not as the state of constant conflict, but as a constant threat 
of conflict that is synonymous with anarchy, so that no one can relax and let down their guard.   
Nothing could be worse than life without the protection of the state, Hobbes argued, and 
therefore an absolute sovereign state was essential so that society does no lapse into anarchy. 
 
Hobbes answer to the question on why a society where no absolute sovereign state exists 
would be a state of anarchy depends almost entirely upon his psychological theory about the 
nature of man. Following Machiavelli’s realism, Hobbes aimed to found a science of society 
and politics not on the basis of man’s highest aspirations, but on the basis of men’s lower but 
most powerful motives that were more likely to be realized: not reason, but passions.148 He 
set out to achieve his aim through the method of geometry by proceeding from the simplest 
propositions to the more complex structure in a step-by-step procedure. 
 
Hobbes believed, as a materialist influenced by the scientific movement of the time, that the 
first principles of all things are body, or matter, and motion, or change of place. The most 
important aspect of Hobbes’s account of matter was his adoption of Galileo’s principle of the 
conservation of motion. Prior to Galileo, philosophers and scientists had been puzzled by the 
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question of what kept things in motion. Galileo’s revolutionary answer was to say this was the 
wrong question. What needed to be explained was why things change direction and stop.149  
 
In Hobbes’s time this view was still a novum, and, he pointed out, defied the common sense 
thought that, just as we tire and seek rest after moving, objects will naturally do this too. But 
the truth, he claims, is that ‘when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless 
something else stays it’.150 This, he thought, was true for humans, too. So, Hobbes used the 
principle of the conservation of motion to develop a materialist, mechanist view of humans. 
 
Consistent with this view, Hobbes takes human beings as mechanical systems of material 
particles whose psychological states are governed by the same physical laws of motion as 
other material bodies. The broad outlines of this account are laid out in the introduction to the 
Leviathan: ‘What is the heart but a spring; and the nerves but so many strings; and the joints, 
but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body…?’151 Thus human beings are animated 
through motion. 
 
In accordance with Hobbes’s geometrical way of proceeding, one would begin with the 
physical laws of motion, from them deduce the passions, the causes of  the behaviour of 
individual men, and from the passions deduce the laws of social and political life. He 
understands human behaviour in terms of a mechanistic psychology of the passions or 
responses to sensations, which are a form of motion. Sensations are caused by the pressure of 
objects from outside on the sense organs through which it is transmitted to the central nervous 
system. Sensations always aid or retard the ‘vital motion’ or life of the human organism. 
 
Human beings invariably respond positively towards sensations that aid their vital motion and 
negatively towards sensations that retard this. As the vital motion is heightened or retarded, 
two primitive types of passions appear, desire and aversion, the first being a response towards 
that which is favourable to vital motion and the second being an avoidance of that which is 
unfavourable to vital motion. Hobbes calls the object of any man’s desire good and the object 
of his aversion evil. The chief object of  man’s desire is to preserve his own life in motion and 
the chief object of his aversion is the discontinuation of his own life in motion. 
 
Hobbes uses the theory of the conservation of  motion to portray human beings as always 
searching for something and never at rest. ‘There is no such thing as tranquillity of mind 
while we live here, because life itself is but a motion, and can never be without desire’152. 
Human beings, Hobbes argues, seek continual success in preserving their lives in motion. The 
desire for continual success in the preservation of life in motion is inseparable from the desire 
for power, the search for the ‘present means to obtain some future apparent good’153.  
 
The search for the present means of preserving life in motion is therefore equivalent to the 
endless desire of power of every sort, whether riches, or position, or reputation or honour. 
Human beings seek not only to procure the means of some future apparent good, but also to 
be insured of a contented life for themselves. ‘So that,’ Hobbes says, ‘in the first place, I put 
for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, 
                                                 
149 Jonathan Wolff, An Introduction to Political Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 9. 
150 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 87. 
151 Ibid., p.81. 
152 Ibid., pp. 129-30 
153 Ibid.,p. 150. 
 55
that ceases only in death’154. Human beings desire the same ends, and they have generally the 
same capacity to achieve them in the state of nature. 
 
While some human beings may be stronger or more intelligent than others, Hobbes assumes,  
they possess roughly the same level of strength and skill, and so any human being has the 
capacity to kill any other. ‘The weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by 
secret machination or by confederacy with others’155.  Since individuals are equally fragile or 
vulnerable to each other and equally seek to continue their own motion, Hobbes argued, each 
person has an equal natural right  
 
to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is 
to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything which in his own judgment, 
and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto… It follows that in 
such a condition every man has a right to everything, including another’s body.156
 
As Macpherson157  observes, Hobbes must be  accounted a natural rights man, and must 
indeed be ranked as the originator of modern natural right. For he made the decisive break 
with the Thomistic-scholastic hierarchical natural law tradition, in which natural rights had 
been deduced from natural law that prescribes ethical rules originating in divine order and 
binding upon earthly communities.  
 
He made the break, Macpherson argues, by deducing natural right from the innate compulsion 
or desire to preserve one’s life or motion, and he made this deduction of right from fact by his 
postulate of equal need of continued motion. It is because men are self-moving systems of 
matter in motion, each of which by the necessity of nature equally seeks to continue its own 
motion, and is equally fragile, that they must be allowed to have equal rights. 
 
It is from the equal right to life itself that Hobbes deduces the right to the means of 
preservation: ‘It is a …right of nature: that every man may preserve his own life and limbs, 
with all the power he has. And because where a man has a right to the end…it is consequent 
that it is…right for a man to use all means and do whatsoever action is necessary for the 
preservation of his body.’158 In such a situation every man has a right to everything. 
 
Since everyone has a natural right to do anything, to take anything, ‘to possess, use, and 
enjoy’159 anything, to invade any other man, it is clear that Hobbes’s conception of natural 
right is different from most ideas of natural rights which by the nature of things entail an 
obligation of other men to respect them. Hobbes makes this point, employing momentarily the 
more usual concept of right160: ‘But that right of all men to all things, is in effect no better 
than if no man had a right to anything. For there is little use and benefit of the right a man has, 
when another as strong, or stronger than himself, has the right to the same.’161  
 
Due to equality of strength and cunning, there arises equality of hope among all human beings 
who desire the same kind of thing. To this Hobbes adds the reasonable assumption that in the 
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state of nature there is a scarcity of goods, so that people who desire the same kind of thing 
will often desire to possess the same thing. Therefore, if any two men desire the same kind of 
thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to 
their end endeavour to destroy or subdue one another.162  
 
Finally, Hobbes points out that no one in the state of nature can make himself invulnerable 
against the possibility of attack. Whatever one possesses, others may desire, and so one must 
constantly be on one’s guard. So long as there is no common power to regulate their 
behaviour, a condition of  ‘war of every man against every man’ will break out in the attempt 
of each one to satisfy their desires at the expense of others. 
 
Such a condition is inconsistent with any kind of civilization : there is no place for industry, 
navigation, cultivation of the soil, building, or art. Men live in perpetual fear and danger of  
violent death. In a famous sentence, Hobbes sums up the horrors of such an existence, telling 
us that the life of man in the state of nature ‘is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’.163  
 
Equally, there is neither right nor wrong, justice nor injustice. ‘Where there is no common 
power, there is no law: where no law no injustice’164. Force and fraud are, in war, the two 
cardinal virtues. In the state of nature there is no property, no dominion, no distinction 
between mine and thine distinct, since the rule of life is ‘only to be every man’s, that he can 
get; and for so long as he can keep it’165. 
 
The human being is not by nature social. Contrary to the Aristotelian-scholastic claim, and in 
support of Machiavelli, nature dissociates, and renders humans apt to invade, and destroy one 
another. Hobbes goes on to assert that experience confirms the destructive and egoistic nature 
of the human being. When taking a journey, he arms himself and seeks to go well 
accompanied. When going to sleep, he locks his doors. Even when in his house, he locks his 
drawers. He would not behave so if human beings were good. 
 
Hobbes’s analysis of the state of nature indicates that the anti-social forces are as natural as, 
and when unmitigated by convention, even more powerful than, the forces promoting civil life. 
Human life in the state of nature is governed by the fear of death and desire for commodities 
of life that propel men to take for themselves what others desire and so brings them into 
conflict in their hope to satisfy what they desire at the expense of others. Reason, working 
along with these passions of fear, desire, and hope suggests rules for peaceful living and 
cooperation with others securing protection for people’s lives, property and families.  
 
Hobbes calls the rules for peaceful living and cooperation with others the laws of nature. A 
natural law, said Hobbes ‘is a precept or general rule, found out by reason,’ that is not a moral 
law but a theorem of conclusion of reason, telling the human being what to do and what not to 
do to survive. The first law of nature is therefore that every man ought to ‘seek peace and 
follow it’166. Now this law that urges man to seek peace is a pre-condition for his survival. 
Human beings have a better chance to survive if  they first help create conditions of peace . 
 
The second law of nature derived from and implementing the first  and fundamental law of 
nature states that the only way for human beings to achieve peace is for them to tacitly agree 
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with others to give up their natural claim to all things, save for the inalienable and inviolable 
claim to life, to a sovereign, whose form and particular identity they thus also determine. This 
presumes a social contract in which it is as if every man should say to every other man: 
 
 I authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly 
 of men, on this condition, that you give up your right to him and authorize all his  
 actions in like manner.167
 
That one should ‘keep covenants made’ is a further law of nature. Given the unsocial 
inclination of human beings in the state of nature, there is no trust that one or both parties will 
perform their covenants, for it may be in their interest not to perform, Hobbes reasons. 
‘Covenants without the sword, are but breath, and of no strength to secure a man at all’; to be 
effective they must be backed by the threat of sanctions for non-compliance. The fear of 
punishment compels all contractors to make good their promise to perform their covenants; 
once again, fear is the passion to be relied upon.  
 
The parties to the contract are individuals who promise each other to hand over their right to 
govern themselves to the sovereign; it is not a contract between the sovereign and the citizens. 
Political power, Skinner explains, is originally instituted by the people, but never in the form 
of a trust.168 For the people to perform that particular act, Hobbes stresses in Leviathan, it is 
essential for them to recognize that they are ‘renouncing and transferring’ their own original 
sovereignty, with the implication that it is totally abandoned or granted away’169 to someone 
else and by virtue of which this some else assumes absolute sovereign power.  
 
Civil government, Hobbes insists, cannot therefore be seen as the powers of citizens under 
another guise. It must be seen as a distinct form of power, for reasons that Hobbes enunciates 
with complete assurance in De Cive almost a decade before giving them classic expression in 
Leviathan. ‘Though a government,’ he declares, ‘be constituted by the contracts of particular 
men with particulars, yet its right depends not on that obligation only’.170  
 
By constituting such a government, ‘that right which every man had before to use his faculties 
to his own advantage are now wholly transferred on some certain man or council for the 
common benefit’.171 But whatever form the sovereign would take, it is clear that Hobbes saw 
the transfer of the right to rule from the people to the sovereign as both absolute and 
irrevocable. It is such an absolute and irrevocable transfer of natural rights that produces the 
political obligation of subjects on which the political right of the sovereign to rule depends. 
 
Hobbes was particularly anxious to demonstrate with logical rigor that sovereign power is 
indivisible. Having shown that, in the state of nature anarchy is the logical consequence of 
independent individual judgments, he concluded that the only way to overcome such anarchy 
is to make a single body out of the several bodies of the citizens. The only way to transform 
multiple wills into a single will is to agree that the sovereign’s single will and judgment 
represent the will and judgment of all the citizens. In effect, this is what the contract says 
when men agree to hand over their right to govern themselves.  
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The sovereign now acts not only on behalf of the citizens but as if he embodied the will of the 
citizens, thereby affirming an identity between the wills of the sovereign and citizens. 
Resistance against the sovereign by a citizen is therefore illogical, first because it would 
amount to resistance to himself, and second, because to resist is to revert to independent 
judgment, which is to go back full circle to the state of nature or anarchy. The power of the 
sovereign must therefore be absolute in order to secure the conditions of order, peace and law. 
 
This contract unites the multitude into one people and marks ‘the generation of that great 
Leviathan, or rather ( to speak more reverently) of that mortal God, to which we owe under 
the immortal God, our peace and defence. For by this authority given him by every particular 
man in the commonwealth, he has the use of so much power and strength conferred on him, 
that by terror thereof, he is enable to form the wills of them all to peace and home and mutual 
aid against their enemies abroad.’172
 
Hobbes was the first to define the commonwealth, which in Raleigh’s view had come to used 
‘by an usurped nickname’ to refer to ‘the government of the whole multitude’,173 as one 
person. As Sabine points out, any distinction between the body politic and the state is a mere 
confusion. It follows that any distinction between law and morals is a confusion. Very 
properly does Hobbes call his sovereign a ‘mortal God’ and unites in his hands both the sword 
and the crozier, symbols of  law and morality,174 replacing the metaphor of the Two Swords. 
 
The sovereign alone makes law and determines the rules of private property, for in a state of 
nature there is no property, and therefore property is created by the sovereign. The sovereign 
also determines the rules of good and evil, of just and unjust actions; he has the power of the 
sword, the power to punish those that will not obey the law. By virtue of the power of the 
sword, the sovereign also commands the armed forces, decides on war and peace. He is the 
only judge of what conduces to peace and therefore of what doctrines may be taught to the 
extent where  he even enlists religion to his side by taking care of it himself. 
 
With Hobbes, we accordingly arrive at the view that if there is to be any prospect of civil 
peace, the fullest powers of sovereignty must be vested neither in the people nor in their rulers, 
but always in the figure of an ‘artificial man’.175 It was as a result of his insistence to establish 
an impersonal form of sovereignty whose power remains distinct not merely from the people 
who originally instituted it, but also from the rulers that the concept of the state as we have 
inherited it was first articulated with complete self-consciousness. 
 
 
4.4.2. John Locke’s Constitutional Limited Monarchy 
 
 
Another English philosopher John Locke (1632-1704) disagreed with Hobbes’s location of  
absolute sovereign power in the state or the monarchical form of government. Locke, as a 
contractarian opponent of the early-modern absolutism of Hobbes, assumed that the 
institutions of the state or apparatus of government  are nothing more than a means of 
upholding the sovereignty of the people in an administratively more convenient form.  
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People never give up the supreme power to preserve themselves and the society, but merely 
depute or delegate the institutions of the state or apparatus of government to safeguard it more 
effectively on their own behalf. The supreme power to preserve themselves and the society 
remains always with the people themselves. People exercise the supreme power actively only 
in society without the institutions of the state or apparatus of government. 
 
While, as we saw, Hobbes identified the state of nature, a situation where no state exists and 
no one possesses political power, with a state of war, Locke is keen to emphasize that this is 
not the case. Locke supposed that it would generally be possible to live an acceptable life 
even in the absence of the institutions of the state or apparatus of government. How did Locke 
manage to draw this conclusion ? Or, how, according to Locke, does Hobbes fall into error ? 
 
Locke begins his second Treatise of Civil Government, as did Hobbes, by supposing a state of 
nature, a situation where no state exists and no one possesses political power. ‘To understand 
political power right, Locke says, and derive it from its original, we must consider what state 
men are naturally in’.176 First, it is ‘a state of perfect freedom; second, a state of  equality; and 
third, bound by the Law of Nature. On the face of it, this sounds more like Hobbes view, but 
each of these three elements is given quite a different interpretation by Locke. 
 
Hobbes principle of equality was a claim about mental and physical capabilities of all people. 
For Locke, it is a moral claim about rights: no person has a natural right to subordinate any 
other. This assertion was explicitly aimed against Robert Filmer, who accepted the feudal 
view of the divine right of kings against the notion of popular or parliamentary control of the 
crown. This is the view that originally God bestowed the kingly power upon Adam, from 
whom it descended to his heirs, and ultimately reached the various monarchs.  
 
In his first Treatise of Civil Government, Locke annihilates Filmer’s positive doctrine at great 
length and with comfortable ease. What reason have we to suppose that God gave Adam the 
right to rule, or that any king ruling now inherits his position from Adam ?177 Although 
Hobbes did not mean this by his assumption of equality, he would accept Locke’s position 
here. But a wide gap develops immediately between the two. 
 
For Hobbes the equal physical and mental capacity and freedom of every man to everything 
under conditions of scarcity leads to a war of all against all in the state of nature. Not so for 
Locke. Though the state of nature ‘ be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence…man 
has not [the] liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but 
where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it.’178
 
The nearest thing to a definition of the state of nature to be found in Locke is the following: 
‘men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth, with authority 
to judge between them, is properly the state of nature’.179 This is not a description of savages, 
as Russell observes, but of an imagined community of virtuous anarchists who need no police 
or law-courts because they always obey ‘reason’, which is the same as ‘natural law’.180 The 
saving feature of Locke’s state of nature is the existence of a law of nature: 
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The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone:  
and reason, which is that law teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it,  
that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his  
life, health, liberty and possessions.181  
 
Whereas for Hobbes natural rights are logically prior, and natural law is derived from them, 
Locke derives his natural rights from natural law, that establishes the rights and corresponding 
obligations. We now critically analyse Locke’s natural rights to life, liberty and property. 
 
Locke calls the natural right to life ‘the right man has to subsist and enjoy the conveniences of 
life.’182 Here, as in the Second Treatise, Locke asserts a natural right to preservation of one’s 
life, and hence to the means of subsistence (and even ‘conveniences’).183 And this right to life 
and the means of life is deduced from the need or ‘strong desire’ every man has ‘of preserving 
his life and being’. ‘The first and strongest desire…being that of self-preservation…’184
 
There is a difference in the manner that Locke deduces the right to life from the ‘strong 
desire’ of self-preservation from the way Hobbes does it. Hobbes deduces the right directly 
from the fact of desire, whereas Locke deduces the right from the intention of  the Creator, 
who planted the desire of self-preservation in men.185 So, the reason the right to life imposes a 
moral obligation is that while we have no natural superiors on earth, we have one in heaven.  
 
In other words, we are all creatures of God, his property, put on earth as his servants, ‘made to 
last during his, not one another’s Pleasure’. Therefore ‘Everyone…is bound to preserve 
himself, and not to quit his station wilfully; so by the like reason when his own preservation 
comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind’.186 
The law of nature, for Locke, is simply that everyone has an obligation to preserve mankind. 
So, Locke argues, everyone has a clear obligation not to harm others in the state of nature. 
 
What the obligation not to harm others supposes is the second natural right to freedom from 
the arbitrary wills of others (‘arbitrary’ being whatever is not required or permitted by the law 
of nature). It is a right not to be interfered with, except when one has transgressed natural law: 
a right of ‘freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as they 
think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending on the 
will of any other man’.187 This is first introduced simply as a freedom, but later called a right. 
 
Locke did not think that human beings would automatically be motivated to follow the law of 
nature. Indeed he comes very close to sounding like Hobbes: ‘For the law of nature would, as 
all other laws that concern men in this world, be in vain, if there were nobody that in the state 
of nature had a power to execute the law and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain 
offenders’188. In other words, the law of nature, like all laws, needs a law-enforcer. 
 
Locke cannot accept that the law of nature could be in vain: it is, after all, in Locke’s view the 
law of God, who presumably does nothing in vain. So, there must be a way of enforcing the 
law: somebody who has the power to enforce it. But we are all equal in the state of nature, so 
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if anyone has such power then everyone must have it. Therefore, from the right to freedom 
follows the natural right of each person, to punish those who transgress the law of nature. 
Each of us has the right to punish those who harm another’s life, liberty, or property. 
 
The right to punish is the right to make anyone who has overstepped the law of nature pay for 
their transgression. If the law of nature can be enforced, we have good reason to hope that life 
in the state of nature will be relatively peaceful. Offenders can be punished to make reparation, 
and to restrain and deter them, and others from similar acts in the future: ‘Each transgression 
may be punished to that degree, and with so much severity as will suffice to make it an ill 
bargain to the offender, give him cause to repent, and terrify others from doing the like’189. 
 
It is important that this natural right to punish is not restricted solely to the individual who 
suffers the wrong. If that were so, then obviously those who commit murders would go 
unpunished. Locke therefore argues that those who break the law are a threat to us all, as they 
will tend to undermine our peace and security, and so every person in the state of nature is 
given what Locke calls the ‘executive power of the law of nature’. It is reasonable and just  
 
 one may destroy a man who makes war upon him, or has discovered an enmity 
 to his being, for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion.190
 
In support of the view that we all have a natural right to punish offenders, Locke claims that, 
without it, it is hard to see how the sovereign of any state can have the right to punish an alien 
who has not consented to the laws. If the foreigner has not consented to the sovereign’s laws, 
then he has not accepted that he is liable to punishment for breaching them. Therefore, such a 
person cannot justly be punished, unless there is some sort of natural right to punish. Locke 
sanctions the sovereign’s right to punish an alien by the executive power of the law of nature. 
 
If the law of nature is enforceable, then a number of other rights can be secured, even in the 
state of nature. For Locke, the most important of these is a right to private property. A 
property in a thing is a right to exclude others from it, to use, enjoy, consume and exchange it. 
The chapter on property of the Second Treatise shows that the individual’s right to property is  
prior to civil society and government, and not dependent on the consent of others to it. 
 
The right to property is deduced from (a) the right of self-preservation,191 and (b) the property 
in, or right to, one’s own person – ‘the labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may 
say, are properly his’192. The right to property is limited, by this derivation, to ‘as much as 
leaves enough for others’, since all human beings have an equal right to subsistence. The 
abundance of natural provisions in the original condition establishes a man’s right to some 
portion of the common holding, to the exclusion of  others, by ‘mixing his labour’ with it. 
 
Though the original condition was an abundance of natural provisions, it was an abundance of  
worthless provisions and not enough of human labour to produce a surplus of goods that 
humans would need for their comfortable subsistence193. Hence the general penury or poverty 
of the natural state. Another major cause of the penury of the original condition was that ‘the 
greatest part of things really useful to the life of man …are generally things of short duration, 
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such as, if they are not consumed by use, will decay and perish of themselves…’194 This 
natural fact of spoiling was perhaps the major limitation of property in the state of nature. 
 
The third factor Locke saw contributing to the penury of the original condition was the lack of 
cultivation of the land: ‘land that is left wholly to nature…is called, as indeed it is, waste’195 ; 
the extent of this natural waste can be lessened, therefore, by the spread of agriculture that 
could produce a surplus to benefit more people. Agriculture then was, for Locke, a major step 
toward alleviating the penury of man’s original condition, but it was limited in its 
effectiveness by the fact of spoiling. Hence the need for some invention that would make it 
reasonable for a man to grow more than his family could consume and thereby benefit others. 
 
That invention was money, which according to Locke, came into existence ‘by tacit consent’ 
that men would exchange it for perishable goods.196 This gave people a reason to cultivate 
more land to produce a surplus for sale and  horde up enormous amounts of money without 
the risk that it will spoil. Locke’s natural man is bourgeois man: his rational man is a man 
with a propensity to capital accumulation. He is even an infinite appropriator of property197. 
 
By the tacit consent to the use of money, Locke turned the limited right to property ( as much 
as its leaves enough for others, since all have an equal right to subsistence) into an unlimited 
natural right to the appropriation of most land by few men, in amounts exceeding the 
requirements of their own comfortable subsistence, leaving others with little land on which to 
labour for themselves. The extended property right is not as pure a natural right as the other 
rights, for others do not require any consent.198 And it is less pure in another respect. 
 
In a second respect, Locke established the unlimited right to appropriation of land by means 
of the utilitarian argument to productivity. It is the greater productivity of labour on 
appropriated land that justifies its appropriation beyond the amount which would leave as 
much and as good for others. Because of the greater productivity, those who are left without 
any land can get a better subsistence than they would have had if no land were appropriated199. 
 
However, inasmuch as consent to the use of money completes the reversal of the original 
economic condition of penury through increased production that can support an increased 
population, the unlimited natural right to the appropriation of most land by few humans leads 
to an inequality in the possession of land as it gives more land to humans of more industry 
than others of less industry200. In turn, this leads to pressure on land which becomes scarce. 
 
Now, Locke does not say that such scarcity introduces the Hobbesian state of war, but he 
recognizes that once land is in short supply, labour can no longer give title to property or be 
the measure of value, and spoiling ceases to limit acquisition. The possessions of the 
‘industrious and rational’ – those men upon whose powers of increase the well being of all 
depends – come to be subject to the ‘fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and 
contentious’201 who may attempt to take their property by stealth or secretly. 
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When this happens, the injured party has the right to punish the transgressor. There would be 
no reason for humans to leave the state of nature and to form societies, except that 
inconveniences of the state of nature once land is in short supply and under dispute multiply 
and multiply in applying punishment to those who transgress the law of nature. So, ‘property’, 
which Locke uses in a wider sense to include ‘life, liberty and estate’202, is not secure. 
 
In the state of nature, property is not secure, because there are lacking three things necessary 
to its preservation: ‘an established, settled, known law’ 203 ; a ‘judge with authority to 
determine all differences according to the established law’204; and the ‘power to back and 
support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution’205. Thus, Locke anticipates 
inconveniences in the administration of justice in a state of nature without the three things.  
 
Individuals will disagree about whether or not an offence has taken place in interpreting the 
law of nature. They will disagree about its proper punishment and compensation. Since every 
person is a judge in their own case, this leads him to make biased judgments and mete out on 
offenders punishment that exceeds the original harm. Or one may simply lack the power to 
protect his/her rights. So, the attempt to administer justice becomes a source of dispute.206
 
In order to overcome the impairments of the state of nature, men require a legislature to lay 
down consistent and uniform laws, a judiciary which will administer the law impartially, and 
an executive who can enforce the law when it is broken. Society originates in the attempt to 
develop such institutions for the purpose of remedying the defects of life in a state of nature. 
 
All humans are in the natural state until by their own consents they decide to leave the state of 
nature and enter into a contract and create a political society. The decision to form one 
political society is the original contract. The contract is created by the unanimous consent of 
those who enter entered into society; those who wish may remain in the state of nature. 
 
The contract members make to form a political society is an agreement to transfer the rights 
each had in the natural state ‘into the hands of the community’207. In the state of nature, every 
man has two rights:  the right to exercise the legislative power ‘to do whatsoever he thinks fit 
for the preservation of himself and others within the permission of the law of nature’ and the 
right to exercise the executive ‘power to punish the crimes committed against the law’208. 
 
The right to exercise the executive ‘power to punish the crimes committed against the law’ 
every person ‘wholly gives up, and engages his natural force…to assist the executive power 
of the society, as the law thereof shall require’209; they agree in a common intention to put 
themselves under whatever specific form of government the majority may choose. 
 
But Locke says that the right to exercise the legislative power, which includes judging what is 
necessary for preservation, is not wholly transferred to government; he says it is given up ‘so 
far forth as the preservation of himself and the rest of that society shall require’210. Each one 
does not give up the right to exercise the legislative power to preserve himself  and society. 
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The contract by which the rights of everyone in the natural state to exercise legislative and 
executive powers are transformed into the powers of the political community is not between 
the people and government. The contract is made between equally free persons. 
 
Government is created through a trust arrangement by which equally free persons entering 
into a contract depute or delegate powers to government as a fiduciary agent to do for them 
things they find inconvenient to do themselves, just as we appoint a secretary to handle our 
affairs if we are too busy. These powers are limited by the purpose for which the contract was 
made: the preservation of life, liberty and estate. Locke thus defines political power to be: 
 
 A right of making laws with penalties and, consequently, all less penalties for the 
 regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community 
 in the execution of such laws and in the defence of the commonwealth from foreign 
 injury, and all this only for the public good.211
 
Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled standing laws, cannot be consistent 
with the ends of society and government, which humans would not quit the freedom of the 
state of nature for, and tie themselves up under, were it not to preserve their lives, liberties 
and fortunes, and by stated rules or right and property to secure their peace and quiet. 
 
In order to protect people from absolute arbitrary power, the kind of government which is to 
be formed through the trust arrangement must be based on laws which are arrived at after long 
deliberation by properly chosen representatives of the people, and which are promulgated so 
that all citizens may become acquainted with them. There is need for a law-making body.  
 
The best kind of government, Locke states, is that in which ‘legislative power is placed in 
collective bodies of men who, duly assembled, have by themselves, or jointly with others a 
power to make laws.’212 Locke, of course, expressed his desirability for placing legislative 
power in the hands of a representative assembly  instead of placing it in the hands of one man. 
 
Locke also calls for the need for impartial judges. Finally, a government which is to be 
formed through the trust arrangement must also have the power to execute judgments. Thus, 
an executive branch of government must be set up. The executive possesses authority 
subordinate to that wielded by the legislative and is, in fact, an agent of the legislative. The 
foregoing two powers, Locke states, must not be placed in the same hands. 
 
An absolute monarchy is out of question. For it could never act as a fiduciary agent of the 
people. Unquestioned submission to a monarch is worse than being in a state of nature. Men 
would be foolish ‘to avoid what mischief can be done by polecats or foxes,’ and be content ‘to 
be devoured by lions.’ If a ruler is absolute, he would not have to seek impartiality, he could 
ignore natural rights; and he could make exceptions to his own laws when he pleased. There 
would be no appeal, theoretical or substantial, for his wronged subjects.   
 
Therefore, to be subject to the arbitrary authority of an uncontrolled ruler without the right or 
strength to defend oneself is a condition far worse than the state of nature; it cannot be 
supposed to be that to which men consented freely, for ‘no rational creature can be supposed 
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to change his condition with an intention to be worse’213. Absolute monarchy, Locke says, ‘is 
indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil government at all.’214
 
Hobbes’s great error is not his premise that the fear of death or the desire for self-preservation 
is the first principle of human action but his conclusion that the only remedy for the state of 
nature is for men to make themselves subject to the unlimited power of the might leviathan, a 
conclusion which contradicts the premise. Locke’s conclusion – limited government based on 
the consent of the governed – is more true to that premise than Hobbes’s own conclusion. 
 
Contrary to Hobbes, Locke recommended that the legislative and executive powers be 
wielded by different branches of government, giving as his reason for the doctrine of the 
separation of  the two powers the common one that both powers in the same hands ‘may be 
too great a temptation to human frailty, apt  to grasp at power,’ for it may enable persons 
charged with making laws to exempt themselves from their execution.215  
 
Locke was talking about Parliaments and kings, which he called the executive and legislative 
powers respectively. Instead of absolute monarchy he said there should be a separation of 
power. It is not, however, a separation in which the legislative and executive bodies or 
branches of government are equal. Rather, it is a separation of power into different branches 
of government,  each one of which would function as a check upon the other. 
 
Of the powers, legislative and executive, Locke proposed that the former is supreme, ‘for 
what can give laws to another must needs be superior to him’216 . The executive has no 
authority independent of legislative control. Locke did not, however, hold that the executive 
should be limited to a mechanical and literal carrying out of legislative wishes. 
 
In an interesting chapter on ‘prerogative’, Locke argued that it is proper for the executive to 
exercise discretion where the public good is at stake, and to act in advance of law and 
sometimes even contrary to it217. This doctrine of executive prerogative seems to contradict 
not only legislative supremacy but the rule of law. 
 
Locke, however, believed that ‘the people shall be judge’218 whether the exercise of such 
prerogative tends toward their good. If necessary, they can limit executive prerogative 
through laws passed by the legislature. Since prerogative exists only for the people’s good, 
and indeed is nothing but what people allow and acquiesce in, such limitations are not 
encroachments on a power belonging inherently to the executive. 
 
Such an attitude toward government heightens the importance of the idea that the power given 
to government by the people is a trust to be employed for their good. The legislature and the 
executive are merely the agent and executor of the supreme power of the people for the more 
effective promotion of their own good, ‘the peace, safety and public good of the people’.  
 
This is how it comes about, as Locke concludes, that the community perpetually retains a 
supreme power over its kings or legislative body, and when power deputed to government by 
the people as a trust to be employed for their good is used contrary to that trust it is forfeited. 
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Transgression of its limits in a manner that does not protect the natural rights of the people 
dissolves a government and the obligation of the people to obey it. 
 
Political power reverts to the community acting through its majority, which must act to 
remove the government, by force if necessary, and establish a new government. The right of 
the members of society to choose and remove government assumes that sovereignty rests with 
the people. This sovereignty of the people or community over government is expressed in the 
election of representative legislative bodies and ultimately in the right of removal. 
 
The power of the people over government, however, is still not quite as complete in Locke as 
it came to be in later and more democratic theories. Though he called the power of 
government a trust and a delegation from the majority that acts for the community, Sabine 
observes, he retained the older view that the grant of the community divests the people of 
power so long as the government is faithful to its duties.219
 
The people’s legislative power is in effect limited to a single act ( though Locke admits that a 
democracy is conceivable), namely, that of setting up a supreme legislature. Even if the 
community resumes its power for good cause, it cannot do so ‘till the government be 
dissolved’. The French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau considered this to be an 
unwarranted limitation on the perpetual power of the people to govern itself as it saw fit.220     
 
        
 
4.4.3. Rousseau’s Popular Sovereignty 
 
 
    
Rousseau (1712-1778) rejects the view that the sovereignty of the people can be represented 
by a legislative body or the executive, which, like all other partial associations will develop a 
pseudo-general will of their own, directed towards their special interests. This implies people 
will be subordinated to the will of an interest group more inclined towards its own interests, 
and that they cannot, therefore, be expected to voluntarily obey the state or government.  
 
In other words, where the sovereignty of the people is represented, the people will not be free 
to govern themselves according to the general will, directed towards their general interests. 
Sovereignty, argued Rousseau, belongs only to the people as a whole body, while government 
is only an agent having delegated powers to carry out particular applications of the law people 
make which can be withdrawn or modified as the will of the people dictates. 
 
The only free government is a direct democracy in which each person gives himself up 
entirely together with his natural liberty and property to the political community and in return 
receives the moral and civic liberty to participate actively and directly with others in making 
laws or policies and the legal title to that which rightly belongs to him, and these are 
guaranteed and protected by the greater power of the whole community. In this situation, each 
person while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself (by voluntarily obeying the laws 
of the state he helped put in place), and thus remain as free as possible.  
 
                                                 
219 Sabine, A History of Political Theory, p. 493. 
220 Ibid. 
 
 
 67
Rousseau presented an attractive picture of the life of man in the natural state without the 
institutions of the state or government. In the second Discourse on Inequality (1754), he held 
that ‘man is naturally good, and only by institutions is he made bad’. Like Hobbes and Locke 
he assumed that human beings are primarily motivated by the desire for self-preservation. Yet 
he also believed that human beings are motivated by the innate feeling of pity or compassion.  
 
Hobbes and Locke’s intuition was different to see this central aspect of human motivation and 
so overestimated the likelihood of conflict in the state of nature, not realising that compassion 
acts as a powerful restraint on the desire for self-preservation that might lead to attack and 
war. By so doing, both Hobbes and Locke, who inquired into the foundations of society, could 
not describe man’s natural state the way Rousseau did, despite their attempt to do so. 
 
Hobbes and Locke, who inquired into the foundations of society projected the qualities of 
man-in-society onto natural man. That is, ‘every one of them, in short, constantly dwelling on 
wants, avidity, oppression, desires, and pride, has transferred to the state of nature ideas which 
were acquired in society’ and assumed that without the state there would be war.221
 
In order to accurately describe man’s natural state, Rousseau suggested that all the qualities 
connected with man’s life in society be removed. This forced him into an investigation of 
primitive man. Rousseau acknowledged in line with the thinking of the time that primitive 
man is not a human being in a true sense; he is an animal-like creature who knows neither 
right nor wrong, consequently he cannot be good or bad, virtuous or vicious. He is pre-moral, 
but nonetheless innocent. 
 
When we understand how Rousseau’s natural man behaves, the state of nature would be far 
from a state of war, and even in some respects preferable to a more civilized condition. 
Rousseau’s natural man is not the aggressive brute that Hobbes made him out to be. Rather he 
is a ‘noble savage’ whose natural desire for self-preservation is effectively counterbalanced 
by the innate feeling of pity or compassion, ‘an innate repugnance at seeing a fellow creature 
suffer’222 that prevents him from harming others and from being harmed by them. 
 
Rousseau’s claim that natural man is motivated by pity or compassion is very different from 
that of Locke that natural man in the state of nature  has a moral obligation to follow a moral 
law of divine origin. Unlike Locke, Rousseau claims that natural man generally tries to avoid 
harming others, not because reason tells him that it is morally bad, but because he has an 
aversion to harm, even when it is not his own. He is not primarily rational but moved to action 
by his feelings. So he takes steps to avoid the suffering of others, whenever he is able to. 
 
Natural man is a solitary being, rarely coming into contact with others. He has no family. 
Rousseau speculates that children would leave their mothers as soon as they could survive on 
their own, and that among natural men there would be no permanent union. Compassion is 
just not a strong sentiment to create a family bond.223 Part of Rousseau’s explanation of the 
solitary life of natural man is that nature has equipped the savage to live alone. 
 
Natural man’s passions are of the simplest kind. He desires only food, sexual satisfaction, and 
sleep, and fears only hunger and pain.224 He has few desires, and relative to those desires, 
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goods are likely to be obtained by hunting and gathering rather than by taking them from 
others. Being in direct contact with physical nature, he is untouched by modern man’s 
relations with his fellows that are likely to bring him into conflict with them. 
 
Indeed, natural man wholly lacks language, unless in the form of  instinctive cries, and 
without language any social life is impossible. Without language, the opportunities for 
forming and expressing opinions seem restricted. Equally, he has no desire for power that 
Hobbes, as we saw, defined as ‘the present means to satisfy future desires’. But Rousseau  
argues, the natural man has little foresight, and hardly ever anticipates future desires, let alone 
seeking the means to satisfy them.225 Consequently, all of Hobbes’s drives to war – desires 
for gain, safety, and reputation – are either defused of absent in Rousseau’s state of nature. 
 
Limited and instinctive though the life of natural man may be, it is at least a happy one in that 
it is independent of others and so neither harming nor harmed by them. Leading a simple 
isolated life in the midst of nature, natural man could rely on the basic impulse of self-
preservation, any aggressiveness that arose from the rare frustration of his desire, being held 
in check by the natural feeling of compassion by which he avoided harming others. In this 
sense, compassion contributed towards the preservation of peace and the whole species. 
 
Still, despite its relatively peaceful character, Rousseau’s state of nature hardly seems a 
welcoming prospect. Rousseau’s ‘noble savage’ may not be the brute that Hobbes made him 
out to be, but nevertheless, as portrayed, seems barely distinguishable from other wild animals. 
Natural man, unlike the brute, has free will and perfectibility: he can choose, accept and reject 
and can improve his faculties and pass these on to the whole species. But both distinguishing 
characteristics are pure potentiality that cannot be developed in a vacuum.  
 
Perfectibility or the capacity for self-improvement is the source of all human progress and all 
human misfortune. The first moment of consciousness is the beginning of natural man’s 
decline, for reflection leads him to the fatal knowledge of his superiority and the potentiality 
that lies within. Natural man’s first path to progress begins through the first exercise of the 
capacity of self-improvement: the development of tools in the struggle for  existence. 
 
This struggle for existence is brought about, Rousseau speculates, by an increase in 
population. Wolff finds it interesting that Rousseau sees innovation, and not Hobbesian 
competition, as the primary response to scarcity. And it is, in actual fact, innovation to make 
work easier –tool-making - that first awakens man’s pride and intelligence.226
 
The capacity for choice and self-improvement require a community for it to be realised at all. 
The commonality of interests brings about the need for cooperation, as for example, in 
overcoming natural hazards. Thus the advantages of living in communities, and making  a 
common dwelling, become apparent, and the habit of living in these new conditions ‘gave rise 
to the finest feelings known to humanity, conjugal love and paternal affection’.227
 
Co-operation and tool-making conquer scarcity well enough to give the opportunity to create 
goods which go beyond bare survival needs. Thus natural man now starts to create luxury 
goods unknown to former generations. However, ‘this was the first yoke he inadvertently 
imposed on himself, and the first source of the evils he prepared for his descendants’.228  For, 
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man now develops ‘corrupted needs’. He becomes dependent on what were at first considered 
luxuries. Having them gives one little or no pleasure, but losing them is devastating. 
 
As communities develop, so do languages, the comparison of talents, competition and 
inequality. This gives rise on the one side to vanity and contempt and on the other to shame 
and envy. For the first time an injury is treated as a sign of contempt rather than simply as 
damage, and those so injured begin to seek their revenge. As the state of nature begins to 
transform itself, causes of dissension and strife break out, a  fatal combination to the 
innocence and happiness of natural man in the natural state that is still a relatively stable stage 
in human development, what Rousseau calls ‘the real youth of the world’.229
 
Instability only begins to set in with the long and difficult development of agriculture and 
metallurgy. The development of iron tools and agriculture is the source of private property. 
The foundation of private property marks the new-born state of civil society according to 
Rousseau: 
 
 The first man who, having enclosed a piece of land, bethought himself of saying, ‘this 
 is mine’, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil  
 society.230
 
With the foundation of private property forethought arises. Men seek to increase their 
possessions and to secure them. Private property leads to mutual dependence, jealousy, 
inequality, and the slavery of the poor. The destruction of  inequality brings about instability. 
 
 Usurpations by the rich, robbery by the poor, and the unbridled passions of both,  
suppressed the cries of natural compassion and the still feeble voice of justice, and 
filled man with avarice, ambition and vice.231  
 
Thus the new-born state of civil society gives rise to a horrible state of war between the rich 
and the poor that Hobbes considered to be the state of nature. The rich are aware that they 
owe what they have to force and usurpation; they also know that they can easily lose their 
possessions in the same manner, and they look for a way to protect themselves .  
 
At this point, ‘ the rich man, thus urged by necessity, conceive at length the profoundest plan 
that ever entered the mind of man to employ in their favour the forces of those who attack 
them.’232 The rich persuade the poor to join in a contract with them to create a power which 
will protect each person in what he has, and thus restore peace. The poor succumb gladly to 
the plan. 
 
The poor consent to the plan in the hope of securing their lives. But it is a swindle. The plan is 
greatly advantageous to the rich, for they, after all, are the ones with property to secure. The 
rich give an appearance of legitimacy to the control of their property and are able to enjoy it 
peacefully. The inequality is made lawful and the subjection of the poor by the rich comes to 
be maintained by public force.  
 
In Rousseau’s main political writings, especially The Social Contract and the Discourse on 
Political Economy Rousseau asks, what he had explained in his second Discourse, as we have 
                                                 
229 Ibid., p. 91. 
230 Ibid., p. 203. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Ibid., p. 98. 
 70
already shown, how the change from the original assumption of the freedom of man in the 
natural state to the political subordination of man in civil society came about and how 
political subordination can be made legitimate:  
 
Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains. Many a man believes himself to be 
the master of others who is, no less than they, a slave. How did this change take place? 
 I do not know. What can make it legitimate ? To this question I hope to be able to  
 furnish an answer.233  
 
Rousseau acknowledges in the Social Contract that political subordination exists and that the 
real question is to discover how it can be made legitimate. By his own admission, force 
cannot be a basis of legitimacy. Might is not right, for it rests upon the principle of strength, 
not morality. If might is right,  argues Rousseau, then as ‘soon as we can disobey with 
impunity, disobedience becomes legitimate.’ The strongest is never strong to be always 
master,’ stated Rousseau, ‘unless he transforms strength into right and obedience into 
duty’.234
 
Nor do people sell themselves into slavery under a despot in order to gain civil peace. If 
security were all that mattered, we could solve our problems by going to jail. ‘One can live 
peacefully enough in a dungeon, but such peace will hardly, of itself, ensure one’s 
happiness.’235 Political legitimacy, therefore, can be based neither on force nor on a contract 
in which freedom is exchanged for security merely for its own sake.  
 
In order to discover the true foundation of legitimacy, argues Rousseau, it is necessary to 
begin with the first community and thus discover the purpose for which that step was taken. 
Rousseau’s assumption for argument’s sake is that human beings in the natural state were not 
in a position to realise the capacity for freedom and self-improvement. Hence the need for the 
establishment of a human community through which this natural freedom could be realised. 
  
But with the foundation of civil society following the institution of property and the resultant 
inequality, human beings were compelled to rely upon their individual strength to protect their 
natural freedom. Freedom was highly desirable, but that of the poor came to be abused where 
the rich only sought to protect their property by using force to subordinate the poor to them. 
Both freedom and security are desirable, and the problem is to secure them through an 
association which combines both freedom and security without neglecting any one of them. 
 
 The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the  
 whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, 
 while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as 
 before.236
 
Rousseau’s fundamental problem was to  explain how a naturally free person can legitimately 
be subject to the authority of a political community that protects his security. Rousseau says a 
naturally free person can legitimately be subject to the authority of a political community that 
protects his security when he obeys only the laws which he himself makes, and not otherwise. 
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Rousseau establishes this new political community by means of his second contract, but it is a 
different form of contract from those envisioned by Hobbes and Locke. In Hobbes’s contract, 
all rights are surrendered to an authority whose duty is to provide security. Rousseau rejects 
this concept of contract, for it protects individual security at the expense of his freedom. 
 
In Locke’s contract, people agree to form a contract and then entrust their security to a 
government which is representative of and responsible to them and is charged with protecting 
the rights which individuals carry with them into political community. As we shall see, 
Rousseau rejects the notion that legislative power can be delegated without a surrender of 
freedom. Moreover, in Rousseau’s contract, there can be no reserving of  any rights on an 
individual basis as Locke’s theory of natural rights  clearly demands.  
 
Rousseau’s contract consists in the surrender of everyone, together with all his rights, to the 
whole community’. The result is that the people as a whole community become sovereign. To 
quote Rousseau, ‘Since each gives himself up to all, he gives himself up to no one; and as 
there is acquired over every associate the same right that is given up himself, there is gained 
the equivalent of what is lost, with greater power to preserve what is left.’237  
 
The surrender is to be without reserve.  Rousseau argues that, ‘if certain rights were reserved 
to the individual, as there would be no common superior to decide between them and the 
public, each being on one point his own judge, would ask to be so on all; the state of nature 
would thus continue, and the association would necessarily become inoperative or tyrannical.’ 
 
Nothing of value is lost, but a great deal is gained through the contract. What man loses is the 
natural freedom to get everything he can and the right to keep that which his strength permits; 
it is not true freedom at all. In return he gains the civil liberty to participate actively and 
directly with others in making laws or policies and legal title to that which rightly belongs to 
him, and these are guaranteed and protected by the greater power of the whole community.  
 
Each person, under the terms of the contract, gives all his rights to everyone, as they give their 
rights to him. This means that, in effect, no one loses anything (in relation to others) and 
everyone gains security by the increased power of the community. At any rate, a new political 
community that is able to provide security without loss of freedom is established by contract. 
 
What now exists, Rousseau says, is a ‘public person,’ which, in its ‘passive role,’ is known as 
the state and, in its active role as the sovereign. The people, or individual components of this 
body, also have a dual role. When they exercise their sovereignty through their collective and 
legislative capacity they are citizens; when they obey the state they are subjects.  
 
It is possible for a person in the exercise of his collective and legislative capacity to seek his 
selfish interest and ignore the general interest, that is, he may ‘enjoy his rights as a citizen 
without, at the same time, fulfilling his duties as a subject.’ To avoid such a particularistic 
pursuit of interests, which may destroy the community, Rousseau finds it necessary for the 
body politic to operate on the basis of  what he calls the ‘general will.’  
 
Talking about the general will in his Discourse on Political Economy, Rousseau says: 
 
 The body politic…is  also  a moral being  possessed of a  will; and this general will,  
 which tends always to the preservation and welfare of the whole of every part, and it 
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 is the source of the laws, constitutes for all members of the state in their relation to  
 one another and to it, the rule of what is just and unjust…238
 
The general will emanates from the whole community and is directed towards the community 
as a whole. Moreover, it is invariably good for every member of the community. Rousseau is 
saying that in the diversity of particular interests of a community there is a common interest 
which must be discovered. This common interest must form the basis for all laws and policies.  
 
Rousseau makes a distinction between the general will and the ‘will of all.’  According to him, 
it is possible for people to express political opinions or make laws not based upon the general 
will. This would be the case if the opinions rendered or the policy adopted were designed to 
benefit only a part of the community, whether that part comprises a minority or a majority. 
The ‘will of all’ is this expression of  the sum of  particular wills that are self-centred and do 
not think of the good or interest of others.239
 
What we must do, Rousseau says, to ascertain the general will from the sum of particular 
wills is that we must ‘take away from their wills the pluses and minuses - which cancel one 
another, the sum of the differences is left, and that is the general will.’240 If we take away 
from the sum of particular wills, Rousseau explains, the various particular interests which 
conflict with each other, what remains is the general will.  
 
However, this procedure is only reliable when the people, in isolation, exercise their 
individual wills as citizens. If they state their opinion as members of ‘intriguing groups and 
partial associations’, the result will be the ‘will of all,’ not the general will.  
 
If, then, the general will is to be truly expressed, it is essential that there be no 
subsidiary groups within the state, and that each citizen voice his own opinion and 
nothing but his opinion.241
 
In practice, such a system would involve the prohibition of churches (except a state church), 
political parties, trade unions, and all other organizations of men with similar economic 
interests. The result is obviously the corporate or totalitarian state in which the individual 
citizen is powerless. Rousseau seems to realise that it may be difficult to prohibit all 
associations, and adds, as an afterthought, that, if there must be subordinate associations, then 
the more there are the better, in order that they may neutralize each other.242
 
Rousseau’s proposal that ‘pluses and minuses’ should offset one another and that the balance 
determines the general will is another way of stating that the people express their views 
through voting. The majority vote voices the general will. The good citizen will always obey 
the decision of a well-informed and public spirited majority as that of the general will. 
 
 When, therefore, a view which is at odds with my own wins the day, it proves only that 
 I was deceived, and that what I took to be the general will was no such thing.243
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It is generally assumed that in a political community which operates on the basis of majority 
rule, the minority shall give way to the majority’s will or risk the disruption of the community. 
Thus, it is a difficult and perennial problem in a free state to determine in any specific case 
just how far the rights of the minority need be respected as against the will of the majority.  
 
The minority may simply be misled by its selfish interest and be honestly but wrongly 
convinced that it coincides with the common interest. But, its true interest is always the same 
as the common interest. The minority may, therefore, be forced to follow its true interest. It 
may be forced to free itself from its selfish interest in order for it to follow its true interest. 
 
 Whoever shall refuse to obey the general will must be constrained by the whole body  
 of his fellow citizens to do so; which is no more than to say that it may be necessary 
 to compel a man to be free…244
 
The true meaning of Rousseau’s theory of the general will is that a properly constituted and 
functioning majority can never go wrong, that what it decides is beneficial to everyone, and 
that a force is moral which compels individuals to do those things that are good for them and 
which they could do voluntarily if they were not influenced by selfish interest. 
 
There is no place for the doctrine of individual rights in Rousseau’s proposition of the general 
will. The sovereignty of the general will requires obedience from all the people, but, like any 
sovereign, the general will is itself subject to no laws. Being concerned for the welfare of 
society as a whole, ‘the sovereign power need give no guarantee to its subjects.’ 
 
Rousseau designed the legislative and executive institutional arrangements to initiate and 
implement the general will, respectively. Two forces, Rousseau declares, are required to 
produce action – will, and the strength to execute it.  It is the legislative which provides the 
general will, and in a legitimate political community it consists of all the people.  
 
The people as a whole body must create a constitution and establish a body of laws. It must 
found government and devise methods of electing magistrates. It must meet regularly, often, 
and in a manner prescribed by law. This requirement raises the practical problem of how a 
legislative comprising the whole body of  citizens can meet and deliberate more effectively.  
 
The sovereignty of the entire people cannot be divided into population segments and the 
general will be taken in each. This is impossible, for sovereignty is, according to Rousseau, 
indivisible; to divide it is to destroy it. Unless all participate, Rousseau argues, some are 
subordinated to others. Equality disappears and the legitimacy of political community is lost. 
 
Rousseau does not see a representative system solving the problem either. In his view of 
things, sovereignty cannot be delegated or represented in any legislature. ‘The moment there 
is a master, there is no longer sovereignty’. Rousseau rejects the solution offered by admirers 
of the English system. ‘The English,’ he says, ‘are free only once when they are electing their 
representatives; the rest of the time they are slaves’. 
 
Rousseau suggests two solutions to the problem, one of which greatly disqualifies the other. 
First, if it is impossible to maintain the size of the state at a point which will permit all 
citizens to gather and deliberate at a central location, it will be necessary to move the seat of 
government from one place to another in order that the general will may be ascertained in 
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each. Rousseau recognizes that this would be enormously difficult, but he insists that it is 
worth the effort. After all, ‘where right and liberty is everything, inconvenience matters little.’ 
 
Upon further consideration, Rousseau changes his mind. The second, and only solution, is the 
adoption of the city-state form as found in ancient Greece and existed at the time in Geneva. 
 
  Having examined the whole question thoroughly, I do not see how, 
 henceforth, it will be possible for the sovereign to maintain among 
 us the exercise of its rights unless the city be a very small one.245
 
The only free government is, therefore, a direct democracy in which laws are made by an 
assembly of  the people in which all have the right to vote. But he knows that factions in the 
assembly can easily prevent the general will from being expressed and that supplemental 
institutions, tailored to local needs and conditions, must be added to ensure the right outcome. 
 
The supplemental institutions Rousseau proposes include the requirement of more than a 
simple majority for passing laws, the proper management of sub-political groups (clans, 
interest groups), the artful apportionment of votes among the different segments of the 
population, and above all the creation of a virtuous, or patriotic citizenry. 
 
The agency that carries out decisions of the general will is the executive. In Rousseau’s plan, 
the executive is the government. The entire people cannot concern themselves with 
administrative tasks. Moreover, the people do not have sufficient virtue to combine and 
adequately employ both legislative and executive authority. ‘Were there a people of gods, 
their government  would be democratic. So perfect government is not for men.’ 
 
An elective democracy, by which Rousseau means a system in which executive officials are 
elected by the people, is  generally the best form of government. A hereditary aristocracy, or 
executive power exercised by the nobility, is the worst. A monarchy provides vigour in the 
execution of laws and could be the most desirable government, but given the character of 
most kings and the fact that heredity rarely produces a monarch of quality, this is unlikely. 
 
What is evident from the foregoing is that Rousseau’s discussion of democracy, aristocracy, 
and monarchy in government applies only to the executive, and that any form of executive 
may be compatible with a legitimate political community. The same is not the case with 
respect to the legislative. Legitimacy here is inseparable from democracy. Legislative power 
must always be exercised by the whole body of sovereign citizens, or the entire purpose for 
which men undertook the establishment of political association is subverted. 
 
Legislative effort should de directed towards securing the liberty and equality of citizens, and 
moral equality is impossible where there is no freedom, or where citizens are politically 
subordinated to the wealthy. Liberty and equality is only possible where each person totally 
surrenders his natural freedom to everything he can get and the right to keep that which his 
strength permits to a political community and in return receives the moral freedom to actively 
and directly participate with others in making laws or policies and the legal title to that which 
rightly belongs to him which are guaranteed by the greater power of the whole community.  
 
Rousseau’s idea of popular sovereignty made him to be one of the most influential and 
explicit proponents of  democracy. Indeed, the Social Contract became the bible of most of 
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the leaders of the French revolution. 246  In their contest with the old oppressions of the 
monarchy and the church, the leaders of the French revolution relied heavily on the 
proposition that the third Estate, the bourgeoisie, that represented the peasants and workers, 
were the rightful rulers of France. In later revolutions, similar claims were made. 
 
The result was to attack the position of the established state authority of the personal rule of 
the absolute monarch by appealing to an alternative and presumably more popular source of 
sovereignty from which was born the French Revolution. The French Revolution can best be 
characterised as a period of upheaval between 1787-1799 that overturned the old order of the 
nobility and church in France on behalf of  “the people” and “the nation”. 
 
The revolutionary movement, based on liberal, democratic principles, established a 
constitution in 1791 and proclaimed the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. 
After a phase of reform, it entered a period known as the Reign of Terror. The Revolution 
ended in 1799 with the overthrow of the First Republic by Napoleon Bonaparte. 
 
 
 
5. The Completion of the Development of the State: 
The Liberal Theory of the State. 
 
 
 
5.1.  The Social and Political Idea of Order of the French Revolution. 
 
 
 
The immediate cause of the French Revolution was the large national debt France incurred in 
its recent war with Britain in North America, that King Louis XVI inherited. In 1787, the king, 
deeply in debt, called an emergency assembly of people of rank to approve the imposition of 
higher taxes on the higher estates. He could not persuade the privileged classes to agree to pay 
higher taxes. When he sought to impose higher taxes, the nobility and the clergy refused the 
king’s request and challenged his authority by demanding a say in the governance of the 
realm in exchange for the relinquishment of their immunity from taxation.247  
 
Previously, the arrangements inherited from the feudal polity of estates had given the three 
Estates – the propertied clergy, landed nobility and bourgeoisie – the political privileges and 
burdens of shaping and executing policy.248 For instance, the king needed the consent of the 
estates to obtain access to their financial resources, especially for war. The absolute kings in 
the highly stratified European society excluded all groups from the political privileges and 
burdens of shaping and executing policy.  
 
Thus, from the point of view of  absolute rulers, society – or civil society - appeared chiefly as 
a realm of great processes of great political significance, but which on that very account had 
to be authoritatively disciplined, monitored, administered and policed from above.249 This 
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was a societas civilis cum imperio as it was called at the time.250 The political implication of 
the view of the old civil society as it existed before the French revolution amounted to 
something like a benevolent, enlightened despotism.251
 
In response to the challenge from the social groups of the nobility and clergy against his 
benevolent, enlightened despotism and to the demand for a say in the governance of the realm, 
Louis XVI took the fateful step of calling together an advisory assembly of deputies from the 
three estates that had not met since 1614 – the Estates General.252 During this assembly that 
opened in May 1789, the third estate, the bourgeoisie, which was already very heavily taxed, 
and the security of whose rights was in jeopardy under economic policies of mercantilism of 
the despotic regime that placed more restraints on property, 253  was encouraged by the 
challenge of the higher estates to the king’s authority to make its own demands.  
 
On June 17, 1789 the third estate proclaimed itself to the National Assembly, the only true 
representative of the French people.254 It invited the peasants and workers, who suffered real 
privations and hardships at the hands of secular and clerical nobles, who continued to enjoy 
privileges and wealth not acquired through their labour and on merit, but at the expense of the 
third estate, to join it.  Although Louis XVI dispersed the third estate, it reassembled and 
resisted further orders to disband. Peasants, workers, as well as liberal members of the 
nobility and clergy finally joined the ranks of the Assembly. 255  Reluctantly, the king 
sanctioned the meeting and stationed foreign regiments in Paris. 
 
The result was open insurrection. Rioting and protests broke out in Paris and on July 14, 1789, 
the people stormed the Bastille, a prison that symbolized royal despotism. Rioting and civil 
unrest soon spread to the rest of France, caused, for the most part, by fear that the king and 
nobles would try forcibly to disband the Assembly and by the desire for revenge against 
hitherto invincible oppressors.256 The army did little to oppose the insurrection. Louis XVI 
entered the Assembly and declared that he entrusted himself to the members. 
 
In August 1789 the National Assembly embarked on the reconstruction of France. It began 
with a dismantling of the old feudal societal order. It abolished feudal privileges, ended 
serfdom and swept away all the special privileges traditionally enjoyed by the clergy and 
nobility.257 It imposed an equitable tax on land and succeeded in confiscating church lands in 
order to meet the financial crisis. It then proceeded to draft a new constitution of France.  
 
The preamble to the constitution known as The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen,258 summarized the ideas of a new social and political order upon which the revolution 
was based and which determined the form of Europe and also the present-day world. In The 
Declaration and, additionally, in the constitution, emerged the ideas of order which are 
principally significant for the completion and extension of the construction of the modern 
state, as well as for the founding and development of modern society as a civil society. 
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The Declaration and the constitution of 1789 set the whole social and political order on a new 
foundation. Against the historically traditional institutions which existed and developed for 
centuries, and against a religiously legitimated force of order, The Declaration and the 
constitution proclaimed principles of reason and of natural rational right as the basis for a new 
social and political order. The new social and political order should alone be built and shaped 
from the claim of reason. Which reason? Böckenförde hastens to ask.259
 
The reason that The Declaration and the constitution relies on is not in itself, as such, 
detached from interests and historical political determination; it is also no longer, as is the 
case with the thinkers of the middle ages and early modern times, a distinct reason oriented 
towards a universal order of goals seen as of a divine creation; it is rather, a free self-
determining individualistic reason. First, on the basis of this setting of its life goals, it is 
generally a deducing and constructing reason: the begin and goal of all social and political 
order is the single, free , equal personality on its own, the individual. 
 
The fall back on nature and also, as far as that goes, the natural rights argument is not in this 
case given up. But in place of the socially bound, in historical life-forms shaped concrete 
nature emerges the elementary abstract nature detached from all historical particularisation 
and concretisation. This is the social bond thought in advance and leads back to the last 
indivisible figure, the individual, pure nature. The social and political institutions must now 
be measured on the claim and postulates of this rational nature and shaped according to them. 
Even when taken over and continued, they acquire through this a new content and meaning. 
 
The Declaration is the precipitate of rational thinking, the constitution of 1791 explains this in 
further detail. The positive change from the old societal feudal order to a new order brings 
about The declaration, the ‘first basic law of the new society’, as Lorenzo von Stein said.260 
This first basic law contains rational principles of societal order and principles of state order.  
 
 
 
5.2.  The Social and Political Construction of Order of  
the Declaration and Constitution. 
 
 
 
The principles of the new societal order appear in inalienable human rights: equal rights; the 
general freedom ( that is, the freedom of the person, of thought, speech and the press and of 
work and ownership acquired through labour and not as a result of one’s  social status, as was 
the case with the nobility and clergy under the old societal feudal order). They – and they 
alone – are the firm ground, the normative basis of all social order. 
 
What is meant and intended is not only the abolition of  all violence between individuals or 
segments of the population, but also of all limitations of rights and occupation to status and 
the integration of the individual to the corporate-status of the estate. It is about the completion 
of  emancipation : on the one hand, of the detachment from the given orders of rule and life, 
from the binding force of birth and status of the family; and, on the other hand, of the release 
of the individual to full  self-referential development on the basis of  legal equality.261
 
                                                 
259 Ernst-Wolfgang  Böckenförde, Staat, Nation, Europa, p. 13. 
260 Ernst- Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit, p.56. 
261 Ernst- Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat, Nation, Europa, p. 15. 
 78
What is guaranteed fundamentally is abstract, general freedom, and it is the freedom of the 
individual on his own, not the corporate freedom of social communities. It takes the place of 
the concrete freedoms of the old order. These existed within social and political relationships 
of the ruled, almost shaped the legal status within them, but they thereby presupposed them as 
such. Freedom exist now according to the idea, not in law, and through law, by which social 
relationships in which the human being stands inextinguishable are justly organized. It is 
rather the precedent and prerequisite: law appears as the limitation of freedom.262  
 
Looked at in the foregoing manner, freedom is the potential unlimited extension; the fellow 
human being and the network of social relationships in which the individual lives come into 
play not as a condition for one’s own freedom and self-development, but as the limit of one’s 
own extension, as Karl Marx correctly remarked263. ‘Liberty consists in the freedom to do 
everything which injures no one else; hence the exercise of the natural rights of each man has 
no limits except those which assure to the other members of the society the enjoyment of the 
same rights. These limits can only be determined by law’ (Art. 4). 
 
As a means of order against this freedom so as to be able to regulate the common life in 
society, The Declaration refers to the law. It is the general and only means of order. ‘Law can 
only prohibit such actions as are hurtful to society. Nothing may be prevented which is not 
forbidden by law, and no one may be forced to do anything not provided for by law’ (Art. 5).  
 
The characteristics of law are that it is general, it is the same for all; it lays down no privileges, 
equality of right is immanent in the law; it is in its content, just as in its origin, general: it 
proceeds from the right of every citizen to participate personally, or through his representative 
in its foundation (Art. 6). While all provisions in questions are only generally or potentially 
laid down, the principle of freedom is maintained: the citizen who himself or through his 
representatives obeys the laws,  decides not for others, but at the same time for himself as this 
thought is expressed in Rousseau’s political writings and later in Kant’s metaphysic of morals.  
 
The underlying idea of order clearly emerges here: over the free and equal and the society that 
they build, there arises a unitary power of order, the state, that has its definitive outward form 
in law. The state appears as a unitary, central power of order and rule over individuals that are 
released by the other as stately rule. The state detaches itself, on the one hand, from the 
person of the monarch, becomes an abstract organisation; The Declaration refers to the state 
as a political association (Art.2). On the other hand, it is based on individuals and their social 
contract, it is a social body , as it is expressed in the preamble of  The Declaration. 
 
The state builds itself over individuals as their political organisation. It obtains its legitimation 
and its purpose not as godly support in order to resist, like Martin Luther, the unjust and the 
evil, not as a naturally given, historically arisen institution (from the power of tradition), but 
from those who are subject to the power of the state and bear the state. From there is the goal 
and purpose of the state also determined: ‘the aim of all political association is the 
preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, 
security, and resistance to oppression’ (Art.2). 
 
The afore-stated goal and purpose of the state immediately finds approval today, but it means, 
at the same time, a rejection of every transpersonal and every community-oriented goal-
setting of the state that captures the individual also as a member of a greater whole. Not only 
is the glory of the ruler or the power-related spreading out of the true religion, for which 
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human beings were frequently used and sacrificed, ruled out as a state defined goal, but so is 
the communal ethical good life, the eudaimonia in the sense of Aristotle, or – presently – the 
order and responsibility for the preservation of the ecological basis in the world. 
 
The state, seen in this way, acquires an instrumental character. Its sole responsibility is that of  
the preservation of  emancipative  rights of freedom of the individual. It becomes a state of 
civil society in which the individual is the starting and ending point of social life. Its principle 
is the elevation of individuals to the fullest freedom, to the fullest personal development. The 
political organisation of the state seeks this principle as a result. But it necessarily props itself 
on an additional element which is not compatible with the individualistic basic approach. 
 
The French Revolution fused the idea of  the nation to the political organisation of the state. 
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man declares that all sovereignty 
resides with the people and that nobody may exercise sovereignty, that means the highest and 
extensive power , which does not proceed from the nation or from the people constituting it. 
 
What this means, first of all, is a rejection of  rule by nature, as well as of such originating 
from one’s own right or divine power. All political power must ultimately rest with the people; 
the holding of political power by certain persons only serves a specific  function, it justifies no 
own, more than ever, irrevocable right that allows its bearer  to step out  as person from civil 
equality. In this respect, the identity of the ruled and ruler remains in force. 
 
The people become the bearer of sovereignty, not as a sum of individuals, or an embodiment 
of those affected by stately measures, but a totality and a unit, really a nation. One’s national 
identity or nationhood, therefore, comes from being a member of a certain people, which was 
defined as homogenously distinct in language, culture, race, and history from other peoples. 
Thus, nation comes to have its contemporary meaning: “a uniquely sovereign people readily 
distinguishable from other uniquely defined sovereign peoples who are bound together by a 
sense of solidarity, common culture, language, religion, and geographical location.”264
 
While the people become a nation, the people taken together as a unit constitutes itself as a 
self-conscious political body. In this way, the shift of sovereignty from monarchy to nation, 
its anchor in the will of those who are subject to it, at the same time, a raise in the claims and 
extent of sovereignty is here allowed to take place: political rule and its bearer no longer 
appear as an opposite number, but as the outflow of equitable self-rule.265
 
The exercise of sovereignty takes place through the delegation to different powers. They are 
clearly defined in their responsibilities and must operate as checks and balances upon one 
another, thus directly countering the tendency, characteristic of absolutism, to concentrate all 
power in the ruler. 266  They are bearers of power of decision-making, no longer from 
themselves, the force of a social, religious or traditionally justified position of power, but first 
the force of authorisation through the constitution and in the extent of this authorisation. 
 
In addition to this comes the principle of representation. Through the will of the unity and the 
collectivity, the collectively binding and obliging, not the individual personal will, and in the 
decision-making powers, representation should be shown to advantage and be authoritative. 
Therefore, it requires as holder of these powers – legislative and executive – not instructed, an 
agent carrying out a particular will, but representatives. Elected from the citizens or – like the 
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king - appointed through the constitution, they should represent the nation itself, act as the 
people and for the people in the sense of the general will.267
 
Locke’s English model of representation and separation of powers are the ways in which the 
state, proceeding from the principle of popular sovereignty and bound back on this, in the 
sense of political freedom and the realisation of the general will, should be organised. This 
follows, on the one hand, in a centrally controlled and hierarchically organised administration 
that translates the general will in the country within and equally shows this to advantage. It 
follows, on the other hand, in the self-administration of the communities or municipalities.268
 
The French draft constitution, approved by King Louis XVI in 1790, established local units of 
self-government for purposes of decentralizing authority. It created a limited monarchy. The 
constitution was designed to take advantage of the virtues of the separation of powers. Thus, 
in addition to a limited monarchy, the constitution created a unicameral legislature that could 
make laws, which could be blocked by the king for a period of four years, though. Moreover, 
the legislature was elected by voters who met property requirements. 269  In effect, the 
constitution conferred the electorate on the middle and upper classes. The constitution was 
thus a bourgeois document that reflected the ideas of moderate leaders of the revolution. 
 
The failure to give the poor a voice in government had serious implications for the revolution. 
Hoping for relief from economic misery, and angry that they had been denied the franchise, 
the poor became increasingly radical. A wide civil society network of Jacobins, the most 
extreme of the political clubs debating the shape of the revolution, accelerated the process, 
spreading their radical sentiments throughout the nation in political writings, in theatre, music, 
opera and scientific circles.270 The Jacobins espoused a republic and universal suffrage. 
 
The Jacobins placed the claim of equality for all citizens – an implicit element of liberal 
claims of individual rights, which moderate liberals more responsive to the concerns of 
private property-owning bourgeoisie avoided – above all else, even the protection of private 
property.271 They appealed to the national sentiment that the French state was a common 
enterprise that deserved to be run by the French people themselves and thus urged them to 
escape from the old oppressions of the monarch, the church, or even from foreign rule.272
 
Much of the Jacobin debate centred around the future of the King, an issue fanned by Louis’s 
aborted escape from Paris in June 1791 and growing fears that he was conspiring with foreign 
states against the French people. Louis’s acceptance of the final draft of the constitution did 
nothing to strengthen his position. The revolutionaries, believing that the king and the 
aristocracy were colluding with foreigners, imprisoned the royals.273
 
In August 1792, the Paris commune was set up. Its purpose was to suspend the power of the 
king, call a national convention and revise the constitution. Radical leaders  Georges Jacques 
Danton and Comte de Mirabeau instituted the First Terror. They aimed to stamp out the 
king’s remaining supporters by organising a wide net of arrests, seizures and executions. The 
National Convention was elected in September 1792 to write a republican constitution. 
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Consequently, the monarchy was abolished. Louis was tried for treason and executed in 
January 1793.274
 
Although France was declared a republic in 1792, the stiff resistance of the nobility and the 
clergy prevented liberals from gaining full control of the French state. Moreover, France was 
invaded by several European kings, who saw the survival of the new French republic as a 
direct challenge to their monarchies. In order to deal with these threats, the republic ordered 
universal conscription in August 1793. At the same time, all of France’s economic resources 
were placed under the authority of the new republican government, called the Directory.275  
 
These two actions were truly radical: for the first time, an army of citizen-soldiers loyal to the 
nation was raised and supported by mobilizing the vast resources of an entire national 
economy. To compensate for its weakness at home, the republican regime waged war against 
its absolutist, monarchical enemies abroad.276 The French met defeat, however, and suffered 
further hardship as a result of crippling trade blockade imposed by the British.277
 
Mounting international pressure led to renewed internal strife. The extremist position in 
France became stronger, and moderates were expelled from the National Convention. Under 
the direction of Danton,  Robespierre and Marat, who allied themselves with the middle class, 
the convention introduced radical reforms: state limits on prices; national assistance for the 
poor; heavy taxes on the rich; and universal compulsory education. The Convention drafted a 
new constitution, ratified by national plebiscite, announcing universal suffrage. 
 
Organized regional resistance grew to the radical programme and, in response, the National 
Convention issued a proclamation in October 1793 legitimating any means it deemed fit to 
continue the revolution. Power was centralized in the committee of Public Safety, which 
worked with the Committee of General Security and the Revolutionary Tribunal to subdue or 
execute enemies of the people. Thousands died and the country was plunged into civil war. 
 
Robespierre was overthrown and executed on July 27, 1794. Power shifted to the moderates, 
who expelled the directors of the Terror. The National convention undertook to create a new 
constitution. In August 1795 the National Convention, now wary of the abuses of one-
chamber assemblies, approved a new constitution that placed executive power in a five-
member Directory and legislative power in a Council of Ancients and a Council of Five 
Hundred. It added a statement of  duties to the declaration of rights in the constitution in 
1791.278
 
But the Directory faced crippling problems: the burdens of the European wars; a financial 
crisis; counter-revolutionary unrest from both radicals and royalists who yearned for a return 
to strong centralized rule. An insurrection by royalists and reactionaries encouraged Napoleon 
Bonaparte (1769 – 1821), the republic’s most successful general, to seize dictatorial power in 
1799.279 The Directory was abolished and Napoleon declared the revolution had ended. 
 
Napoleon’s own empire, however, would convey the revolution’s ideals throughout Europe. 
He sought to unify France around the revolution’s ideals of  liberte, egalite, fraternite (liberty, 
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equality and brotherhood) and to restore order. Between 1799 and 1804, he reorganized the 
state’s central administration, provided France with a constitution and a uniform legal system 
called the Code Napoleon, and expanded territorial administration. He placed prefects under 
the absolute control of the central government in charge of the 83 departements into which 
France had been divided by the previous revolutionary government.280  
 
Therefore, though French liberals were able to overthrow the monarchy, they had a difficult 
time gaining control of the state and were not immediately successful. Even after successfully 
gaining control, the resultant liberal republican state retained many aspects of the previous 
absolutist state, especially its centralized, unitary character. As such, the French revolution 
brought the development of the political state, like it arose in the wars of religion, and was 
thought of by Hobbes, to its completion, Böckenförde asserts.281
 
The French revolution signalled a turning point in modern history and became the model for 
all future revolutions. It was the first revolution built on the principle of total reconstruction, 
not only overhauling social and political institutions but also overseeing the smallest details of 
social and personal life. Its achievement was the establishment of the democratic principle 
that the constitution is the will of the people and, as Thomas Paine had, said, any government 
violating the constitution exercises “power without right” and thus is a despotism.282
 
The French revolutionaries’ vision of democracy was new. It was not based on the English 
model of  the separation of and balance of powers, nor on representative government, but on 
the general will. From this revolutionary theory, and the experience of diverse people in 
European wars, emerged the idea that the nation is sovereign over the law.  
 
The success of the French Revolution announced the incompatibility of hereditary right and 
privilege with citizenship. After the revolution true democracy could mean nothing less than 
the equal admission of all members in a state to full political participation. The concept of 
being French was beginning to be associated with the right of participation in the government 
of the polity rather than with being a subject of the French king. There was widespread 
national consciousness that the state was a common enterprise that required to be run by all. 
 
Nationalism provided an escape from the old oppressions of Church, monarch, or even from 
foreign rule, since a nation – which was far more than the sum of its individual citizens – by 
its very existence promised a better future to peoples possessing common cultural traits who 
lived within its defined territorial boundaries. The idea of a nation gained currency in the 19th 
century as a new building force of  homogeneity or political cohesion. 
 
 
 
5.3. The Idea of Order of the Nation 
 
 
Originally, the word nation (from the Latin natio, meaning birth or place of origin) was a 
derogatory term that referred to groups of foreigners from the same place whose status was 
below that of Roman citizens. During the Middle Ages, the word came to refer to a student 
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elite from the same geographical region attending Europe’s medieval universities who took 
sides as a group against students from different regions in scholastic debates. 
 
It was during the 16th century, in the aftermath of the French Revolution, that the word nation 
began to be applied to a unique people who had liberated themselves from the tyranny of 
absolute monarchy and the Church, and was readily distinguishable from other people by the 
objective criteria of a common language, culture, race, origin and history.283   
 
The unity of the nation based on a common culture  replaced the unity of religion and 
established a new, though politically and externally directed homogeneity in which one still 
lived largely from the tradition of Christian morality. According to the ‘Sleeping Beauty’ 
views of nationalism of the time, national identity was a dormant natural human emotion that 
needed to be awakened by its desire for freedom, self-government and a state of its own.284 
Thus, the homogeneity of the nation found its expression in the idea of a nation-state. 
 
During the 18th century, creating a common national community to which all subjects of the 
state belonged - that is, a nation bound together by a common language, culture, origin and 
history – enabled states to raise huge armies without threatening the state. Thus the process of 
state formation in Europe in the 18th century created nations where none had previously 
existed in order to mobilize resources and survive in a world of competitive states.285 This 
was more the case with the need for formal political domination of  colonies that were meanst 
to provide a cheap source of labour and raw materials for the industries in Europe. 
 
However, the idea of a nation later lost its binding force not only in many European states. 
Even in the young states of Asia and Africa, Boeckenfoerde observes, the binding force of the 
idea of a nation was to be of a temporary duration. To start with, the modern nation-state that 
prevailed during the 19th century in Western Europe, was legitimated on the basis of the idea 
of the dominant or majority ethno-national group being able to represent the population 
throughout the territory of the state : ‘each nation, one state. Each state, one national 
being.’286  
 
The principle of nationality began to challenge the established boundaries of states, creating a 
serious political problem for imperial regimes. Hurst Hannum notes that, as ‘democracy and 
social contract theory became central to European concepts of government, multiethnic states 
became more difficult to sustain. States-in-waiting utilized ethnic or linguistic homogeneity to 
justify their separation from the imperial regimes to which they were subject, as well as to 
legitimise peripheral territorial expansion’.287  
 
Demand increased for states to be bounded according to national principles and, by World 
War I, the concept had actually become a war aim under the doctrine enunciated as ‘self-
determination’ by Democratic US President Woodrow Wilson. Based on Wilson’s rhetoric of  
nationalist legitimacy, the League of Nations founded after World war I for disarmament and 
war prevention sanctioned massive border changes, population transfers, and realignments.288
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But as nationalism clarified the boundaries of the nation-state, the principle of sovereignty 
derived from the theory of individual freedom and consent revealed its sheltered tendency to 
deny freedom to identifiable outsiders. “When nationalist ideology becomes aggressive, the 
result is the exclusion, rejection and even diabolization of the nationalism of others” 289who 
may be a minority ethno-national group within the population of  the territory of the state.  
 
Nationalism can be used by authoritarian regimes to promote illiberal goals of chauvinism, 
xenophobia, militarism and unjust conquest against alleged enemies of the nation. 290  In 
Europe, the nationalism of the authoritarian Nazi regime revealed the sheltered chauvinistic 
tendency to deny freedom to identifiable outsiders. It is this nationalism that was the primary 
cause of the World War II and spawned enough “crimes of war” to shock the collective 
conscience into articulating the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
 
World War II produced a dramatic shift in the legitimacy of nationalism as a basis of 
statehood.291 Liberal states adopted the myth of ethno-cultural neutrality. They began to treat 
culture in the same way as religion, as something which people should be free to pursue in the 
private life, but which is not the concern of the state (so long as people respect the rights of 
others). Just as liberalism precludes the establishment of official religion, so too there cannot 
be official cultures which have preferred status over other possible cultural allegiances.292
 
In reality, however, liberal-democratic states are far from being ethno-culturally neutral. The 
policies of United States, which is the allegedly proto-typical ‘neutral’ state, that make the 
English language a legal requirement for education and government, citizenship for 
immigrants (under the age of 50), the drawing of internal boundaries, are a case in point. The 
United states is not unique in this respect. Virtually all liberal democracies have, at one point 
or another, attempted to diffuse a single societal culture, throughout all of their territories.  
 
No one would have predicted in 1750, for instance, that virtually everyone within the current 
boundaries of France or Italy would share a common language and sense of nationhood. Other 
typical ‘nation-states’ include England, Germany, and Portugal. These governments have 
deliberately promoted integration into a territorially concentrated culture, based on a shared 
language used in various institutions, in both private and public life (schools, media, law, 
economy, government). By so doing, they have encouraged citizens to view their life-chances 
as tied up with their participation in common institutions that operate in the same language.293
 
Of course, there are other countries like Switzerland, Belgium, Spain and Canada, and not so 
long from now the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, where minorities have successfully 
resisted attempts to integrate them into the dominant or majority societal culture for fear of 
being assimilated into the dominant or majority culture, and governments have had to back 
down on their nation-building policies by recognising the rights of these groups to continue to 
exist as separate cultures outside the mainstream culture. 
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But the quest to become a nation-state has been a powerful one in most Western democracies. 
As Canovan reasons, nationhood is ‘the battery’ which makes Western states run: the 
existence of a common national identity motivates citizens to act for common political goals. 
Modern states need to be able to mobilize citizens in pursuit of a wide range of goals. The 
battery of nationalism can be used to promote liberal goals (such as social justice, 
democratisation, equality of opportunity and economic development)  and illiberal goals.294
 
Since nationalism was recast as the villain of  World War II, it was no longer a legitimate 
basis for state sovereignty. Paradoxically, Wilson’s doctrine of self-determination retained its 
status as a worthy political goal. However, the nature of self-determination shifted from the 
right of an ethnic minority to secede to the right of a people under foreign or alien domination 
to politically constitute itself into an independent territorial state. States were to be legitimated 
by being seen to represent their populations without reference to (ethno) national groups.295
 
The nation was no longer viewed as natural and primordial, in the words of Anderson, but as 
created and invented.296 The nation was now viewed as consciously invented in order to 
create the cultural, sociological, and psychological conditions necessary to sustain the 
sovereign territorial state. Creating a sense of nationhood required the breakdown of the 
individual’s attachment to local languages and cultures in order to create a common national 
culture that inculcates in the state’s subject population a common national frame of reference 
across space (i.e., territory) and time ( i.e., a single national history). Therefore, creating a 
national identity after World War II became closely connected to the formation of territorial 
states. 
 
In the shaping of the United Nations Charter, it was specified that the principle of self-
determination “conformed to the purposes of the Charter only insofar as it implied the right of 
self-government of peoples and not the right of secession.”297 The victors of the World War II 
believed that the maintenance of existing state borders was the means to a stable peace, the 
United Nations became the organisation of externally legitimate states.  
 
Once admitted to the United Nations, the benefits of recognition for a state included the 
presumption of sovereignty as long as the state retained control over territory, cooperated with 
the reciprocal non-intervention norm, and fulfilled its treaty obligations. The United Nations 
rests on the foundation of the mutual recognition of sovereignty and reciprocity of states. 
Crucially, it is based on the formal assumption of states as equal sovereigns (derived from 
theories of political legitimacy)298, as was formally established in the Peace of Westphalia. 
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6. The Expansion of  State Sovereignty 
 
 
6.1. The Colonial State. 
 
 
Through colonialism European states transferred the idea of the state to their colonies, which 
laid the foundation of the present global system of sovereign territorial states.299 In line  with 
the principle of self-determination in the UN Charter, there is a strong correspondence 
between boundary lines of the present system of independent, sovereign states and the 
administrative and legal units of the European colonial Empires, most of which were arbitrary 
markers of the limits of exclusive spheres of political influence and economic influence. 
 
A crucial force that transformed the world of colonial empires into the world of independent 
territorial states was nationalism, which arose in connection with popular sovereignty and 
liberalism and helped generate independence movements in the colonial empires.300 Of course, 
pre-colonial Asia or Africa had very few nations in the accepted sense. The colonies 
themselves usually comprised many ethnic and political entities. None of these colonies were 
strictly speaking nations. They were demonstrably not of one people for one to talk about the 
rise of nationalism, as the self-assertion of the colonised is usually described.301
 
However, by partitioning, say the African continent into administrative entities and imposing 
on them their own legal, linguistic, and cultural concepts, alien European powers made the 
indigenous population more conscious than before that they were one people. Colonial 
domination gave them common experiences, a sense of common history, though brief, and, in 
the manner of India, a common language. They shared common grievances. They also lived 
within a single territory and were subject to the same laws and methods of administration.302
 
It was indigenous Africans indiscriminately who were subordinated to colonial rule, and their 
reactions to colonialism were in great part couched in terms of Africa as a whole. In its 
language, and in some measure in its outlook, African nationalism was African. It was 
Africans and their communities that suffered inequalities, discrimination, spatial distortions, 
limited investments and general backwardness. In brief, the essence of the confrontation was a 
racial one: Africans demanded an end to white superiority  by which they were dominated. 
 
Nationalism arose among Western-educated elites in the colonies. They learnt from the world-
wide dissemination of philosophies proclaiming the equality of all human beings and the 
teaching that equal persons possess an inherent right to rule themselves, that to be ruled and 
never to rule was to be without dignity. Thus, the only way in which they could recover their 
dignity denied to them by their European rulers was by being able to rule themselves.303  
 
The fact that nationalism was a demand for racial equality was its most conspicuous attribute. 
Nationalists demanded acceptance as equals in the human family. This had political 
dimensions, because colonialism in Africa had been marked by the domination of Africans by 
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Europeans. So the demand for equality found expression in the demand for the emancipation 
of the whole of the African continent from European colonial rule. 
 
The granting of the right to self-rule to former European colonies in Africa put an end to the 
drive to secure national unity that had been born, in the words of Immanuel Wallerstein, in the 
crucible of a revolutionary struggle against an alien colonial power.304 Once the alien colonial 
power had been replaced, the new nationalist leaders had to look for another basis on which to 
build a broadly shared sense of national unity in the Post-colonial African states. 
 
 
6.2.  The Post-Colonial State. 
 
 
For the most part, independent African states did not aspire to their own nation-states. In 
conformity with the reinterpreted principle of self-determination in the United Nations 
Charter that was adopted by the Organisation of African Unity, they took their place in the 
colonially determined state-nations that constituted the existing political map of  Africa. 
 
From the point of view of the ethnic groups, few had the power or aspiration to form ‘nation-
states’ in the Western sense, in which their language and culture would monopolize public 
space and public institutions. This was not a realistic possibility in Africa,  since most states 
do not have a majority in this sense. They are composed of several ethno-cultural groups, 
none of which form more than twenty-five or thirty percent of the total population.305  
 
And just as ethnic groups cannot aspire to their own nation-state, so too states cannot attempt 
to integrate citizens by diffusing a particular ethnic group’s language and culture throughout 
the territory of the state. To be sure, most African states are interested in developing a 
common identity, and developing common public institutions and a common public sphere 
operating in a common language. But this has not typically involved diffusing the majority’s 
language, history and identity ( since there is no such majority). 
 
In Africa, state nation-building has not been a matter of majority nation-building. Rather, it 
has typically involved diffusing the colonial language as the language of state institutions, and 
trying to develop pan-ethnic bases for state identification or patriotism which would appeal to 
most or all ethnic groups in the territory of the state. For instance, rather than basing national 
identity on the glorious history of the dominant group , African states have tried to imagine a 
common identity by appealing to a common future in which all groups share.306
 
Citing the example of Mauritius to demonstrate the path that African countries need to follow, 
Eriksen shows the state as being ‘in the process of developing a common set of supra-ethnic, 
national myths and symbols which is invested with meaning and relevance by the bulk of the 
population’, and has a ‘high level of cultural integration, which makes a national public 
sphere possible’, based on a Creole version of the Colonial French language.307
 
Kymlicka calls  this ‘nation-building’, but it does not involve building the state around the 
language, culture and history of the dominant ethno-national group. As a result, nation-
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306 Ibid., p. 65. 
307 Thomas H. Eriksen,“A Non-ethnic State for Africa ?”, in Ethnicity and Nationalism in Africa. 
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building of this pan-ethnic sort is, in theory, not as much of a threat to minorities. In Africa 
nation-building has not meant nation-destroying. Ethnic minorities have not been the target of 
majority nation-building campaigns as was the case in much of the West. 
 
It would be paradoxical if it turned out to be Africa rather than the West which was the real 
home of ‘civic’ nationalism, whose official language and symbols really are neutral amongst 
the various cultures and identities of the ethnic groups living in the territory. In such a context,  
the dialectic of nation-building and minority rights would be different. Where nation-building 
does not privilege a hegemonic majority group, there may be less need for specific rights to 
protect minorities from injustice which arise as a result of majority nation-building.308
 
However, ethnic conflicts can still arise in this form of post-colonial pan-ethnic nation-
building. But they are likely to take the form of struggles for a share of state power at the 
central level, rather that ethno-nationalist struggles for self-government and autonomy at a 
regional level. This indeed is a common feature in African politics. 
 
The problem is that while the state may be more of less neutral (that is, its language, culture 
and symbols are not tied to any particular ethnic group), the avenues for accessing state power 
go through networks of patronage /clientelism and political parties that are predominantly 
defined along ethnic lines. And this raises the danger that some ethnic groups will have much 
better access routes to the state, while other ethnic groups are excluded. 
 
Where this is the problem, ethnic groups are likely to mobilize as communal contenders, 
fighting for a share of state power, rather than as ethno-nationalists, fighting for autonomy. 
And indeed Gurr says that the distinctive feature of ethnic conflict in Africa is that it primarily 
involves ‘communal contenders’ rather than minority nationalism.309
 
In such a situation, political integration is most likely to be enhanced through measures 
adopted to accommodate religious groups in Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria and Northern 
Ireland. In these countries, Protestants and Catholics were in effect ‘communal contenders’, 
rather than ethno-nationalist. Through measures adopted to accommodate religious groups, 
each religious group was guaranteed proportional shares in political power and in access to 
public resources, a veto power over certain decisions, and guarantees of a share of power in 
government, so that neither group was excluded from state power. 
 
For as long as ethnic conflicts in African take the form of conflict between communal 
contenders for a share of state power, Kymlicka suggests that measures adopted to 
accommodate all groups are the most appropriate, for they ensure that no ethno-national 
group is excluded from state power310 and all ethno-national groups are thus able to support 
the public objectives of the state and thereby enhance its legitimacy. 
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7.  State Legitimacy  
 
 
The question of what makes political power rightful or legitimate has exercised the minds of 
political thinkers since the origin of political speculation, especially so when political power 
has been substantially challenged or widely experienced as oppressive and unjust. 
 
The concept of political legitimacy has been central to both political philosophy and to 
empirical social science despite their divergence in the twentieth century. The majority of 
social scientists writing about legitimacy during the second half of the twentieth century have 
been concerned with exploring the conditions and causes of the emergence of legitimacy in 
subjects’ favourable beliefs, attitudes and perceptions that produce compliance with or 
support for a state1, or in the stability or lawfulness of a regime that give it “the capacity to 
engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate.”2
 
That a state is stable, lawful and refrains from the persecution or deliberate impoverishment of 
its subjects shows that it is good in some ways, but it does not obviously show that a state has 
the kind of special moral relationship with any particular subjects that gives it a right to rule.3 
Similarly, accounts of legitimacy simply in terms of the subject’s beliefs or attitudes could 
also not show that a state has the rights to exclusively impose and coercively enforce binding 
duties on its subjects.4 It is a mistake, then, to focus in an account of state legitimacy on the 
attitudes of subjects or on the capacity of a state to produce or sustain these attitudes. 
 
Political philosophers present a different perspective, which is largely normative and moral. 
Their focus of attention is on the question of considerations of a significant moral relationship 
between the state and its subjects that gives the state the exclusive moral right to impose the 
duty on subjects to obey its law, to have its subjects comply with the duty, to use coercion to 
enforce this duty within the moral limits set to the exercise of political power by the state. 
 
In view of these considerations, political philosophers have sought to demonstrate by a priori 
argument that the state is morally legitimate. Traditionally understood, only states have 
legitimacy for only states exercise political power. That is, only states claim a monopoly right 
to enact, apply and enforce laws on all those residing within their jurisdiction and only states 
claim that those subject to their authority have a general obligation to obey their orders.  
 
Recently, the traditional understanding of legitimacy has been challenged. It has been claimed 
that both sub-state entities and international organizations can and do exercise political power. 
As Woods points out, the legitimacy of international institutions is being challenged by states 
who feel inadequately consulted or represented within organizations. The old hierarchy of 
states within multilateral forums, say the World Trade Organisation (WTO), is being 
challenged and their effectiveness and legitimacy questioned by smaller or weaker states.5
 
Thus, the question of legitimacy can be raised in the domain of sub-state entities and 
international organizations, just as the concept of legitimacy can be applied to other kinds of 
                                                 
1 Charles Taylor, “Alternative Futures: Legitimacy, Identity, and Alienation in Late Twentieth Century Canada,”  
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4 Ibid., p. 750. 
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power other than that involving the state, such as that of an employer hiring workers. But in 
our discussion, we shall apply the concept more to the exercise of power by the state. 
 
 
7.1.  The Idea of a State. 
 
 
However, before making an attempt to understand why political philosophers have sought to 
demonstrate the legitimacy of state power, we first need to again briefly look at the idea of a 
state, by distinguishing it from what it is not. In order to do so, we first distinguish two kinds 
of social groups. The German sociologist and philosopher, Ferdinand Tönnies, distinguished 
between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society or association). 
 
Gemeinschaft  is the earlier form of social group; it involves an attitude of natural friendship 
and is not deliberately organized; it is based on ‘natural will’. Gesellschaft comes at a later 
stage of development; it involves an attitude of deliberate planning or calculation; it is based 
on ‘rational will’. Though, Gesellschaft does not preclude the formation of friendships.6
 
Following the practice of sociologists using the word ‘society’ in a very broad sense for the 
whole subject-matter of sociology and treating ‘association’ as a technical term with a sharply 
defined meaning, Raphael defines an association as a group of persons organized for the 
pursuit of a specified common purpose or set of common purposes.7
 
An association is spoken of when the group, deliberately organized for a common purpose, is 
not for a short duration, but usually lasts for some length of time. The purpose of an 
association may be a continuing one, more than a group of tenants who try to get their rents 
reduced and disband once they succeed after a month’s campaigning to achieve their purpose. 
 
In contrast to an association, a community does not have a specified set of purposes and need 
not be deliberately organized. The Greek polis or city-state was more of a community than the 
modern state. Aristotle in his Politics (I.2) says that the polis comes into being for the sake of 
life, but that once it exists it has as its purpose the good life as a whole, the sum of all 
purposes humans think worth pursuing (of  morality, religion, art, order and defence). 
 
Unlike the Greek polis or city-state, the modern state is an association rather than a 
community. It is indeed the most highly organized of all forms of associations and, except for 
the totalitarian state that does not leave scope for private initiative, does not try to take upon 
itself the organization of all communal purposes, so that its purposes are in practice limited to 
the traditional negative function of the preservation of order and security against deliberate 
infringement of rights in respect of person or property (for instance, against assault or theft) 
and freedom, as well as the newer, positive function of the promotion of welfare and justice 
 
The state is often called a nation, as when we refer to the nation’s  flag, hymn, pride or pledge 
allegiance to the ‘nation’, but we will reserve the term ‘nation’ for a different kind of entity. 
The nation is a community, a group with a common language, culture, origin and history 
giving rise to natural sentiments of loyalty and identification, and not limited to a specific set 
of purposes, as is the case with the idea of a modern state, except when a group urges that it 
secedes from an existing state and that it be organized as a separate state.  
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7 Ibid., p. 36. 
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As we use the terms, therefore, nation and state are two quite different entities and do not 
always coincide. Some nations are divided into, or distributed among, more than one state; 
some states comprise more than one nation. It is possible for nation to be formed into a state 
just as it is possible for the population of a state to be or even become a nation, but the 
concept of a state is not the same as  the concept of a nation. 
 
Even when nation and state have the same territorial boundaries, membership of the two is not 
identical. An immigrant who becomes naturalized and so a citizen of the state, with all the 
rights and obligations of the natural-born citizen, will not, for sometime at least, feel himself 
to be a member of the nation and may not be accepted as such by others. 
 
In general, nations and states in the modern world tend to coincide in membership, if only 
because nationalism gives rise to new states and the ties of statehood give rise to the feeling or 
sentiment of being a nation. Yet the difference in character between nation and state remains. 
The nation is a community; membership of the nation is a matter of sentiment, depending on 
common experience and history, while membership of the state is a matter of  legal status. 
 
The state should not be identified with those people who happen to be in government at any 
given time. A typical state lasts through a great many changes of government, and in principle 
any state could last for many decades. The state shares these properties with the institutions of 
government, suggesting that we might identify the state with the institutions of government of 
the legislature, the executive, judiciary, police, military and the bureaucracy. 
 
So the main institutions of government include those which enact laws, administer the law, 
and adjudicate disputes about the law. Also included are institutions which maintain the 
internal order and security, the military which enforces the state borders, and the complex 
institutions operated by the civil service that administer the programmes of government.  As a 
first approximation, then, we propose to identify the state with institutions of government.8
 
An institution can be conceived as a system of offices and roles. But, it will not do to think of 
the state in such an abstract and impersonal way. It is much more natural to think of the state 
as a system of offices and roles together with the people who occupy them at the times they 
perform their duties, as part of the state, at least during the times they occupy those offices 
and roles. That is, the state consists of the animated institutions of government against which 
we could make a claim for the protection of our person and property and pay allegiance to. 
 
This understanding of the state rests implicitly on Hans Kelsen’s idea of a state as a system of 
law, an idea David Copp9 adopts, for the institutions of government are creatures of the law. 
They are defined legally, in the constitution and in the various statutes that have been enacted 
under the constitution. The idea of a legal system can be used to illuminate the idea of a state.  
 
A state can thus be characterised by identifying a system of law and the territory in which the 
system is in force in the sense that residency in it is sufficient to put one under its jurisdiction. 
The state is the system of animated institutions that govern the territory and its residents, and 
that administer and enforce the legal system and carry out the programmes of government.  
 
A state corresponds to the legal system that is in force in a territory. It governs the people in 
all of the territory in which its legal system is in force. It rules, or has its jurisdiction applied 
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universally to all the people who happen to be within its territorial bounds, though a state 
claims some, typically partial jurisdiction over persons outside their territories (for example, 
their citizens abroad or those who have committed crimes against their citizens). 
 
The relevant bounds of jurisdiction of a state are in principle limited, roughly to the 
recognized territory of the state (with some extension to territorial waters, air space, and ships 
flying the state’s flag in international waters). These bounds are defined by the general 
agreement of states in international law, designed to mitigate potential sources of conflict.10
 
States divide among themselves all usable territory – and that of the territory that remains in 
the usable universe that is claimed by no particular state (e.g., the high seas, Antarctica, the 
earth’s moon, outer space), nearly all is regarded in international law as res communis (as held 
in common by all states and unavailable for acquisition). Virtually nothing usable is treated as 
res nullius (as “unsubjected” territory) and thus as unavailable for appropriation or 
settlement.11
 
The entire population of the world and its inhabitable territory have been divided into states or 
brought under the jurisdiction of  existing states. If a person does not wish to live under the 
jurisdiction of a state in which s/he is born, and if  s/he can afford to emigrate, s/he can escape 
the jurisdiction of his state but not the jurisdiction of any other state. All persons in the world 
today have become captive to the universal jurisdiction of one state or the other. 
 
The universal jurisdiction of a state over all people in its territory means that everyone who 
resides in, or even temporarily visits, a certain territory, is willy-nilly subject to the laws of 
the state which controls it. No one can say that he chooses not to be subject to its laws. If 
anyone is in a state, s/he is necessarily bound by its laws, and if anyone disobeys any of them, 
s/he will be liable to punishment on the assumption that s/he is bound by them.12
 
The compulsion to obey the law which is exercised by the state is greater than that  exercised 
by some other social groups, including associations like trade unions, for a state is able to give 
effect to the continued bonds of allegiance to it by coercively enforcing the duty to obey the 
law on residents within its territory in a manner other associations are not able to.13
 
The laws of a state require its subjects to act in certain ways, and the state typically enforces 
its law by attaching punishments or penalties to failures to comply. An example of this is 
criminal law, much of which requires actions of forbearance that would be morally required in 
any event. This is unlike the traffic law in which some actions that are legally required would 
not be morally required in the absence of the law. But in all these cases, there is the problem 
of explaining by what right the state imposes requirements and enforces them.14
 
Moreover, a state is territorial. A state may apply its law to anyone within its territory, 
including many who have no special attachment to it, such as illegal immigrants and their 
children, and temporary visitors. A state may attempt to control the use of land and resources 
within its territory, and a state defines the rules of property. Further, a state enforces its 
boundaries by controlling entry into or exit from its territory. The territoriality of the state 
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raises the problem of explaining by what right the state has jurisdiction in these ways in its 
territory.15
 
 
7.2.  The Problem of  State Legitimacy. 
 
 
The problem of legitimacy is, then, to demonstrate how a state can have the authority to do 
the kinds of things involved in governing. In part, it is the problem of explaining how a state 
can be morally entitled to impose its laws throughout its territory and to enforce its borders. In 
A. John Simmon’s words, a legitimate state would have “the right to rule”.16
 
The problem is to understand, first, precisely what this right amounts to, and second, under 
what conditions a state would have it. No one has brought out the problematic aspect of 
authority better than Robert Wolff in his In Defense of Anarchy.17 Wolff’s insight was to see 
that the problem with authority is not in the right to rule directly. 
 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, people do not rule themselves, not even in a democracy. 
Nor is democratic power the most extensive power people have themselves. For democratic 
power still involves submission to the will of others. It would be anarchy for one to have the 
absolute right to decide ones own action while conceding an equal right to all. 
 
Wolff’s insight was to see that the problem with authority is in the duty to obey the state 
which it brings in its wake. If there is an authority which is legitimate, then its subjects are 
duty bound to obey it whether they agree with it or not. Such a duty is inconsistent with 
autonomy, with the responsibility of subjects to decide on the balance of reasons themselves. 
Hence Wolff’s denial of the moral possibility of legitimate authority.18 This is the challenge 
of philosophical anarchism and much of the debate about authority are seen as replies to this. 
 
The most common route followed to avoid the anarchist challenge consists in the attempt of 
assimilating authority as the right to rule with authority in its other use of the permission to do 
something. In the case of political authority that something is the use of coercion in 
circumstances in which it is usually forbidden. 19But, if a right to rule means no more than the 
authorization to use coercion, then it does not involve a duty of obedience. The anarchist’s 
problem of political authority arises because it involves a duty of obedience. 
 
Political philosophers have sought to demonstrate the legitimacy of the state, both to meet the 
challenge presented by philosophical anarchism and convince subordinates that obedience is 
not just a question of prudence or advantage but also a matter of duty. For, as Rousseau wrote, 
 
The strongest is never strong enough to be master unless he transforms strength into 
right and obedience into duty.20
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We would grant that the state has power over its citizens when it imposes and typically 
enforces its law by attaching punishments or penalties to failures to abide, but we would 
hardly suppose that the state has authority, that is, that the state has a right to demand the 
obedience of its subjects to its law and subjects have a duty to obey the state and its law. 
 
The more philosophically sound route followed by political philosophers to meet the 
challenge of the philosophical anarchist and convince subordinates that obedience is not just a 
question of prudence or advantage but also a matter of duty is one that points to a similarity 
between political authority and theoretical authority or the authority of the expert, whose 
judgment is a particularly reliable guide as to how things are independent of that judgment. 
 
Indeed a close connection between theoretical authority and political authority is presupposed 
by the philosophical anarchist’s challenge. What after all is disturbing in the case of authority 
is not the utilitarian consideration that one satisfies the wishes of rulers. The special problem 
with authority is that it requires one to let authoritative directives pre-empt one’s own 
judgment. One should comply with them, whether or not one agrees with them because one 
believes that authoritative directives can guide one better than one can guide oneself. 
 
In this sense, to have authority may mean to have the right to be obeyed, or it may mean to 
have the state’s commands acknowledged as rightful by those at whom it is directed. When 
the state imposes and typically enforces its law on its subjects resident in its territory, its 
subjects may comply, because they believe it is something they ought to do. They are not, 
strictly speaking, obeying the command, but rather acknowledging the command as rightful.21
 
Of course, there are many reasons subjects acknowledge the power of the state. As Weber 
observed, it may be because of the prescriptive force of tradition: the fact that something has 
always been done in a certain way strikes most subjects as a perfectly adequate reason for 
doing it that way again. It may also be due to the extraordinary characteristics of those who 
hold state power: the fact that those who hold power may be great military leaders or forceful 
characters in times of crisis may inspire their subjects to acknowledge their authority. The 
official positions of those holding state power is a further reason for acknowledging power. 
 
The fact that those subject to the state acknowledge the power of the state is clear. The fact 
that those subject to the state ought to acknowledge the power of the state is not so obvious. 
Hence the need to establish under what conditions and for what reason those subject to the 
state acknowledge the power of the state. Restated, there is need to demonstrate under what 
conditions the power of the state can be acknowledged to be rightful or legitimate. 
 
The power of the state cannot be acknowledged to be rightful or legitimate by pointing to 
instances of human communities in which a state imposes and enforces its law on its subjects 
and subjects comply with the duty to obey the law. We must demonstrate by an a priori 
argument that there can be forms of human community in which state’s power to impose its 
law and enforce it can be acknowledged to be rightful or legitimate.22
 
Indeed, demonstrating that the state is legitimate is not the same as showing that the state is 
justified. Justifying the state is a matter of rebutting the anarchist view that anything that is 
sufficiently coercive to count as a state also necessarily does or sanctions wrong (i.e., violates 
rights) and so could not be morally justified by showing that one or more specific kinds of 
                                                 
21 Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, p. 6. 
22 Ibid., pp. 7-9. 
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state (say, Nozick’s minimalist state) are morally justified.23 On the other hand, justifying  its 
legitimacy involves showing that there are forms of human community in which the state’s 
power to impose its law and enforce it does not violate applicable moral principles. 
 
The recognition of the power of the state as rightful or legitimate by obeying its commands is 
not, however, as already pointed out, merely to the advantage of rulers in the consolidation of 
their rule and thereby meant to satisfy their wishes; the moral assumptions or principles which 
serve to define what counts as legitimate also typically set limits to what the powerful may do 
if they are to maintain their moral authority over those subordinate to them. 
 
Therefore, a useful starting point in answering the question of what legitimacy consists in is to 
recognise that legitimacy, as a convenient expression for describing in general terms the 
criteria for the validity of power, its ‘title’ for issuing orders and demanding obedience from 
those who in turn hold themselves under obligation to obey, presupposes (i) legality, the 
existence of a legal system and of  a power issuing orders according to rules, and provides (ii) 
the justification of legality, by conferring on power the chrism of authority. It is a further 
‘plus’ sign added to the force which the state exercises in the name of the law.   
 
The Latin root of the word ‘authority’ augere ( to augment) clearly suggests the idea of 
conferment and possession of a special qualification, without which we speak only of  ‘might’ 
and of  ‘power’ in reference to the state.24 When we recognise that the first dimension of 
legitimacy presupposes legality, we speak mostly of ‘power’ in reference to the state. Thus, it 
is  only with the second dimension providing moral justification that we speak of authority.  
 
In what follows then, we critically analyse legitimacy from the first dimension of legal rules 
as providing the primary ground, before analysing it from the second dimension of the moral 
justifiability of legal rules as providing the ultimate ground, for the legitimacy of state power, 
which is recognized as morally binding and worthy of the willing obedience of its citizens. 
 
 
7.3. Dimensions of Legitimacy 
 
 
7.3.1. Legitimacy as derived from Legal Rules 
 
 
The relationship between legality and legitimacy has long held to be one of the basic 
problems concerning the state. In the 16th and 17th centuries, the subtle distinctions drawn by 
medieval writers with regard to unjust or tyrannical power, especially the distinction between 
the two kinds of tyranny, ex parte exercitii and ex defectu tituli were still very much alive. 
 
Power, according to the foregoing theory, which was fully developed by Bartolus and by 
Coluccio Salutati, could be unjust, that is tyrannical, on account of the use that was made of it, 
that is, of the way in which it was exercised. But it could also be unjust, and was held to be so 
even more definitely, due to a flaw in its origin, when the ruler had no proper title to govern.25
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Therefore, in constructing legitimacy from the first dimension of  legality, Beetham is able to 
speak of the state as legitimate insofar as it acquires power, and exercises it in accordance 
with established rules, whether these rules are customary and conventional or legal in form. 
Rules form a basic component of social life. It is only through their existence that we are able 
to predict the behaviour of others, and introduce any settled expectations into our lives.26
 
Social rules ensure predictability through their normative or prescriptive force; they impose 
obligations and create corresponding entitlements, which are publicly acknowledged and 
collectively enforced. It follows from the nature of social rules that we cannot separate the 
existence and acquisition of power from the normative expectations and entitlements by 
reference to which its possession is also justified, since both occur simultaneously; in 
acquiring power according to the rules a person also acquires the right to exercise it.27
 
Social rules may be customary and conventional in form, or be part of a legal order. The 
drawback to custom and convention, particularly with regard to important and potentially 
contested issues, is that they carry with them no means of adjudicating disputes about their 
precise reference and scope, and they rely on diffuse means of enforcement applied by society 
as a whole. The distinctive feature of the legal order, as H. L. A. Hart has shown, is the 
existence of rules prescribing the means whereby customary and conventional rules are to be 
recognized and adjudicated, and the presence of a specialized agency to enforce them.28
 
In most societies the basic rules determining access to the means of power come to be defined 
in legal form, even where they may have originated in convention, because of the disputes 
that arise among the powerful themselves over women, property and position. A characteristic 
feature of the modern world is the extent to which power is subject to precise legal regulation; 
and the flexibility of its procedures of legal enactment which enable the disadvantage of 
customary rules in the context of a rapidly changing environment to be overcome.29
 
It is not too difficult to detect behind this subjection of power to precise legal regulation in the 
modern world a deep commitment to legality as something worth preserving at all costs. In 
other words,  the defence of legality is itself an indication of a choice, of the acceptance of a 
value considered to be inherent in the very existence of a legal system, one which, as such, is 
also seen to provide the ultimate justification of the power of the state. 
 
Max Weber’s comment on this is illustrative when he says that, ‘today the most usual basis of 
legitimacy is the belief in legality, the readiness to conform with rules which are formally 
correct and have been imposed by accepted procedures.’ He observes that modern societies, 
and the state, are ‘legal societies’ where ‘commands are given in the name of an impersonal 
norm rather than in the name of a personal authority; and in turn the giving of a command 
constitutes obedience to a norm rather than an arbitrary decision, a favour, or a privilege.’30
 
Legality in its positivist form requires the exclusion of arbitrary personal orders that go 
beyond the impersonal norms established according to some procedures and enacted as laws. 
These laws have come to replace ‘the potentially capricious appeal to transcendent norms,’ 
and are, in principle, ‘what free men would establish by their own rationality.’31
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Hence, Weber concluded that ‘rational legitimacy’, which he identified with legality, was the 
only type of legitimacy to survive in the modern world. In it ‘every single bearer of power of 
command is legitimated by the system of rational norms, and his power is legitimate so far as 
it corresponds with the norms. Obedience is thus given to the norms rather than to the 
person.’32 Weber’s comments certainly explain why the respect of legality plays such an 
important part today, not only in legal theory but in the modern conception of the state.  
 
However, even in the contemporary world, acknowledges Beetham, the force of convention 
still persists, whether to qualify and subvert a status of formal legal equality, or to limit the 
power of the powerful in areas where the law is silent. Throughout history, in fact, the 
limitations on power which the subordinate have been able to secure, and which they 
understand as constituting rights for themselves have usually been conventional than legal.33
 
Such rights as those of peasants to a share of an agricultural product sufficient for subsistence, 
of industrial workers to control aspects of the work process, of women to a sphere of activity 
from which men are excluded, are typically the product of historical struggles between 
dominant and subordinate, and represent the crystallisation of a particular balance of forces. 
Like rights of way, they become confirmed by repeated use, and established as customary 
rules governing the relations between the subordinate and the dominant parties. 
 
The breach of such rules by the dominant constitutes one of the most frequent sources of 
grievance on the part of the subordinate, though one which does not necessarily undermine 
the legitimacy of the power structure as a whole.34 Where the powerful are able to secure 
legal validation for their action, the grievance becomes a dispute over which type of rule 
should have priority: whether the legal rule or the rule of custom or convention. 
 
The much readier access of the powerful to the law, and the fact that it provides both the 
source and protection of their power, makes appeal to the law as the ground of legitimacy a 
particularly favoured strategy for dominant groups. Indeed, obedience to the law is insisted on 
as the first duty of the subordinate, and legal validity is made to appear not only as the 
necessary, but also the sufficient, condition of legitimacy: its ultimate, not primary source.35
 
However, the more the powerful appeal to the law as the self-sufficient justification of their 
power, the more they have to obey it themselves for their legitimacy to be sustained. The 
absolutist idea that those who make the law are themselves above it is historically exceptional. 
Much more usual is some version, however embryonic, of  the ‘rule of law’ : the idea that the 
powerful and their agents, whatever influence they may exercise over the formulation of the 
law, are themselves subject to it, and have to conform to recognised procedures to change it.36
 
The notion of the constitutional system was born from the struggle against arbitrary rule and 
the need to restrict the action of the state within precise legal limits. The old idea of the rule of 
law was transformed into the institutional practice of the Lockean separation of powers 
between legislative, executive and judiciary. Special devices were gradually developed (such 
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as ‘administrative justice’ on the Continent and ‘judicial review’ in the US) for the purpose of 
safeguarding legality against abuse by the executive power and by the legislative as well.37
 
Moreover, the rule of law came to mean that judges’ decisions rest on interpreting existing 
law and relevant precedents, that judges must justify their verdicts by reference thereto and 
adhere to a consistent reading from case to case, or else find a reasonable basis for 
distinguishing them. Thus, the rule of law exists so long as government institutions and their 
associated judicial practices are conducted in a reasonable way in accordance with correct 
formal procedural rules of impartiality and consistency, adherence to the law and respect for 
precedent, all in the light of a coherent understanding of recognised constitutional norms.38
 
Although the institutional separation of powers and their associated legal and judicial 
practices could not of themselves guarantee to the subordinate any control over the content of 
law, they could at least secure the subordinate against the arbitrary exercise of state power (by 
depriving arbitrium of its ultimate ground – the right to get away with it), and provide the 
protection of the due process of the law when they fall foul of the powerful. The idea of the 
rule of law thus serves as a limitation on power39 and a guarantee of rights of the subordinate. 
 
The idea that legality is the foundation of the state was the inspiration of formulae such as 
Government under Law, Stato di diritto, Rechtsstaat, which are generally accepted today as 
the best descriptions of what the modern state is or purports to be, and of the reason why its 
commands are accepted as legitimate.40 Legality seems indeed to have become, as Max 
Weber said, the modern version of  the legitimacy of  state power.  
 
But if this is the case, the question then arises as to what kind of legitimacy legality offers. If 
our analysis thus far is correct, legality is inherent in the notion of power as force exercised 
according to, and in the name of, the law. There is no denying that this ‘normalization’ of 
force in itself represent a benefit or a value. In unravelling Hobbes’s views we found that it 
was precisely that normalization or regularity in human relations which constituted for him 
the highest benefit or value of political association. We have to pay a high price for the 
preservation of peace and security by giving up our right or power to everything to the state. 
 
However, no sooner is mention made of a value assured by the state through the 
normalization or monopolization of force, as Weber would have it, than the strictly formal 
approach is abandoned. The question is no longer one about the presence of power, but one 
about its purpose and scope: no longer one that can be answered in purely descriptive terms, 
but one that presupposes a choice and necessarily entails prescription. 
 
We do not limit ourselves any more, as lawyers appear to do, to taking account of the fact that 
laws exist which ensure the regular exercise of force; but we commit ourselves to a particular 
view about the object, the content of law itself, about the end that norms pursue and that 
justifies their existence. This is the obstacle of all strictly legal theory of the state, the reason 
why the principle of legality cannot by itself alone fulfil the task fulfilled by that of 
legitimacy. For legality to provide legitimacy as well, it must of necessity refer not only to the 
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formal structure of power but to its intrinsic nature. In other words, what is required is clearly 
to indicate what kind of legality we have in mind when we praise the state for ensuring it.41
 
Undoubtedly an indication of this sort is traceable to the principle of the Rule of Law, at any 
rate, as it was usually understood in the Anglo-American tradition, and as it gradually 
influenced legal thought in other countries also. In the discussions held in Chicago in 1957 ‘it 
seemed to be generally agreed that the Rule of Law as understood in the West involved more 
than the mere compliance of the sovereign power in a state with the rules of the positive law 
of the state. There was, in fact, a large measure of agreement that the rule of law was some 
positive content capable of being expressed in terms of fundamental values’.42
 
Less than two years later the International Commission of Jurists, in the Congress it held in 
New Delhi, agreed to define the rule of law as ‘the realization of the appropriate conditions 
for the development of human dignity’.43 Clearly, the emphasis here is on the content of the 
law, on the purpose of legality. This is not merely a request for the formal correctness of the 
particular rules or the single decisions which compose a legal system.  
 
There is a request for the conformity of these rules and decisions to the values that are posited 
as necessary for the existence of a free society.44 We are provided with a criterion which 
enables us to evaluate the ‘legal quality’ of law, the substantive aspect of legality. Thus 
legitimacy and legality are identified only insofar as legality itself is an assertion of values. 
 
But such views still found difficulty being accepted on the Continent of Europe. Initially the 
notion of  Rechtsstaat, or government under law, sounded almost synonymous with the theory 
of constitutional government. It was intended to account for states founded on the principles 
of liberalism, if not of democracy. But later, particularly under the influence of  the ‘positive 
theory of law’, the idea of  Rechtsstaat completely altered its meaning and character.45
 
Once ‘ethical neutrality’ was accepted as the condition of scientific work, once all and every 
reference to value and content was declared to be irrelevant and even obnoxious to the 
understanding of the law, the one and only justification of any legal system was found to be 
‘efficacy’, that is, its factual existence: and every state, in as far as it was a legal system, could 
by definition be considered to be a Rechtsstaat. The problem of legitimacy thus underwent a 
radical change. The ‘principle of effectiveness’ became ‘the new rule of legitimacy’.46
 
The ‘principle of legitimacy’ means to Kelsen that the ‘validity [of a given system of norms] 
is determined only by the order to which they belong’. When, as in the case of a successful 
revolution, ‘the total legal order … has lost its efficacy’, this merely indicates that a new 
legitimacy has set in: ‘the principle of legitimacy is restricted by the principle of 
effectiveness’.47 In the positivist view of things, an illegitimate legal system is a contradiction 
in terms. The existence of a legal system and its legitimacy are one and the same thing. 
 
The positivist views ended by making force, not justice, the last resort of legal as well as 
political life. Hence, as Giovanni Sartori has pointed out, in our epoch ‘legality’ has emerged 
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as a ‘trap word’ often applied to any form of state organization with no value qualification of 
its legitimacy.48 This is what enabled many tyrannical regimes of the 20th century to obscure 
their lack of intrinsically valid claims to rule in justifying the use of arbitrary power, or to 
portray their de facto lawlessness as the highest form of lawfulness by underscoring the 
sanctity of procedural rules as if they validate their commands as authentic legitimacy.49  
 
The fact that state legality created for itself what Carl Schmitt called a political surplus 
value… ‘a value that breeds surplus value’ enabled totalitarian regimes to disregard legality 
and at the same time pretend to establish ‘total’ lawfulness.50 As Hannah Arendt has pointed 
out, totalitarian ‘defiance of all, even its own positive law implies that it believes it can do 
without any consensus juris whatever, and still not resign itself to the tyrannical state of 
lawlessness, arbitrariness, and fear. It can do without the consensus juris, because it promises 
to release the fulfilment of law from all action and will of man; and it promises justice on 
earth because it claims to make mankind itself the embodiment of the law.’51
 
In its positivist version, the concept of a legal authority that rejects appeal to higher law like 
religious commands or natural law is in serious contention with the democratic dogma that 
laws should be enacted only with the consent of the governed – theoretically the political 
community. Therefore, the legal positivist does not tell us a thing about how rules should be 
enacted or who has the right to hold office, nor does it prescribe precepts delimiting the scope 
of authority, that is, the range of commands based on established rules that can be issued.52
 
Of course, the foregoing criticisms may sound rather unfair. Positivist may be inclined to 
support their view of legal validity by repeating the view of Austin that ‘the existence of law 
is one thing; its merit or demerit another.’53 The question of the validity of law is to them a 
different question from that which needs to be asked of law being morally obligatory. 
However, many contemporary positivists would probably agree with Hart when he says that 
the ‘official system’, the state, must be submitted to some further ‘scrutiny’ before its power 
is recognized as morally binding and worthy of the obedience of  citizens subject to it.54
 
What this scrutiny can mean is that the possession of power is not the final word about the 
state. The whole structure of normative propositions which constitute a legal system can very 
well be represented as a set on hypothetical imperatives, or rules concerning the use of force if 
and when the system so disposes. Power would in this case be merely force once removed. 
And laws could hardly be called obligatory indeed, since they would not provide a more 
adequate description of the reason why those who are subject to them should obey them.55
 
It seems to D’Entreves that for laws to be obligatory, that is, true ought-propositions or 
prescriptive propositions and not mere statements concerning the use of force by the state, a 
value-clause must be inserted somewhere in the system. The whole structure must be invested 
with some kind of legitimation of state power. It will be necessary to assume that the state is 
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the holder not only of power but of legitimate power, or better still, of authority; that the ‘aura 
of majesty’ that surrounds the ‘official system’ can be somehow explained and justified.56
 
The search for a legitimate basis of state power is not an empty and futile search. Rather, it is 
the fundamental quest of political philosophy. A theory of the state which only takes account 
of  its legal validity is necessarily incomplete. It is no use protesting that such notions as the 
moral justifiability of legal rules are emotionally loaded, that they are at bottom irrational and 
certainly incapable of definition with the precision and rigour of scientific language. 
 
On its own, legality cannot provide a fully adequate or sufficient criterion of legitimacy. 
Despite its correct formal procedures we have already made mention of  which conspire to 
seemingly set the law beyond question, circumstances will always occur which expose a more 
fundamental issue: why these particular laws, and what gives them legitimacy?  
 
Such occasions arise, for example, when there is a conflict over the interpretation of existing 
law, which can only be resolved by appealing to some basic principle. Or social changes take 
place which provoke demands for reform of the law, thereby exposing its contingency. Or 
there occurs some infringement of the law by the powerful, which they seek to justify by 
reference to norms or an authoritative source that lies beyond existing rules.57
 
Such occasions expose a general truth, that appeal to the law can never provide more than a 
primary ground for legitimacy. That such an appeal is a necessary first step is ensured by the 
fact that established rules provide the recognised source of entitlements, and because a 
generalised respect for rules is the condition for any social order or settled expectations. That 
it is no more than a first step follows from the fact that rules cannot justify themselves simply 
by being rules, but require justification by reference to considerations 58 about the object, the 
content of law itself,  about the end or purpose of power, its scope, and the means available to 
citizens to ensure that government enacting law is responsible and responsive to them. 
 
These normative considerations typically set limits to the range of commands based on 
established rules that can be issued by the state if it is to maintain its moral authority over 
those subject to it residing in its territory. For though law does indeed have the threat of force 
or penalties behind it for those who do not comply with its requirements, the threat of force 
alone is insufficient to oblige citizens to willingly obey the law all the time.  
 
To some extent, at any rate, there must be a willing or uncompelled obedience of citizens to 
the law because they recognise its authority and accept that they ought to obey. Therefore, we 
now address ourselves to the second dimension of legitimacy of  the normative justifiability 
of legal rules that is necessary and sufficient to complement the first dimension of  legality. 
 
 
7.3.2.  Legitimacy as Normative Justifiability of Legal Rules 
 
 
In order to distinguish a legitimate state from an illegitimate state, we must suppose that the 
laws of a legitimate state have some significant normative status. They must be more than 
simply enactments, more especially that appeal to the law as the ground of legitimacy is a 
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favoured strategy for dominant groups, including tyrannical ones, who, lacking intrinsically 
valid claims to rule opt to take recourse to legality in justifying their use of arbitrary power. 
 
It is simply implausible that we have an obligation to obey the law regardless of  its moral 
content and nature. For this reason, a sensible view would propose that whether there is an 
obligation to obey the law depends on the moral quality of  law that is enacted. For it is the 
moral quality of law derived from beliefs that the dominant share with the subordinate that 
should oblige the latter to willingly obey the law and give the state the right to rule.  
 
Without this common moral order, the legal rules from which the powerful derive their power 
cannot be justifiable to the subordinate; the powerful can enjoy no moral authority for the 
exercise of their power, whatever its legal validity, and their requirements (rights against 
subordinates that they have an obligation to obey the law) cannot be normatively binding in 
the long term, though they may be successfully imposed on subordinates by force.59
 
If the point of legitimacy is its significance for the character of power relationships, and its 
effect on the behaviour/action of the subordinate, then it follows that the legal rules of power 
must be justifiable to them. The criteria for the justifiability of legal rules to subordinates can 
be classified into the following three moral principles that Matthias Kaufmann in 
Rechtsphilosophie60 puts forward: 
 
 
1. The principle according to which domination serves the protection of the subordinate. 
 
2. The principle that makes any form of consent a condition that anything at all, 
especially obedience, can be demanded from the subordinate. 
 
3. The principle which has as its goal the implementation of justice and other moral 
maxims in the political framework. 
 
According to this classification, the first principle is an aspect of what Kaufmann calls 
functional legitimacy, the second principle an aspect of affirmative legitimacy, while the third 
is an aspect of  moral legitimacy. We will follow the foregoing classification of legitimacy 
into functional, affirmative and moral legitimacy as providing normative principles or criteria 
to demonstrate when the origin and exercise of state power is legitimate. 
 
 
7.3.2.1. Functional Legitimacy 
 
 
The first form of legitimacy is traceable to the principle in Thomas Hobbes’s political 
writings that the power of the state is legitimate to the extent that it can be shown to fulfil the 
rightful end, purpose or function of providing protection to those subject to the state. As 
Anscombe and Finnis61 make clear, the authority of the state is justified in characteristically 
Aristotelian teleological terms of the end, purpose or function that the state has to fulfil.  
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In the natural state where no  sovereign state exists, human beings are subject to the constant 
threat of conflict that is synonymous with anarchy. Given that human beings in the natural 
state have roughly the same strength and skill, says Hobbes, every human being has the right 
to use his own power for the preservation of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything 
which in his own judgment he shall conceive to be the aptest means to this. It follows thus 
that every human being has a right to everything, including another human being’s body. 
 
Since everyone has a natural right to everything, ‘to possess, use, and enjoy’ anything, to 
invade any other person, it is in effect no better than if no man had a right in respect of his 
physical person, property and freedom to pursue his life-plan or conception of the good life. 
In the natural state with no absolute sovereign state, there is no law, where no law there is no 
justice. There is no right and wrong. Force and fraud are the cardinal virtues in this state.  
 
On account of the lack of security for people’s lives, property and their freedom, the 
domination by a sovereign state is therefore justified and citizens have a corresponding 
obligation to obey the authoritative directives of the state, in Hobbes’s view, because the 
domination of the state is able to meet the anthropologically deep-rooted need for internal 
security  against deliberate infringement of rights in respect of physical person or property 
(e.g. against assault or theft), and against non-deliberate damage (e.g. due to negligence). The 
domination of the state also meets the need for security against external injury that covers 
both deliberate harm ( as in acts of war by other states) and non-deliberate damage ( as when 
a home industry suffers from the dumping of excessively cheap foreign goods).62  
 
Internal security is maintained by the keeping of order, that is to say, the inculcation of 
regular modes of behaviour that will guarantee such security. The criminal law, and much of 
the civil law, of a state which protects personal and property rights enables individuals to 
pursue their life plans or conceptions of the good life with reasonable security and 
predictability.63 Law, with its sanctions, is the main method used by the state to give effect to 
the maintenance of  internal security by the keeping of order. Security against external injury 
is pursued by the maintenance of armed forces, the making of treaties and alliances with 
foreign states, and economic measures such as trade agreements and tariffs.64  
 
The maintenance of security and the keeping of order are then always emphasized as the 
original task of political authority when in situations of upheaval and crisis there is a threat to 
life and property,65 as well the freedom to pursue one’s life-plan or conception of the good 
life. Obeying the commands of the state is thus a better way of serving the need for security of 
physical person, property and freedoms of individual members of society subject to a state 
that is able to guarantee order and inner and external peace of the society in which it operates. 
 
Kaufmann66 sees the attraction of the formula for the liberal and the problem for an 
authoritarian interpretation of Hobbes in the fact that this form of legitimacy supplies not only 
a criterion for the justification of  the authority of  the sovereign  state to rule, but also a 
criterion of when the authority of the state cannot make a claim to the obedience of 
individuals subject to the state, that is, when the state is not able to protect its citizens or it 
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effectively endangers them by its failure to guarantee a general situation of  order  and 
security necessary for preserving rights for the free development of  individuals in society. 
 
On account of the fact that this viewpoint absolutely received support from “above”, it 
acquired the heading of “functional legitimacy” in order not to lose sight through fixation on 
the view “from below”, from the vantage point of individuals that is, of the historical as well 
as systematically important pattern of justifying the legitimacy of the state. In the age of 
absolutism the reason of the state had to step behind the interests of those subject to it as is 
well known, which one considered justified, as well as those of the dominant. One only 
justified the violation of the interests of the individual worth protecting with the common 
good, or general interest. This is so in both authoritarian states as well as in democratic states. 
 
One could, therefore, not entirely surrender functional legitimacy “from below” to the 
advantage of the view “from above”, because the guarantee of peace, order and stability itself 
cannot be deemed worth striving for and thus function as an argument for legitimacy. Without 
any connection to the fate of individuals, the guarantee of peace, order and stability offers no 
criterion for distinguishing illegitimate states that effectively endanger their citizens from 
legitimate ones that are able to offer effective protection to their citizens. 
 
Today there is however consensus that a number of regimes still endanger their subjects than 
protect them and are for this reason to be seen as illegitimate. But, the demand not to 
endanger subjects appears in a clear way to be somewhat lowly placed, when one should 
accept it as the only criterion for the recognition of  the legitimacy of a state.67  For it only 
performs a negative function of preventing harm to existing rights or existing well-being and 
does not also perform a positive function of  adding to well-being or of adding new rights. 
 
In the 17th and 18th centuries, liberal democratic theory held that the negative function was the 
sole function of the state. The promotion of pursuit of further positive good was thought to be 
the business of the individual. The individual, according to this minimalist view, should be 
left with as much liberty as possible for that purpose. State action, which takes the form of 
laying down and enforcing laws, restricts liberty, in that its requirement to do or not to do this 
or that limits our freedom to do as we please. The purpose of such laws, it was said, was to 
prevent individuals from encroaching on each other’s rights or liberties. The business of the 
state was to leave to each individual as large an autonomous sphere for the development of 
the citizen. Its interventions should therefore be minimal, limited to the negative function of 
preventing one individual or group from encroaching on the liberty of another.68
 
In the 19th century most western states following the social democratic model added a positive 
function to the negative one of protecting established rights.69 It came to be regarded as a 
responsibility of the state in its organized capacity to raise in some degree for the functional 
legitimacy of interventions of authority the welfare of its members and make more fair  the 
distribution of rights they enjoy beyond the mere protection of life through improved medical 
care, introduction of elementary hygienic measures, the upgrading of infrastructure70 as 
necessary social and economic conditions for the pursuit of their individual life-plans.  
 
The understanding underlying the positive function was that the state should be responsible 
for providing a basic minimum of material welfare and individual members should 
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themselves be responsible for trying to rise above a basic minimum. This consideration 
responds to arguments of the proponents of the minimalist state against an absolutist 
overprotective welfare state that the collectivised delivery of welfare services (health, 
education, pensions and so on) brings about a vast increase in public law that authorizes 
public officials to carry out public plans, thereby investing them with great discretionary 
power over individuals71 and thus taking away their right to autonomous development.  
 
With both the negative and positive functions, the demand is that political domination should 
not be exercised only in the interest of an individual or a class in power, but rather that it 
should be exercised for the common good or in the general interest that involves both the 
negative function of the state of protecting the life, property and freedom of the public subject 
to it, as well as its positive function of the provision of a basic minimum of welfare.  
 
But to be able to decide on controversies about whether domination serves the needs of the 
common good or those of the dominant, the second principle of affirmative legitimacy is seen 
by Kaufmann to be an obvious procedure for that purpose72 which the principle of functional 
legitimacy does not provide to citizens subject to the authority of the state. 
 
For, the reason one has to obey the directives of a legitimate authority, according to the latter 
principle, depends on the belief that obedience is the best way of serving the needs of the 
general interest of those subject to the authority of the state which the state is there to serve. 
This means that those subject to the authority of the state yield to authority the right to serve 
their needs of general interest. Affirmative legitimacy in this sense intends to determine 
whether domination indeed serves the needs of general interest of  citizens of a state. 
 
 
7.3.2.2.  Affirmative Legitimacy.  
 
 
The procedure for this form of legitimacy requires to take the free, unforced consent of those 
subject to the state as a standard and to call on the legal principle volenti non fit iniura, 
according to which no wrong is done to one who desires something if one’s wish is to be 
satisfied, for the justification of domination. This is the development that took place in 
reaction to Hobbes starting with Locke and later Rousseau and Immanuel Kant.73
 
The Hobbesian contract of submission as a basis of domination gives way in the contract 
theoretical formulation of this position for Locke to the agreement and “mutual consent of  
those that form society” (Locke, Second Treatise, XV, 171) This consent can again be 
withdrawn by the ruled from the order of domination by the state if the ruled believe that the 
state no longer fulfils its negative and positive functions and is therefore not legitimate. 
 
The obvious question with respect to affirmative legitimacy here is, how consent or the lack 
of it allows itself to be ascertained. The subject of consent is a confusing one. If by consent to 
power we mean a condition of voluntary agreement to it, then what counts as voluntary and 
what sort of evidence is needed to demonstrate such agreement ? Simply fulfilling the 
requirement of the powerful to obey the law is not enough, since obedience can be maintained 
by coercion. What sort of evidence, then, will count to ascertain consent or the lack of it ?74
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We wish to agree with Beetham here that what is important about consent is not the condition 
of voluntary agreement, but the specific actions that publicly express it, and that these are 
important because they confer legitimacy on the powerful, not because they provide evidence 
about people’s beliefs. They confer legitimacy for they constitute public expressions by the 
subordinate of their consent to the power relationship and their subordinate position within 
it.75
 
What sort of actions, then, will confer legitimacy? If we may ask. The answer of the 
traditional liberal, individualist view embodied in the practice of Western societies, has 
typically been that consent is given to a condition of subordination only by a specific and 
voluntary promise, agreement or contract on the part of each individual in person, say of the 
worker to the employer at the time of employment, of the woman to her husband at the point 
of marriage. Necessary conditions for the voluntariness of such an agreement are not only that 
it should not be coerced, but that there should be a choice available between contract 
parties.76
 
As regards the political sphere, the early liberal approach to consent was to develop the 
contract model into the idea of social contract made by all individuals at the original 
establishment of  the state and government.  The first form of social contract goes back a long 
way in history to the time of Plato. It is called a contract of citizenship, a contract made by 
each individual citizen with the state or law. An implicit contract of this kind is described as 
the ground of political obligation in Plato’s dialogue, Crito. The argument is put forward that 
if a person remains in a particular state and enjoys its privileges, then she has an obligation to 
the state to obey its law.77 Corresponding to this obligation is the state’s right to her 
obedience. 
 
However, as Simmons argues, it is implausible that the subjects of states have voluntarily 
committed themselves to obey the law. Actual undertakings would be required, not merely 
hypothetical ones, for hypothetical ones do not bind us. And although some naturalized 
citizens might have consented to obey the law in the process of becoming citizens, and some 
citizens might have undertaken to obey the law in some other specific context, such as in 
course of swearing an oath, very few other citizens have so committed themselves. To commit 
oneself voluntarily to obey the law would be to do something with the intention to obligate 
oneself to obey, and very few citizens can be said to have promised this.78
 
The problematical status of this fictional social contract has led to a water-down version of the 
social contract theory that is designed to avoid the difficulties of the former. The doctrine of 
consent is this water-down version of the social contract. According to this doctrine, the 
authority of the state rests on the popular consent of the subjects. The idea of popular consent 
played an important part in the development of parliamentary institutions in England. 
 
The development originated in the Middle Ages with the idea that property owners could not 
be taxed by the King without their consent. This led to the appointment of representatives, 
who consented on behalf of the property owners to the raising of taxes and who took the 
opportunity, when they met for the purpose, to make grievances known to the king. Elements 
of this procedure are still retained in the usages of the UK Parliament today. All acts of 
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Parliament state that the Queen legislates ‘by and with the advice and consent’ of 
Parliament.79  
 
This means that a form of consent is essential for the authority of a particular law. The idea 
that consent supplies the ground of political obligation to obey the law, is commonly 
associated with the political philosophy of John Locke, though in fact Locke’s theory includes 
also a kind of double contract. On the Lockean model, as Simmons demonstrates this, a 
mutual consent of members of society transfers to the collectivity those rights whose exercise 
by a central authority is necessary for a viable political society. Governments are legitimate 
only if they have been entrusted by the state with the exercise of those same rights.80
 
Since those subject to the state have only agreed to give up their natural right to exercise their 
legislative and executive powers of the law of nature to the government as a trust that it will 
protect their natural rights to person, property and freedom (as well as provide a basic 
minimum of welfare) they have no duty to obey authority once government abuses the trust 
placed in it to protect natural rights of the ruled. In other words, the consent given to 
government to obey its authority can be withdrawn from it by the ruled. 
 
Locke in fact thinks of the act of consent of those subject to the state and government as an 
act of promising, so that this theory is still one of contract. The difficulty with the contract 
theory, as we have seen, is that most members of a state cannot be said literally to have given 
a promise. But if consent does not imply a promise, then it does not impose an obligation. It is 
the problematical status of the fictional social contract that has led to a different approach 
today, which focuses instead on elections by majority decision as the source of legitimacy. 
 
The convention within contemporary liberal democracies is that it is the act of taking part in 
elections that secures the obligations of citizens in principle to obey it. Here again, it is for 
Beetham the existence of  a secret electoral choice by majority decision between candidates 
for public office (both government and parliament or only parliament), their programmes and 
parties that is crucial. In other words, in government as in employment or marriage, it is 
making an agreement to subordination under conditions of choice between alternatives that 
confers legitimacy on the exercise of power, and a corresponding obligation to obey.81  
 
Elections are not only in a sense an aristocratic procedure for the occupation of public offices. 
They are in a full sense democratic, since the assumed equality of all is occasionally practiced 
through the opportunity that is made available to all eligible citizens to occupy public office. 
An equally weighty argument for free and secret elections is the possibility for the expression 
of consent to and dissent against a government depending on whether or not its rule fulfils the 
functions of the protection of  citizens and the provision of a basic minimum welfare to them. 
 
Though the elections are a liberal and individualist model of consent because it is familiar and 
paradigmatic for modern society, it does not however follow that this is the only form of 
action that can demonstrate consent or confer legitimacy on the powerful, or that there are 
other types of action which, while failing to meet the liberal criteria for voluntary agreement 
may not have or have had a legitimating force within the conventions of different societies. 
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Actions which are historically seen as conferring or confirming legitimacy, and which 
continue even within a liberal society, albeit in a subordinate role, include swearing an oath of 
allegiance, taking part in consultations or negotiations with the powerful that result in 
agreement, public acclamation whether of a monarch upon coronation or of a popular leader 
at a notable event and taking part in mass mobilisation in a regime’s cause.82
 
First, swearing an oath of allegiance is of course a form of promise, but differs from the 
liberal model in that typically there is no choice about whom a person is to obey. However, in 
societies where such oaths are required of subordinates, the lack of choice has not been 
regarded as making the promise any less binding. In traditional systems of rule such an oath 
given by the most important figures in society was a significant element in the legitimation of 
the leader, chief or monarch. It carried an exemplary force for others, and a binding one for 
those who took part; for the ruler to show that s/he had the consent of those who carried 
weight in the society or in its different localities was an important aspect of legitimacy.83
 
A second type of action expressive of consent which Beetham mentions is that of taking part 
in consultations or negotiations with the powerful, either about aspects of policy or about the 
terms on which a particular service is rendered, which culminate in agreement. In some 
respects this resembles a contract, but it does not entail any choice about who the superior will 
be. Yet it carries with it, not only a commitment on the part of the subordinate to support the 
policy or observe the terms agreed, but an implication that they acknowledge the authority of 
the powerful more generally, and this act of public recognition itself confers legitimacy.84
 
A third type of action expressive of consent, which differs from the others in that it does not 
carry suggestions of promising, is the public acclamation whether of a monarch upon 
coronation or of a popular leader at a rally or other notable event. Demonstration of popular 
support and mass mobilisation in a regime’s cause confer legitimacy in the age of  popular 
sovereignty; and the continued mobilisation of the people to help carry out its policies can  be 
an effective alternative to the electoral process as a means of popular legitimation. This is the 
expression of consent through mass participation in activity clearly supportive of a regime.85
 
For the expression of consent through mass participation in activity clearly supportive of a 
regime to be possible, there is need for a doctrine of limited government, that is, of the 
principled limitations on the possible scope of  the authority of government. Consent can 
legitimise authority only within the bounds of, or subject to the limitations articulated by the 
doctrine. Consent to the power of  government beyond these limits would not legitimise it.  
 
It seems reasonable according to Raz’s view that a doctrine of  limited government has two 
parts. One part would say that it does not have authority to do what it cannot do efficiently. In 
more positive terms, a limited government has authority to do what it can do efficiently. The 
other part would set limits to what it is in principle authorized to do, that is, it would exclude 
from its jurisdiction certain matters even if it handled them efficiently, basic rights. 86
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In other words, individuals, at least those considered to be sufficiently rational and 
responsible to qualify for rights, are seen as ‘sovereign authorities’ over questions as what 
religious belief to profess, what family life to lead, what lawful career to pursue, and so forth.  
The right to make such decisions for oneself may be construed as a right against individuals 
or the state, but the point is that others would be wrong to use coercion, manipulation, 
deception, etc., to interfere with an agent’s efforts to make and carry out these decisions.87 
The need for limitations on the possible scope of authority makes moral legitimacy  
necessary. 
 
 
7.3.2.3.  Moral Legitimacy. 
 
 
According to this form of legitimacy, the power of the state is justifiable to citizens subject to 
it if it is based on moral norms that they share with the dominant. On this view, the power of 
the state cannot then be based on a single comprehensive religious, philosophical and moral 
conception of the meaning, value and purpose of human life or conception of the good life, or 
its associated philosophical accounts of truth on which there has been no agreement, at least 
since the Reformation, and which would require the oppressive use of state power by those 
holding it to impose it on those who reject it and thus restrict or suppress their  basic rights. 
 
A single comprehensive religious, philosophical and moral conception of the good human 
life, or its associated philosophical accounts of truth requiring the oppressive use of state 
power to maintain it and thus restricting or suppressing the basic rights of citizens subject to 
state power cannot be willingly and freely supported by at least a substantial majority of its 
politically active citizens holding different comprehensive conceptions of the good life.88
 
Thus, argues Rawls, the power of the state is to be justifiable to citizens subject to it if it is 
based on a moral conception of justice worked out for the ‘basic structure’ or the main 
political, social, and economic institutions of a democratic state,89 that a vast majority of 
politically active citizens come to freely and willingly support as rational from the standpoint 
of their own comprehensive views because they consider it worthy of their agreement.  
 
What this means is that the power of the state is justifiable to citizens subject to it only if the 
moral or political conception of justice on which it is based is such that we could justify it to 
all citizens in terms that each of them can accept, no matter what comprehensive view of the 
good life each of them affirms. For it to be justifiable to citizens subject to the power of the 
state, a political conception of justice providing a public basis of justification must be 
formulated in terms of certain fundamental intuitive ideas citizens share with the dominant.90
 
The fundamental ideas making up the moral and political conception of justice are derived 
from such settled convictions (of community) as the belief in religious toleration and the 
rejection of slavery as inherently unjust. We look, then, to the public political culture of a 
democratic society including its main institutions and the historical traditions of their own 
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interpretation, as the shared fund of implicitly recognised basic ideas and principles.91 These 
ideas are used to articulate and order in a principled way the political values of a democratic 
regime, thereby specifying the aims of  the constitution and the limits it must respect.  
 
It is hoped that the conception of political justice arising from these political values will be 
congenial to the firmly held conviction of both those subject to state power and the dominant. 
Rawls expresses this by saying that a political conception of justice, to be acceptable, must be 
in accordance with the considered convictions of members of  a democratic society.92
 
The fundamental intuitive ideas worked out into a political conception of justice include those 
of society as a fair system of cooperation over time. Within this overarching fundamental 
intuitive idea is the idea of citizens as free persons, in virtue of their powers of reason, thought 
and judgment connected with those powers, and citizens as equal persons in virtue of their 
having these powers to the requisite degree to be fully co-operating members of society.93  
 
In connection with the intuitive idea of citizens as free and equal persons, Rawls further 
describes citizens as having two moral powers that would enable them to be normal and fully 
cooperating members of society, namely: a capacity for a sense of justice, as the capacity to 
understand , to apply, and to act from the public conception of justice which characterizes the 
fair terms; and, a capacity for a conception of the good, as the capacity to form and to revise 
and rationally pursue what they consider worthy or of  value over a complete life.94
 
Together, the foregoing ideas provide the requisite framework that specifies the primary 
goods citizens need as free and equal persons. Citizens require roughly the same primary 
goods, that is, the same basic rights, liberties, and opportunities for the development and full 
exercise of their two moral powers, as well as the same all purpose means such as income and 
wealth for the advancement of their conceptions of  what they consider to be a good life.95
 
A specification of  citizens’ primary goods leads to the idea of constitutional essentials or the 
aims that a constitution is to achieve, for they concern the fundamental principles that 
determine the “basic structure” of the political process. A fuller idea of the content of a liberal 
conception of justice specifying the aims that a constitution is to achieve is, for Rawls, this: 
 
1. Political authority must respect the rule of law and a conception of the good that 
includes the good of every citizen; 
 
2. Liberty of conscience and freedom of thought is to be guaranteed, and this extends to 
the liberty to follow one’s conception of the good, provided it does not violate the 
principles of justice; 
 
3. Equal political rights are to be assured, and in addition freedom of the press and 
assembly, the right to form political parties, including the idea of a loyal opposition; 
 
4. Fair equality of opportunity and free choice of occupation are to be maintained against 
a background of diverse opportunities; and 
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5. All citizens are to be assured a fair share of material means so that they are suitably 
independent and can take advantage of their equal basic rights, liberties and fair 
opportunities.96 
 
Thus, the equal political liberties and freedom of speech and thought enable citizens to 
develop and exercise their moral powers by participating in society’s political life and by 
assessing the justice and effectiveness of its laws and social policies; and liberty of conscience 
and freedom of association enable citizens develop and exercise their moral powers in 
forming, revising, and rationally pursuing their own conceptions of the good life.97
 
The idea of the same primary goods is the practicable public basis on which interpersonal 
comparisons of citizen’s well being can be made. The fulfilment of appropriate claims to 
primary goods by the institutions of the basis structure is publicly accepted as advantageous 
and thus counted as improving citizens’ situation for the purposes of political justice. 
 
Though Rawls’ political conception of justice may be considered to be inappropriate for 
hierarchically-ordered non-western societies, we would still want to contend that the settled 
convictions that this conception reflects, like the belief in religious toleration and the rejection 
of all forms of oppression, are today gaining more currency in non-western cultures as worth 
striving for in the quest for lasting peace and stability in these societies. 
 
All cultures accept in principle the attempt to put into practice the ideal of justice. To this  
belongs under the greatly accepted premise of a far-reaching equality of humans in a 
politically relevant area the emancipation movement against racial and sexual discrimination 
and discrimination against minorities. There also belongs to this the exertion for just social 
relations - differences over the question of what just social relations are, notwithstanding - as 
well as the sustainable use of the environment by current generations that leaves enough 
resources for later generations, that is intergenerational justice.98
 
Of course, it can be pointed out here that residence within the territory of a particular just state 
does not ground any special relationship between the state and those subject to it, since all 
human beings, as moral agents, have a natural positive duty to support the justice and 
happiness of others elsewhere, irrespective of where they are and to which state they belong. 
 
In addition, it can be pointed out that the mere fact that someone resides within the claimed 
territory of a just state to which he is subject seems inadequate to ground any special duty of 
obedience to that state and its laws. For mere residence of that sort does no guarantee receipt 
of any of  the benefits and participation in any of the cooperative schemes that make loyalty - 
or even obedience to the law – appear morally compulsory. 
 
But it can also be convincingly argued that where residents benefit from (or in other ways 
meaningfully interact with) a particular just state, which is of course more typical, it is as a 
                                                 
96 John Rawls, “The Idea of an  Overlapping Consensus,” in  John Rawls: Collected  
   Papers, ed., Samuel Freeman, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999, p.440.   
    
97 John Rawls, “The Domain of  the Political and Overlapping Consensus,“ p. 495. 
    
98 Matthias Kaufmann, Rechtsphilosophie, p. 249. 
 112
result of this kind of interaction, not any general duty to support or obey just states, that 
residents have a special obligation of compliance to that particular state.99
 
The foregoing classification of legitimacy into functional, affirmative and moral legitimacy 
provides normative principles or criteria by which the exercise of state power can be 
demonstrated by a priori argument whether it is legitimate or not legitimate, that is, whether 
the state has the right to rule or does not have the right to rule. Having clarified the normative 
criteria by which it can be demonstrated that the exercise of state power is legitimate or not, 
we now move on to discuss what is precisely involved in the state’s right to rule. 
 
 
8. The Right to Rule 
 
 
The portrayal of the state as having the right to rule is intended to lay claim to a body of 
rights, the rights in which the state’s legitimacy would consist. This way of putting things 
raises the question of what these rights in which the state’s legitimacy consists are. To answer 
this question, the standard starting point is the American jurist Wesley N. Hohfeld (1879-
1918) who saw the phrase ‘a right’ used with different meanings in the legal literature. 
 
To avoid the resulting confusion, Hohfeld distinguished four meanings of this phrase.100 He 
viewed rights as legal relations having “jural correlatives” and “jural opposites,” though this 
typology has also been extended to the sphere of moral philosophy in recent years. 
 
A claim-right is the presence of a duty owed to a person by some other person or people in 
general. A person A has a claim-right to x, and against person B, if B has a duty to assist A in 
obtaining x. Thus, A has a claim-right to life, and against B, if B has a correlative duty to 
refrain from taking A’s life or a duty not to interfere with A’s life. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
A privilege is the absence of a duty owed to a particular person or to people in general to 
refrain from doing a certain thing. A has a privilege or liberty-right to x, and against B, if B 
has no claim-right that A not do or obtain x. Hence, a state by virtue of its expertise and its 
ability to secure social coordination has a privilege or liberty-right to provide common 
facilities and services in improving the life of its citizens and meeting their needs. 
 
A power is the ability that a person has to alter the rights and obligations between him and 
other people by performing some (permitted) action. A has a power or power-right to x with 
regard to B, if A is in a legal or other justified position to effect a change in some relevant 
status of B, and B has a correlative liability to undergo this change. Thus, a religious official 
has a power-right to perform a marriage ceremony between a man and a woman, so that their 
legal status is changed from being unmarried to being married to each other. 
 
An immunity is simply the absence of a relevant power in others. A has an immunity or 
immunity-right to x against B, if A is free or exempt from B’s legal or other justified power 
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with regard to x. Thus, A has an immunity to being forced to testify against himself in a 
criminal case, and the state has a correlative disability to force him to testify. 
 
These distinctions clarify the many usages of the phrase ‘a right’; but they also leave many 
conceptual problems unresolved. For instance, what do all these types of ‘rights’ have in 
common? Hohfeld said they are all “legal advantages”; but this is vague. Other problems arise 
from the very sharpness of his distinctions. To deal with this, one suggestion has been that 
rights must be viewed not as diverse Hohfeldian types taken separately but rather as 
“bundles” of these types taken together, with claim-rights being the most important kind of 
rights, especially because of their stringency as entailing strict duties to forbear or assist.101
 
Equipped with this toolkit, we shall take advantage of the distinctions Hohfeld makes to 
clarify the usages taken together of the phrase ‘a right’ to apply them to the state with regard 
to its right to rule in order for us to demonstrate the rights and powers that a state would claim 
to have. The rights a state would claim to have in order for it to have the right to rule are 
minimally those it must exercise if it is to impose and to enforce its law on persons within its 
largely territorially-bound legal jurisdiction and not to be interfered with by persons, groups, 
or states outside the state’s jurisdiction and thus be able to control its geographical territory. 
 
Often, the rights the state claims in asserting its legitimacy go far beyond this minimum. But 
whether a state’s claims are modest or extravagant, these rights invariably fall into the 
following three categories of  the kinds of things involved in the ruling of a state. 
 
 
(1) The rights to command persons who fall within the state’s claimed legal jurisdiction; 
 
 
(2) The rights of non-interference against persons, groups, or states without/outside the 
state’s jurisdiction in the exercise of  those rights claimed in the first category. 
 
 
(3) The rights to have control over a particular geographical territory (whose extent 
largely determines the scope of the state’s jurisdiction).102 
 
 
The rights that a state claims in these three categories together define its conception of  
sovereignty, “ which expresses internally the supremacy of the governmental institutions and 
externally the supremacy of a state as a legal person.”103  
 
We want now to specify the contents of the three categories of rights claimed by a state, as put 
forward by Simmons, so that we can also move on to specify the relations that might be 
thought to hold between the rights in these  three categories. 
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8.1. The Rights to Command Persons within the State’s Legal Jurisdiction 
 
 
 
In the first category of rights that it has over its subjects, a reasonable state claims: 
 
 
(a) the right to exclusively impose the law on those within its jurisdiction (that is, on  
            its subjects, in one natural sense of that term); 
 
(b) the right to be obeyed by its subjects (that is, the right to have persons within its  
 jurisdiction perform its imposed legal duties); and 
 
(c) the right to threaten all subjects with the legal use of coercion and to use such coercion  
 against non-compliers. 
 
 
The first of these rights, the legislative power of the state to exclusively impose the law on 
those within its jurisdiction, is generally taken to be limited to making only tolerably just ( or, 
at the very least, procedurally legitimate) law. 
 
The relevant jurisdiction the state claims is always defined principally in terms of the territory 
in which it has the right to exclusively make law for, and enforce that law on, those within it 
who are subject to the state. But the class of subjects within a state’s legal jurisdiction is 
seldom thought to be identical to the class of persons within its claimed territory. 
 
States normally claim some, typically partial, jurisdiction over persons outside of their 
territories (for instance, their citizens abroad or those who have committed crimes against 
their citizens). And they claim only limited jurisdiction over some persons within their 
territories (for instance, diplomats or visiting aliens who, while generally held to the 
observance of the laws – such as parking or traffic, tax, or military service laws). 
 
These rights in the first category – rights to make and enforce law within a territory and to be 
obeyed by those subject to the law - are normally taken to correlate with the obligation of 
subjects: obligations not to attempt rival legislation or enforcement, to fulfil lawfully imposed 
requirements, and not to resist the state’s lawfully employed coercive powers.104
 
It is not plausible, however, as earlier alluded to, that subjects have a duty to obey the law 
regardless of its content and nature. For this reason, a sensible view would propose that 
whether subjects have a duty to obey a law depends on the law’s moral quality. On this view, 
we would consider then the idea that whether subjects have a duty to obey the law depends on 
its being the morally unobjectionable law of a legitimate state, insofar as the state does not 
violate claim-rights of its citizens or that it observes limits to the exercise of its power. 
 
If  so, then a legitimate state would have a qualified power to put its subjects under a duty to 
fulfil lawfully imposed requirements and, and not to resist the state’s lawfully enforced 
coercive powers by enacting a morally unobjectionable law requiring them to do it.105 To 
explain this, we need to explain the state’s right to legislate, which is a privilege or liberty-
right. 
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A state is not morally free to enact any law whatsoever, Copp argues, for individuals have 
claim-rights that would be violated by certain laws, including laws interfering with the 
freedom of religion, and perhaps laws imposing the death penalty. If individuals have a right 
to choose their own religion, this implies that a state has no privilege to interfere with their 
choice of religion. A state has no privilege to enact or enforce laws that violate their claims.106
 
Nevertheless, the idea that a state is entitled to enforce and enact law can be understood as the 
idea that there is a sphere within which it has a privilege or liberty-right to legislate. And it 
surely must be true, if a state is legitimate, that there is a sphere of competence within which 
it has a privilege to legislate such that the state would not violate any of its subject’s 
claims.107
 
We are thus able to demonstrate by  a priori argument that a legitimate state has the power to 
put its subjects under a duty to obey the law and not to resist the state’s lawfully enforced 
coercive powers insofar as the state enacts a law which is able to carefully observe the moral 
limits for the exercise of  the power that it holds by not violating the claims of its subjects. 
 
The fact that a state would possess such a power distinguishes it from an illegitimate state. 
The duty to comply with the morally unobjectionable law of a legitimate state gives its law a 
special normative status as compared with an illegitimate state. A legitimate state would also 
have the power to make it permissible for its officials to enforce the law simply by enacting 
laws that provide for the enforcement of law, provided again that they do not violate subjects’ 
claim-rights. 108
 
The above view implies that a legitimate state can in principle change the moral status of 
actions. A legitimate state can put its subjects under duties to perform actions that, in the 
absence of law, would merely have been morally permissible, provided that the relevant laws 
are not morally objectionable or do not violate claims of those subject to them. For instance, 
we are under a duty to pay the taxes required by the state assuming the relevant tax laws do 
not violate the claims of individuals to a limited right to property as against the right to the 
primary goods that are needed by every human being for the actualisation of his life goals. 
 
The view also implies that a legitimate state can place its officials under duties to do things 
that would otherwise have been prohibited, provided that the relevant laws are not morally 
objectionable. For example, in the absence of law, it would be wrong to exact money from 
people under the guise of taxation. But the law of a legitimate state can give officials 
permission and a duty to tax people, so long as coercive tax laws are morally unobjectionable. 
 
A legitimate state has a power to put its subjects within its legal jurisdiction under a duty to 
obey the law, but it does not exercise this power each and every time that it enacts a law. 
Many laws are not strictly enforced, and some of the less important laws are enforced merely 
by threatened penalties, rather than by threatened punishment. Thus, we would say that for a 
state to exercise the power to put subjects within its jurisdiction under a duty to obey the law,  
it must not only enact a law, but must enforce the law by threatening to punish violations.109
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The rights in the first category - rights to make and enforce law and to be obeyed - do not only 
correlate with the obligations of persons within the jurisdiction of the state. They also 
correlate with the obligations of persons, groups, or states outside the claimed legal 
jurisdiction of the state. Here the first category of rights makes contact with the second, with 
the rights against persons, groups, and states outside the legal jurisdiction of the state.110
 
 
8.2. The Right to Non-interference by Persons, Groups, or States outside  the State’s  
Jurisdiction 
 
 
The state claims the right not to be interfered with by persons, groups, or states outside its 
legal jurisdiction in the exercise of those rights claimed in the first category. The state claims 
rights to non-interference, self-determination, self-government, or external sovereignty.  
 
The state’s right to non-interference by other persons, groups, or states outside its jurisdiction 
in the exercise of its first-category legislative and executive rights is substantiated in 
international relations by the state’s recognition of the exercise of the legislative and 
executive powers of others within their jurisdiction.111 Crucially, this right of the state is an 
aspect of its moral relation to others based on the assumption of  the equality between 
states.112
 
A legitimate state’s claimed legal jurisdiction or sphere of privilege is presumably one within 
which it could exercise its first-category legislative and executive powers without violating 
any claim of other persons, groups or states since they have no claim to legislate and enforce 
laws on persons within a legitimate state’s claimed legal jurisdiction. 
 
Plausibly, too, a legitimate state would have a claim against other states that they do not 
interfere with its governing within this sphere of privilege. This means that it would have a 
claim that it not be interfered with in governing its residents and territory. 
 
Thus, a legitimate state does not merely have a privilege to govern those within its claimed 
legal jurisdiction; it has a “protected privilege,” a privilege that is protected from interference 
by the duty of others to respect the states’ exercise of its first-category legislative and 
executive rights113, as well as Locke’s federative “power of… peace, leagues and transactions 
with all the persons and communities without/outside the commonwealth”(II, 146).  
 
The need for peaceful and cooperative relations with other states has become even more 
important in an increasingly technologically, economically and politically interconnected 
global world that requires the concerted efforts of both state and non-state actors to solve 
problems that go beyond the boundaries of the nation-state (i.e. international terrorism, 
insecurity of financial markets, global warming, and its effects of drought and famine, cross-
border drug and human trafficking, global pestilences like bird flu etc.). 
 
It is also because of the need for peaceful and cooperative relations with other relations that it 
is sensible to attribute to a legitimate state the immunity-right to having any of its rights 
extinguished by any action of any other state using force, or for that matter, by any group or 
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person outside its claimed legal jurisdiction. If its rights could simply be extinguished, they 
would provide no moral protection. For example, if its claim to non-interference could be 
extinguished by another state, it would not be a significant barrier to interference. 
 
The sovereignty of  a legitimate state is its immunity to having its exercise of its first-category 
legislative and executive rights within its legal jurisdiction as well as its federative power in 
its relation with other states extinguished by any other states, through the use of force, plus its 
claim against other states that they not interfere with its governing its residents within its 
claimed legal jurisdiction. The only exception to this is when states are allowed to intervene 
on humanitarian grounds, with the support of the United Nations Security Council, to allow 
states to address a disaster caused by a state’s grave and large scale violation of fundamental 
human rights and thus fulfil the duty to support the justice of a state as well as its citizens. 
 
It is also worth adding that a legitimate state presumably also has the moral power to modify 
and perhaps to limit the exercise of its own legislative and executive rights over a range of 
affairs by giving up part of  these rights to a higher authority of a supranational organization 
such as the European Union through membership of the union. For example, members of the 
European Unions have altered by treaty their rights to control movements across their 
borders.114
 
 
 
8.3. The Right to Control a Particular Geographical Territory. 
 
 
 
We mostly think of a state’s territory, of course, in largely positivist terms. Thus, a state’s 
territory is that portion of the earth’s surface acknowledged to “belong” to the state by the 
“world community” or by an appropriate international agency115; or, following Weber, we 
think of a state’s territory as the area in which it has a monopoly on the ultimate use of  force. 
 
But such accounts either ignore altogether or merely push one step back questions about the 
moral bases for a state’s claim to that portion of the earth’s surface in which it does in fact 
exercise largely unchallenged control. And we know that the actual means by which any 
existing state has established its territorial claims have largely been through coercion.  
 
Therefore, though it might seem that political philosophers should leave to one side questions 
about the legitimacy of states’ territorial claims for it to accommodate itself to the real world 
if it is to avoid reasonable charges of utopianism, we should not simply accept as a datum for 
political philosophy the basic and virtually unchallengeable fact that the world is made of 
states that have territories. On account of the origin of most modern states, the territorial 
claims that modern states make are often controversial, contested and plainly unjust.116
 
A legitimate state, therefore, would have more than simply a positivistic jurisdiction that 
consists in a complex non-moral historical and sociological fact about the territory and the 
relationships among its residents. It would have a moral jurisdiction or authority over its 
territory and over subjects within its territory. There are at least three aspects to this.117
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To begin with, a state is territorial in the sense that it imposes and enforces its law on all those 
who reside within its territory. Though a state normally claims some, typically partial, 
jurisdiction over persons outside its territory (for instance, its citizens abroad or those who 
have committed crimes against their citizens). In addition a state claims only limited 
jurisdiction on non-residents (for instance diplomats or visitors). A legitimate state would 
have the moral authority to impose and enforce its law on largely all those within its territory. 
 
Second, states presume that their authority over their territory includes rights to full control 
over land and resources within the territory that are not privately owned. This right 
presumably includes the privilege to enact a regime of property law, including laws governing 
the transfer of property, prohibiting the use of force or fraud. 
 
States also presume that their authority over their territory includes rights to tax and regulate 
uses of  property which is privately owned within the state’s claimed territory. This is based 
on the recognition of the limitation to private property rights. A legitimate state would have a 
privilege to enact and enforce laws restricting owners’ use of land, laws regulating the 
exploitation of mineral resources, laws restricting dangerous activities in populated areas, and 
so on in order to protect its territory and its resources for posterity, as Rawls reasons.118
 
A further respect in which states are territorial is that they claim to have the right to control 
access to their territories across their borders (which, of course, involves as well certain quite 
direct rights against persons outside their claimed legal jurisdiction from our second category 
of rights). For our notion of  a state is of a thing that governs a bounded territory and that does 
at least claim to have the privilege to control access to its territory. 
 
At this point, we are only concerned with what legitimacy would consist in, and our claim is 
that a legitimate state would have a privilege to control movement across its borders. But we 
have not shown how the state’s privilege to control movement across its borders can be taken 
to be morally justified at all relative to the first and second categories of rights. 
 
It is therefore important to show how the three categories of rights claimed by the state might  
be taken to be justified relative to one another. There is need to demonstrate the nature and 
basis of the state’s rights to rule its members and territory without interference. For this 
purpose we are going to claw back to the societal needs justification of the state’s right to rule 
that has its origins in the functional legitimacy of the state. 
 
 
 
 
9. The Societal Needs Moral Justification of  the Legitimacy of State Power. 
 
 
 
We now develop the societal needs view of  the legitimacy of state power. According to this 
view, the state is justifiable to citizens subject to it by the currency of moral norms in society 
derived from settled convictions of the community, say the belief in religious toleration and 
the rejection of all forms of oppression as inherently unjust, that they share with the dominant, 
where the fact that they share them enables society to get along and efficiently meet its needs. 
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The fact that citizens subject to the state and the dominant share moral norms of the same 
basic rights, liberties and opportunities for the development and full exercise of the two moral 
powers of a capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity for a conception of the good, as 
well as the same all purpose means such as income and wealth for the advancement of their 
particular conceptions of  the good life, facilitates the society’s needs for continued existence 
in its normatively determined identity, needs for beneficial cooperation among the 
subordinate and dominant, and needs for peaceful and cooperative relations with 
neighbouring societies based on the principles of  liberty and equality of societies or states. 
 
The fact that the subordinate share with the dominant norms current in society derived from 
settled convictions of the community also facilitates the efficient coordination by the state of 
the efforts of members of society for them to secure public goods and social needs. In this 
sense, coordination is distinct from cooperation which is governed by shared norms, which 
when specified into constitutional essentials or rules and regulations, enable free and equal 
persons to be fully cooperating members of society over time. Coordination is activity that is 
brought to function in a socially concerted way by ‘orders issued by some central authority’119 
of  the state, so that benefits can be secured in a way which is agreed to by all as fair or just. 
 
It is evident enough that a society that is organized into a state, or at least included in a state,  
will tend to do better at meeting the needs of society than it otherwise could expect to do. This 
view rings true at least for current societies in the world which are the result of the division of 
the world into states. The formation of a state can lead to the existence of social fault lines 
between its population and the populations of its neighbours such that its population comes to 
qualify as a society. In other cases, however, social fault lines may not parallel political 
borders and societies may not have states, but may come to be included in a state. 
 
A society is a population comparable in size and in social and economic complexity to the 
population of a state. A society has a multigenerational history. It is characterized by a 
relatively self-contained network of social relationships, such as relationships of family, 
friendship and commerce, and by norms of cooperation and coordination. It is comprehensive 
of  the entire population of permanent residents of a relevant territory, with the exception of 
recent arrivals who may not yet fit into the group’s network of social relationships.120
 
What makes Copp think that a society organized into a state, or that is at least included in a 
state, will tend to do better at satisfying its basic needs than it otherwise could expect to do is 
that a state is after all essentially the administrative apparatus of a legal system. Therefore, to 
think that societies could do better at meeting their needs in the absence of states, one would 
have to think that societies could do better in the absence of law which is certainly 
doubtful.121  This doubt already found expression in the thoughts of the ancient Greek thinker, 
Aristotle, who, like Plato, believed that society originally grew out of human need : 
 
Man, when perfected is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, 
he is the worst of all.122  
 
Though not as extensive as the modern state, the Greek polis or city-state was seen by ancient 
Greek thinkers as providing the requisite social, economic, political and legal framework in 
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which man could not only satisfy his physical needs in cooperation with other members of 
society, but more so realise his natural moral and intellectual capabilities. Similarly, Hobbes 
later claimed that, in the absence of a common power, ‘there is no law: where no law no 
injustice’. Force and fraud are, in war, the two cardinal virtues. ‘There is nothing that a person 
can make use of, that may not be a help to him in preserving his life against his enemies; it 
follows that in such a condition, every man has a right to everything,  even to another’s body.’  
 
Therefore, only a state as an administrative apparatus of a legal system can provide security 
against deliberate infringement of rights in respect of person or property (against assault or 
theft) that are necessary for any individual to freely pursue her/his values within society. And 
only a state can efficiently coordinate the efforts of members of society in developing 
common infrastructure for the provision of public goods and services that are available to all 
residents (such as national defence, public safety, clean air, water etc) and in improving the  
welfare and general conditions of development and justice of society that takes into account 
its ability to make use of the environment in a sustainable way that meets the needs of present 
generations without at all compromising its ability to meet the needs of future generations.  
 
The authority of the state is basically justified in terms of  the ends it has to serve. The right to 
rule of the state is the result of the need that human beings have to be ruled, a need that arises 
from the needs of society and its members, the need for society to develop common facilities 
for the provision of public goods and in improving the life of its members. The authority of 
the state is only justified to the extent that it serves the needs of society and its members.123
 
Members of society have a duty to obey the legitimate authority of the state because doing so 
is meant to serve best the needs of society and their own which the state is there to serve. The 
directives of  the legitimate authorities are to be obeyed not because this complies with the 
will of the authorities of the state, but because complying with them is a better way of serving 
the needs of society as well as its members who are subject to the authority of  the state. 
 
We can now see they way in which political authority resembles theoretical authority. Just as 
the word of a theoretical authority or expert is a reason for belief because it attests to the fact 
that there are other reasons for such a belief (its judgment is a reliable guide as to how things 
are), so the directive of a legitimate political authority is a reason for action because it attests 
to the fact that such action would better serve the needs of society and its members.124
 
Raz believes the primary arguments in support of  the authority of the state rely on the 
expertise (or that of its policy-making advisers) on public goods and on its ability to secure 
social coordination. The former is seen most clearly in consumer-protection legislation, the 
regulation of the pharmaceutical industry, laws to secure safety at work or on roads,125 laws 
restricting owners’ use of land, such as zoning laws, laws regulating the exploitation of 
mineral resources, laws restricting dangerous activities in populated areas, and so on. The 
latter is most evident in the provision of  public goods and services. 
 
Without coordination some public good will not be achieved, or if achieved it will be secured 
by imposing  the full burden of securing the good on a smaller group of people, while the 
larger group contributes nothing or less than they should, or even stand in the way of the 
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achievement of the good by their conduct. But it would be unjust to impose the full burden of 
securing the good on a smaller number of people rather than on a larger group.126
 
Therefore, the state can play a crucial role in securing coordination and establishing the 
authority of the state if it is less likely to be biased than those subject to the state themselves 
in judging when there are strong or sufficient reasons for social coordination and has greater 
expertise than the subordinate themselves on the public goods for which the state may need to 
efficiently coordinate the efforts of the subordinate by ensuring that they act in ways that are 
sensitive to the way others are likely to act, so that public goods will be secured, and fairly so.  
 
When the subordinate obey the law, they recognise  the ability of the state to meet the needs 
of society. But for the state to further the satisfaction of  the needs of society by means of law, 
the law must certainly be obeyed with greater likelihood. Moreover, in most circumstances, 
laws must be enforced in order to ensure a greater likelihood that they will be obeyed. This is 
the basic justification of a standard permitting the state to enforce law that observes the moral 
limits for the exercise of its power  by not violating the claim-rights of  its subjects. 
 
But it is a familiar point that the cost of sanctions and of enforcement could be avoided if 
human beings obeyed freely and willingly, as a matter of subscribing to a moral standard that 
required them to obey. The advantage of voluntary compliance with the state’s arrangements 
to realize its members’ needs is the basic justification of a moral standard requiring members 
to obey the law, at least in cases where the law does not violate the claim-rights of  members.  
 
This argument responds to many of the intuitions that drive the argument from the state’s 
efficiency in the coordination of the efforts of members of society, so they do not foil each 
other, and the state is better able to provide them with public goods. The key to it is the 
justification of the state based on the moral norms that those subject to the state share with 
holders of state power, a justification that bridges facts about the performance of a state and 
the moral credentials of a state, thereby overcoming the “fundamental problem” of 
consequentialism that attempts to ground state legitimacy in facts about its performance.127
 
The state is justified, in our view, if  its members as a whole benefit from what it does. And 
what is hereby justified more specifically is a standard that requires members’ obedience to 
law that observes the moral limits in the exercise of state power by not violating the claims of 
those subject to the state, as well as standards that permit the enforcement of the same morally 
unobjectionable laws and that supports the other moral aspects of legitimacy. 
 
According to the societal needs justification of the state, any claims possessed by persons or 
states must ultimately be justified on the basis of the needs of society and those of its 
members. You have a claim just in case some other person has a corresponding obligation; the 
other person has such an obligation only if a moral standard that requires him to act in the 
appropriate way in dealing with you is justified on the basis that its currency in the state 
would promote its ability to meet the needs of  society and of those subject to the state. 
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Indeed, people do have claims of various kinds, including basic liberties. Yet if it is true that 
human beings need to be organized into states, then any claims that exist and that constrain 
the privilege of the state are tailored to ensure that the state retains the ability to enact and 
enforce law, compliance with which will promote its ability to meet the needs of society and 
its members. Thus, people do not have claims that prevent the state from meeting both needs. 
 
Property rights are similar to the other rights people have. That is, property rights are 
restricted in a way that gives the state the privilege to control the use of land within its 
territory, provided that by exercising such control, the state can serve the needs of its current 
generation better without at the same time compromising its ability to meet the needs of  
future generations on account of the obligation that present generations have towards them. 
 
Given certain empirical assumptions, the argument supports institutions of private property. It 
is at least arguable that private ownership gives people incentives to make productive use of 
property just as a state’s privilege to oversee people’s use of their property gives it a stake in 
the long-term protection of its territory and resources for generations to come later. 
 
This brings us to the view that a legitimate state would have a qualified privilege or liberty-
right to control access to its territory. The simplest argument for this thesis turns on the fact 
that at least some of the projects that a state undertakes to serve the needs of  its members, say 
social security, might not be successful without some restriction on access to it. Thus, non-
state members have no claim-right against a legitimate state’s control of access to its territory.  
 
But we can also not ignore the coercive and arbitrary carving of existing territorial boundaries 
driven by the motive of resource exploitation and accumulation and the contribution this made 
to global economic inequality that is reflected in differential life prospects between members 
of rich states in the north and members of poor states in the south which imposes a duty on 
rich states in the north towards improving life prospects of members of poor states in the 
south128 and thus meeting their needs through technological and economic cooperation. 
 
It is because of the need of each state for peaceful and cooperative relations with other states, 
more so in an increasingly interconnected global world that requires the concerted efforts of 
both state and non-state actors coordinated through multilateral international institutions to 
solve problems that go beyond the boundaries of the nation state, that we think that it should 
not have the power-right to interfere with another state’s governing its people and its territory. 
A norm of non-interference would tend to preserve peaceful relations among states. 
 
It is each state’s responsibility, as it were, to serve the needs of its members. Other states have 
no power-right to intervene, except to assist a state whose government is failing in some 
significant way to meet the needs of its members. For these reasons, it is plausible to attribute 
to a state a qualified claim to non-interference by other states. But, in view of the increasing 
interconnectedness of the fate of members of one state with the fate of other states, the claim 
to non-interference is better reinforced through peaceful and cooperative state relations. 
 
Finally, a legitimate state would have an immunity-right to having its claim-right to rule 
extinguished by the action of any other state or person through military intervention, except 
only on humanitarian grounds, and with the legitimate support of a United Nations Security 
Council resolution that gives other states the power-right to address a disaster caused by a 
                                                 
128 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002, pp. 203-204. 
 123
state’s grave and large-scale violation of fundamental human rights and thereby fulfils their 
natural duty to support the justice of  another state and its members in a more active way.  
 
The basis of the state’s claim-right to rule is that the currency of norms attributing to it the 
relevant power-claim, sphere of privilege-claim, and the immunity-claim to interference from 
outside, as well as the qualified power-right of the United Nations’ intervention, all contribute 
to the ability of the state to efficiently meet the need for justice of  society and its members. 
 
If other states, or other persons, had the power to extinguish a state’s claim-rights to rule 
without exceptions, they would only do so without regard for the needs of the members of a 
state. A norm that accorded such a power to others could not be justified on the basis that its 
currency serves the needs of  members of a  particular state and is thus justifiable to them. 
 
This completes the societal needs justification of the state. It rests on a debatable moral 
theory, as well as on contestable efficiency and consequentialist empirical claims, including 
especially, the claim that  human beings need to be organized into states to more efficiently 
coordinate their efforts and serve their needs and for the state to be thereby justifiable to those 
subject to it who are either permanently or temporarily resident within the state. 
 
The argument demonstrates how one could support the thesis that a state is legitimate. It 
illustrates the complexity of the issues and the kinds of claims that might need to be defended 
to defend the claim-right(s) of  the state to rule. In addition, and more controversially, the 
argument supports the plausibility of a presumption that a state has the moral authority to rule. 
 
The conclusion of the argument is that there is a presumption that a state has a claim-right  to 
rule. The argument did not depend on detailed instances that distinguish one state from 
another, so if it supports the legitimacy of any state, it supports the legitimacy of all states. 
 
On this view, an existing state is legitimate, other things being equal, unless the needs of its 
members it governs are so poorly served by it that either its members would be better if they 
viewed themselves as under no moral duty at all to obey the law, not even in cases where the 
law does not violate the claims of citizens subject to the state, or the state would do better  if 
other states viewed themselves as under no duty to interfere with the state’s right to rule. 
 
Matters would have to be very bad for a state not to be legitimate. For even if an existing state 
is legitimate, if things are bad enough, members might be justified overall in disobeying laws 
that violate their claims or basic rights, and other states might be justified in intervening in the 
affairs of  a state in question in the attempt to restore these claims or basic rights. 
 
 
 
9.1.  Conclusion. 
 
 
There has been two sides to our discussion of the quest for the moral authority of the state. To 
start with, there has been the historical side to the quest for the moral authority of the state 
that has involved attempting to uncover the metaphysical foundation of intuitive ideas and 
beliefs from which the modern state  developed up to the present.  
 
What is evident from this is the fact that the metaphysical foundation of  ideas and beliefs 
from which the modern state has grown does not come from the state itself, but is to be found 
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in a two-fold process of secularisation by which the spiritual order of the state that was one 
with the civil order first retained its spiritual autonomy by setting politics on its own course of  
a natural rights development, and by which politics placed itself above the confessional 
dispute of the true faith by making this a private matter of  religion and the individual.  
 
From the belief in the toleration of different religious confessions within a state and the 
rejection of  all forms of oppression grew the first rights of worship and conscience that paved 
the way for the development of a liberal state that plays the instrumental role of providing a 
neutral framework for guaranteeing the fundamental rights of all citizens within its 
jurisdiction. 
 
It is on the basis of the moral norms of the same basic rights, liberties and opportunities for 
the development and full exercise of a person’s moral powers, as well as the same all purpose 
means such as income and wealth for the advancement of a person’s conception of the good 
life that the ruled share with the dominant that the moral authority of the state is built. For the 
currency of these norms in society derived from settled convictions of the community that the 
ruled share with the dominant enables society to get along and efficiently meet its needs.  
 
The currency of such norms in society that the ruled share with the dominant are what make it 
mostly likely that the commands of the state will come to be freely and willingly obeyed by a 
substantial majority of its politically active citizens holding different conceptions of the good.  
 
However, though the state comes to be recognised as better able to meet the needs of society 
and those of its members by virtue of  the expertise of its policy makers to perform certain 
functions better than individuals, the quest for the moral authority of the state cannot be 
complete without a consideration of  a theory of participatory government in society whereby 
every member of society is made to see his well being as tied up with the prosperity of others. 
The development of such a theory has been the aim of Rousseau’s political philosophy and 
needs to be developed further. 
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